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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the significance of ritual inoperativity for political theology.
Drawing from representative interpreters of biblical/traditional sources, contemporary
philosophical reflection, and practical analysis of rituals, this study argues that rituals such as
Sabbath, vigil, shmita, and fiesta paint a unique image of human identity and authority in the
world. This image is starkly opposed to the common political-theological framework in which
God is defined through action, and human beings are similarly defined as action-producing
beings. In contrast, ritual inoperativity depicts God’s identity and authority as one who gives rest
or “lets be.” For this reason, human identity and authority should follow a similar model. This
study argues that this perspective of political power could be enormously important for
addressing the most significant political challenge in the contemporary world: climate change. It
concludes by suggesting how a climate-healing Sabbath ritual could function

vii

INTRODUCTION
What is the value of doing nothing?
Tersely put, that is the question this dissertation seeks to answer. Of course, “doing
nothing” is a bit of an over-simplification. My focus is not on sloth, mindless wandering, or the
various types of unproductive diversion that occupy human attention in all cultures. Naturally,
anthropologists have a rightful interest in investigating such matters, and they are significant in
their own way.1 But my interest is in what I will call “ritual inoperativity,” specifically the kind
that emerges in Jewish and Christian traditions, usually in the form of the Sabbath day (and
similar and related phenomena such as the shmita or sabbatical year, night vigils and fiestas).2
To be more specific, what follows will focus on the value of such rituals for political
theory. This could seem counterintuitive. To some, Sabbath is a private practice, interesting to
researchers because of its “high cost” as a religious activity, but hardly overtly relevant to the
political world.3 Although many theologians have recently paid attention to the influence of

Such investigations usually fall into the category of “leisure studies.” For an overview of this field see
Ken Roberts, Leisure in Contemporary Society (Oxfordshire: CABI, 2006). See also John T. Haworth, Work,
Leisure, and Well-Being (London: Routledge, 1997).
1

I will use the term “ritual inoperativity” or just “inoperativity” frequently in this dissertation, even though
most of the time I will be talking about Sabbath in particular. The reason for this term is that I want to emphasize
that the ritual qualities of Sabbath are not limited to Sabbath alone, but extend into other rituals. Furthermore, it is
possible that the investigation of inoperativity developed here could be applicable to other religious rituals with
which I am less familiar, such as those found in Hinduism, Buddhism, or Shinto.
2

On the significance of Sabbath as a “high cost” religious activity (that is, one which take up a large
amount of time and commitment) see Karl G. D. Bailey and Arian C. B. Timoti, “Delight or Distraction: An
Exploratory Analysis of Sabbath-Keeping Internalization,” Journal of Psychology and Theology 43, no. 3 (2015):
192-203.
3

1

2
4

doctrines on political paradigms, fewer have focused on how doctrines interact with rituals and
practices that together correlate with political worldviews. This dissertation seeks to partly fill
that void by offering a political theology of a unique category of religious activity, inoperativity.
The following chapters will show how Christian and Jewish practices of inoperativity unveil a
perception of God’s relationship to humans and humans’ relationship to each other that is
politically weighted.
By “politically weighted” I refer to the fact that when we engage in particular religious
practices oriented to God (or, as philosopher Jean-Yves Lacoste puts it, “the Absolute”) we are
saying something about how divine authority functions (because the origin of the ritual is
grounded in some kind of liturgy, or “service” to divine authority). We are also at the same time
saying something about human identity, because rituals model how humans are supposed to exist
in the world.5

4
I refer here to the burgeoning field known as “political theology.” Although there is extensive debate as to
the precise definition of political theology, most theologians functioning in this area frame their work as a reaction
to mid-twentieth century theorist Carl Schmitt’s claim that “all the modern concepts of the state are secularized
theological concepts.” See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans.
George Schwab (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 36. This seems to imply that ways of thinking about God have
direct impact on political concepts, and therefore that theological/ritual ideas are not isolated from political affairs
but are the “code” underwriting them, even if covertly. Reflection on Schmitt’s work has led to recent developments
of this idea from a variety of thinkers. See, for example, Hent De Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan, eds., Political
Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006); Paul W. Kahn,
Political Theology: Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (New York: Columbia University Press,
2011); Saul Newman, Political Theology: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), and Catherine
Keller, Political Theology of the Earth: Our Planetary Emergency and the Struggle for a New Republic (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2018).
5

The idea that attention to ritual is essential for political theology has been noted by John Thatamanil,
“How Not to Be a Religion: Genealogy, Identity, Wonder,” in Common Goods: Economy, Ecology, and Political
Theology, ed. Melanie Johnson-DeBaufre, Catherine Keller, and Elias Orega-Aponte (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2015), 54-72. Despite this recognition, subsequent essays in this volume pay surprisingly little
attention to the significance of rituals. Perhaps this is a result of the bifurcation within the field of religious studies
that apportions rituals to the anthropologists, and ideas/concepts to the theologians.

3
These two aspects of ritual—human identity and authority—are the centerpieces of
politics. They also feed into each other with a kind of circularity. To know what human beings
strive to be will convey important information about how they should be governed. Conversely,
the type of authority exercised over human beings will influence their identity. What this means
is that rituals reside at the roots of human conceptions of politics and government. Studying
rituals of inoperativity such as Sabbath is therefore immensely important for framing any kind of
political theology.
The central argument of this dissertation consists of two closely related points: First, I
claim that certain rituals of inoperativity—primarily Sabbath—disclose a conception of God’s
absolute power in which this power functions by passivity. In other words, rather than exercising
control, God “lets be.” At first, this may sound like nothing more than standard modern deism—
the enlightenment perspective in which God creates the world and then steps back to let it run
itself. However, the difference is established by my second point: “Letting be” frames a key
element of human identity as well. Humans participate in the inoperative authority of God by
virtue of their status as imago Dei. This means that human beings are not defined by their
production, or ability to manipulate and control the world. These concepts of identity and
authority are latent within the Sabbath ritual (as well as the other analogous rituals I will
analyze).
To explicate this understanding of inoperativity, I will draw on three primary approaches:
biblical traditions, contemporary philosophy, and practical engagement with rituals. Of course,
these categories overlap significantly (and the third obviously draws on the first two). However,
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they provide unique angles for addressing the common question: How does doing nothing impact
politics? These categories also correspond to the first three chapters of this dissertation.
Chapter 1 addresses the theology of inoperativity that arises from reflection on biblical
traditions. In order to draw on this vast trove of resources (a historical/systematic task that could
take volumes of its own) I will focus on the work of two theologians whose reflections utilize
this material in related fashion. These are the Christian theologian Jürgen Moltmann and the
Jewish theologian Abraham Joshua Heschel. Reflecting on texts from the Christian Old and New
Testaments, and particularly on the Genesis creation stories, Moltmann arrives at a theology of
the Sabbath in which God’s inoperativity forms the basis for the human imago Dei. Heschel,
utilizing both biblical texts and concepts from rabbinic tradition, presents an image of Sabbath
that curbs “spatial covetousness,” returning human beings from the realm of material production
to the eternal utterance of time. Together, these thinkers lay a foundation for thinking of human
inoperativity as a key to human identity through participation in divine inoperativity.
Chapter 2 investigates developments of this idea in contemporary philosophy, focusing in
particular on two thinkers for whom inoperativity is a central theme, Jean-Yves Lacoste and
Giorgio Agamben. Lacoste argues that through inoperative rituals such as the night vigil, human
beings implicitly develop a conception of the Absolute as non-necessity, or excess of being. By
these rituals, human beings exist with the Absolute in a state of rest. Agamben, probing the same
idea from a more overtly political angle, differentiates between two types of inoperativity. A
sovereign form of inoperativity maintains the apparatus of power, while another “messianic”
inoperativity disables the categories that preserve power. Combined, Lacoste’s and Agamben’s

5
arguments show that inoperativity plays a major role in either maintaining or upending political
structures.
Moving beneath the broad level of abstract reflection on inoperativity, chapter 3
evaluates two contrasting—though complementary—approaches to specific practices. The
selected examples are early-twentieth century Jewish philosopher Rav Kook’s work on shmita
(the sabbatical year) and contemporary Catholic theologian Roberto Goizueta’s approach to
popular rituals in Latina/o religion. Kook’s advocacy for the heter mekhira (the partial
suspension of the sabbatical year) demonstrates the practical idea that inoperative rituals must be
able to suspend themselves to produce the context for freedom and greater inoperativity. In other
words, they must be oriented toward an end or goal. Goizueta makes what initially appears to be
the opposite argument. Focusing on Latina/o rituals such as the fiesta, Goizueta claims that
inoperative rituals must not be framed as a form of poiesis, or productive action, but must remain
praxis—a form of life in themselves. Despite the apparent contrast between these two practical
angles, this chapter argues that they expose two sides of liberating ritual inoperativity. To create
life, it must be truly inoperative.
Chapter 4 draws together the insights of the previous chapters into a political ethic of
inoperative ritual, seeking to show the significance of inoperativity for the most significant
political problem of the current age: climate change. This chapter shows that the climate crisis is
intricately related to the two key aspects of political theology: identity and authority. The chapter
subsequently argues that ritual inoperativity (specifically Sabbath) alters these conceptions
dramatically. Through Sabbath keeping, human beings frame themselves as beings whose value
arises from non-production, or from more-than-production. At the same time, they demonstrate a
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type of authority over nature that models the divine “letting be.” A political/theological practice
of Sabbath could therefore be enormously important for addressing climate change.
The concluding chapter moves into even more practical detail, outlining practical aspects
(and challenges) of a potential “climate-healing Sabbath.” In order to be effective in addressing a
broad-level ecological crisis, such a Sabbath must incorporate communal life as means for
transforming conceptions of human identity. Communities must also practice it as an intentional
act of authority defiance, understanding it as a ritual of resistance against the powers of perpetual
production. This chapter also explores the real challenges a climate-healing Sabbath may face.
In the end, the research laid out here should give religious communities that practice
Sabbath or other inoperative rituals a new impetus for celebrating these events. It may also give
individuals or communities who have never considered inoperative rituals a greater appreciation
for the beauty and power of doing nothing. What is written here should also stimulate more
research into the significance of inoperativity. In addition to the boldly inoperative rituals such as
Sabbath and shmita investigated in this research, further reflection will show that countless other
practices within religions contain elements of intentional uselessness. Perhaps the research
contained in this dissertation will help to remove the pejorative connotation of “useless,”
revealing that after all, doing nothing is worth quite a bit.

CHAPTER I
BIBLICAL TRADITIONS AND INOPERATIVITY
JÜRGEN MOLTMANN AND ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL
To start exploring the implications of ritual inoperativity for political theology, it makes
sense to begin with texts and their interpretations. Of course, this is not the only way a study of
any given element in political theology could begin. It is not the case that texts are the sole
foundation of religious communities and their practices. The situation may be rather like a circle
or spiral, in which texts, communities, and practices mutually give rise to each other. One could
begin with any of these three elements and move from there to exploring the others. However,
because communities usually appeal to texts as the basis for their own self-understanding, it
seems natural in a study on the theology of inoperativity to begin with textual traditions that deal
with inoperativity.
Because this study focuses primarily on a shared Christian and Jewish ritual of
inoperativity—the Sabbath—this chapter will address two important modern interpreters of the
theology of the Sabbath from Christian and Jewish traditions, respectively. Why have I chosen to
examine these thinkers, and not the numerous others? There are two reasons. Firstly and most
straightforwardly, these two thinkers are unrivaled in the significance of their work on Sabbath
in modern theology. Moltmann’s God in Creation and Heschel’s The Sabbath: Its Meaning for
Modern Man contain classic treatments of Sabbath which other works often draw from. My
investigation of these works reveals that these thinkers both offer mutually reinforcing political
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theologies of Sabbath—grounded in somewhat similar ancient texts. This demonstrates a strong
pattern of agreement between the two traditions on the political implications of inoperativity.
Secondly, political concerns are important for the works of both thinkers. Neither of them
shies away from directly applying textual theology to political questions. Although, as we will
see, Heschel was more politically active than Moltmann has been, both thinkers establish clear
links between their theological ideas and their political problems. These links will be important
for developing my own theory of how ritual inoperativity impacts political theology.
Although Heschel’s work predates Moltmann’s, in what follows I will address the latter
first. Biblical and theological reasons ground this methodological choice. Moltmann’s work
utilizes core texts (specifically the account of God’s rest in Genesis 2:1-3), that Heschel does not
engage with formally, but rather assumes as crucial background. Heschel also utilizes elements
from Jewish traditions that Moltmann does not use—so in a sense we can say that Heschel’s
theology goes beyond Moltmann’s. My approach to each of these thinkers will be to first lay out
essential aspects of their method for approaching inoperativity and how the concept of
inoperativity plays a role in their thought. Subsequently, I will explore the ways in which their
understanding of inoperativity impacts political-theological concepts.
Jürgen Moltmann
As one of the central figures in Protestant theology in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, Moltmann’s work covers vast categories. He is noted especially for his reflections on
suffering and theodicy, ecclesiology, the doctrine of the Trinity, and ecology.1 Obviously all of

1

On suffering and theodicy see Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the
Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper and
Row, 1974). On ecclesiology see Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit, trans. Margaret Kohl (New

9
these areas connect in various ways to political theology. As I will argue, a particular conception
of inoperativity is at the core of Moltmann’s political theology. This notion enables him to
redefine the nature of the person in crucial ways. In what follows, I will begin by explaining
Moltmann’s method for interpreting Christian texts on inoperativity, after which I will be able to
offer a brief account of how Moltmann understands inoperativity within his interpretive
framework. This will provide critical background for an analysis of the political implications of
Moltmann’s theoretical work.
Method
Moltmann approaches Biblical texts with an eschatological framework. In other words,
he reads Christian texts (including the texts about the Sabbath) with a presupposition that they
not only reveal truths about the human past, but also about the human future. This theme
emerges early in Moltmann’s work, beginning with his groundbreaking Theology of Hope, in
which he argues for the centrality of the future in Christian theology. Against previous
theological trends from Schweitzer to Bultmann, which portrayed eschatology as an aspect of
Christian faith that must be left behind, Moltmann places the vibrant expectation of the early
Church at the foundational level of theological reflection. “The eschatological is not one element
of Christianity,” he says, “but it is the medium of Christian faith as such, the key in which
everything in it is set, the glow that suffuses everything here in the dawn of an expected new

York: Harper and Row, 1977). On the doctrine of the trinity, see Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981). On ecology see Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of
Creation (London: SCM Press, 1985).

10
day.” As Richard Bauckham observes, this anticipation of a future world does not negate the
2

significance of the present world in Moltmann’s thought.3 Rather, anticipation paves the way for
improving the present world so as to lead it into its future.
This methodological emphasis on anticipation allows Moltmann to re-evaluate two
concepts of tradition, at work in both progressive and conservative political philosophies. The
first he calls the “classical” approach to tradition.4 In this approach, history looks backward to a
primal authority invested in the “ancients,” whose wisdom and insight are unrepeatable. These
traditions are like vaults of legendary artifacts—glorious but stale.5 Moltmann contrasts the
classical tradition model with what might be called the “prophetic” model (though Moltmann
gives it no title). This is the approach to tradition Moltmann finds in the literature of the Hebrew
Bible. “In Israel,” says Moltmann, “it was not a primaeval mythical event that was handed down
and called to mind in principio, but a historic event, and one which determined the nature, the
life, the path and the history of Israel.”6 The people of ancient Israel looked to the past not to
revere it or uphold it as the age of exaltation, but to see in it the anticipation of God’s actions in
the future.7 Borrowing a term from Gerhard von Rad, Moltmann calls this “an eschatologizing of

2

Jürgen Moltmann, The Theology of Hope: On the Ground and Implications of Christian Eschatology,
trans. James W. Leitch (London: SCM Press, 1967), 16.
3

Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 83.

4

See Moltmann, The Theology of Hope, 296.

According to M. Douglas Meeks, it was precisely this tendency to give religion a “backward” stance that
motivated Moltmann to formulate his forward looking theology of hope. See M. Douglas Meeks, Origins of the
Theology of Hope Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974.
5

6

Moltmann, The Theology of Hope, 297.

As Jeremy Wynne puts it (summarizing Moltmann’s contribution), “Certainly the past remains important
but only insofar as it speaks to us about the promise of God for tomorrow and thus turns one’s attention to the goal.
7

11
the way of thinking in terms of tradition.” Traditions, in this approach, are proclamations of past
8

events that shake the present and pull in the future.
However, it is crucial to nuance what it means to herald future changes. Not all
eschatological expectation is legitimately Christian, according to Moltmann. In his recent Ethics
of Hope Moltmann delineates several categories of eschatological thinking that influence
believers’ actions in perverse or (at least) less than ideal ways.9 These categories include
“apocalyptic eschatology,” which morbidly delights itself with the destruction of the world, and
also “separatist eschatology,” which laments the corruption of the world but seeks to pull away
from the world rather than engage it positively. Both of these eschatologies result in what
Charles Strozier calls “endism”—an apocalyptic tendency that directs all positive thinking to the
end of time, and never within time itself.10 These views emphasize “waiting” for the future,
rather than “hastening” the future.11

As the prophet said by the Lord, ‘Do not remember the former things, or consider the things of old. I am about to do
a new thing’ (Isa. 43:18-19).” See Jeremy Wynne, “Serving the Coming God: The Insights of Jürgen Moltmann’s
Eschatology for Contemporary Theology of Mission,” Missiology 35, no. 4 (2007): 437-452, 439.
8

Moltmann, The Theology of Hope, 298. See also Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1, trans.
D.M.G. Stalkner (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 106-122.
9

Jürgen Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), 15-17.

10

See Charles B. Strozier, Apocalypse: On the Psychology of Fundamentalism in America (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1994). Similar criticisms of this framework have been made by Catherine Keller, Apocalypse Now and Then:
A Feminist Guide to the End of the World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).
11

Of course, Anabaptist theologians such as John Howard Yoder and Stanley Hauerwas would counter
Moltmann by claiming that they are not passively waiting for the parousia of Christ, but are hastening its coming by
living in communities that realize the future world in the present. Perhaps Moltmann overlooks tangible ways in
which various Anabaptist activists have put themselves to work in transforming the world. For an account of the
diversity of political approaches in one Anabaptist group see Ross Thomas Bender, The People of God: A
Mennonite Interpretation of the Free Church Tradition (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1971).

12
Against these invalid or insufficient eschatologies, Moltmann posits “transformative
eschatology.” He finds this model vividly displayed in Martin Luther King’s famous 1963 “I
Have a Dream” speech, as well as in numerous other of King’s speeches.12 Obviously, King’s
work was eschatological. The realities King envisioned in his speeches were incredible and
improbable. But these improbable hopes did not result in passivity or foolhardy mania, but in
diligent work to bend the future “arc of the moral universe” into the present.13 This attitude of
“pulling in the justice of the future” is the type of thinking to which Moltmann gives the
adjective “messianic.”14 According to this definition of this much-debated term, supposedly
messianic concepts or practices can be tested in the present world by examining their ethical
outcomes. Moltmann interprets the visions of second Isaiah, as well as Jesus’ teachings in the
Sermon on the Mount, as rubrics for evaluating the merits of any messianic hope. Paraphrasing
Isaiah and Amos’s famous “swords into ploughshares” text, Moltmann offers a neat formula:
The principle behind this ethics of hope is:
--not to turn swords into Christian swords
--not to retreat from the swords to the ploughshares
--but to make ploughshares out of swords.15
12

Moltmann addresses King’s work in Ethics of Hope, 35-37.

Moltmann places all of King’s work in the background of future hope. He focuses especially on King’s
use of the language of the Hebrew prophets, especially Isaiah: “In order that ‘all flesh’—that is, all the living—may
see the glory of God ‘together’, the mountains must be made low and the valleys must be raised up, so that in human
history equal living conditions for everyone are created, together with a life-furthering community of human beings
with all living things on earth” (Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, 36). However, one could argue against Moltmann’s
literal reading of King’s prophetic imagery. Perhaps King’s language was merely symbolic, and not truly contingent
on a future realization of a messianic hope. Further research needs to be done to determine the role of the future in
King’s work.
13

The term “messianic” can be incredibly problematic, partly because there is an enormous diversity of
possible meanings for this term. Hence, it is important to specify what Moltmann means by it. He is specific in his
definition: “By ‘messianic’ I mean in this connection a present already gripped and determined by the eschatological
future” (Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, 38). In my own work, this is also the definition that I will use.
14

15

Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, xiii.

13
This is a transformative eschatology. The Christian who holds a transformative eschatology
cannot let go of the reins of history, but neither can such a person operate them in the same way
as a typical sovereign.16
We can summarize Moltmann’s approach to Christian sources by saying that Moltmann
reads these sources in a transformative-eschatological way. In other words, he uses Christian
texts to pull central ideas of how a Christian is to anticipate a new world. One of these central
ideas is the concept of inoperativity.
Moltmann’s Understanding of Inoperativity
Due to the fact that, in Moltmann’s method, Christian traditions are not simply cultural
artifacts but dramatic depictions of God’s role in the present and future, it should not be
surprising that the Genesis accounts of God’s creative activity take a central place in Moltmann’s
understanding of redemption and sovereignty. Here I will not evaluate all the details of
Moltmann’s interpretation of the Genesis origin stories, or examine the exegetical work on which
they are based. I only want to point out a few key aspects of Moltmann’s theology of creation
that are relevant to his understanding of inoperativity.
Turning to Moltmann’s classic work God in Creation, we find the following striking
observation: “It is impossible to understand the world properly as creation without a proper
discernment of the Sabbath.”17 Moltmann bases this statement on the fact that in the Biblical

Catherine Keller argues that Moltmann’s eschatology features a vision of sovereignty that draws its very
source from God, meaning that God is not merely the model, but in effect the actual actor behind human sovereignty
in the renewed earth. See Catherine Keller, “The Last Laugh: A Counter-Apocalyptic Meditation on Moltmann’s
Coming of God,” Theology Today 54, no. 3 (1997): 381-391.
16

17

Moltmann, God in Creation, 277.

14
account of creation in Genesis, God performs the work of creation “for the sake of the
Sabbath.”18 Sabbath is not an appendix to creation, or merely a symbol of creation. It is the
future or telos of creation. The world exists for the purpose of Sabbath-keeping.
Moltmann argues that this concept of Sabbath in the creation texts portrays a vision of the
God-world relationship that is much different from that of most modern theology. Because
theologians and preachers have focused on the six days of creation and have neglected the
seventh day, God has been viewed “as the one who in his essential being is solely ‘the creative
God’ as Paul Tillich says.”19 If human beings are created in the image of this kind of God, then it
follows that human beings are true to themselves only by creating. While Moltmann does not
deny the value of human work and creativity, he argues that it is a travesty to reduce human
existence—or the existence of nature at large—to creative production.
To show why this reductionism is problematic, Moltmann explores the implications of
God keeping a Sabbath. This unusual theological idea communicates that God comfortably
abides with and alongside creation, not merely in front of or behind creation.20 Moltmann uses
these spatial prepositions to convey that God’s Sabbath is a communal rest. Sabbath is not God’s
escape from creation. Nor is it a result of God’s being weary. It is instead a fulfillment of God’s
goal to be present in the community of creatures. Moltmann struggles for language to describe
this intimate process:
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By ‘resting’ from his creative and formative activity, he allows the beings he has
created, each in its own way, to act on him. He receives the form and quality their
lives take, and accepts the effects these lives have. By standing aside from his
creative influence, he makes himself wholly receptive for the happiness, the
suffering, and the praise of his creatures. . . The God who rests in the face of his
creation does not dominate the world on this day: he ‘feels’ the world; he allows
himself to be affected, to be touched by each of his creatures.21
This language of affectation and feeling connects Sabbath to Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity,
in which God exists as mutual, egalitarian fellowship of Father, Son and Spirit. In the context of
his theory of the Trinity, Moltmann observes that “fellowship does not subject but allows others
to be themselves,” implying therefore “openness to one another, sharing with one another and
respect for one another.”22 Following Karl Rahner, Moltmann dissolves any qualitative
separation between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, thereby indicating that the
fellowship of God’s triune existence corresponds to God’s true inner nature.23 The upshot of this
theological argument is that God’s fellowship existence is also the way God “rules” the world.24
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Given this connection between the Trinity and Sabbath, we might say that for Moltmann,
Sabbath is a window into the practical meaning of Trinitarian life—non-hierarchical being-withothers. Although Moltmann himself never connects God’s Sabbath-keeping with a Trinitarian
concept of God, he confirms this correlation when he asserts that “creation is God’s work, but
the Sabbath is God’s present existence. His works express God’s will, but the Sabbath manifests
his Being.”25 In other words, Sabbath is God’s way of being in relation to the world, a way of
being that is intrinsically relational.26
This type of inoperativity describes not only God’s being; it also describes God’s future
for the world. Using language from Franz Rosenzweig, Moltmann affirms that Sabbath is
simultaneously the “feast of creation” as well as the “feast of redemption.” The Jewish story of
creation is for Moltmann a “prophetic tradition”—its point is not to recall a mythic legacy or
provide a scientific account of origins. Instead, it charts a path for the future, awakening hope for
God’s trajectory in history. As Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz points out, creation theology, for
Moltmann, is essentially redemption theology.27 The Sabbath rest of God therefore discloses the
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destiny of the world. Moltmann suggests that the redemption of the world will occur as a
repetition of the Genesis account:
Heaven and earth, the visible and the invisible, will be created anew, so that they
may become the cosmic temple in which God can dwell and come to rest. Then
the presence of God will fill everything, and the powers of chaos and annihilation
will be driven out of creation. That is the all-pervading cosmic indwelling of God,
the Shekinah. Towards that indwelling God’s creation Sabbath already pointed.
The true creation is not behind us but ahead of us.28
On this account, the human celebration of Sabbath is an anticipation of a new world governed by
a Sabbatical mentality.
What is this “Sabbatical mentality”? The key to answering this question is to recall that in
Moltmann’s interpretation, God’s rest on the Sabbath is performed with human beings and the
natural world. This distinguishes Moltmann’s God from the withdrawn God of deism.29At one
point, Moltmann points out that his idea of God’s Sabbath keeping has some commonality with
the deistic notion of a God who creates the world and then retreats into inoperativity.30 This God
gives space for the world by leaving the world alone. One might assume that a vision of a
disinterested, withdrawn God would result in a politics of liberty, in which sovereigns would
allow maximal freedom to their subjects. In many ways, this is precisely what the Enlightenment
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deists such as Locke and Jefferson were aiming at. Moltmann points out that a detachment
between sovereign and subject can sometimes lead to exploitation of the latter by the former.32
Moltmann carefully distinguishes the God of Sabbath from the deistic God. The God of
Sabbath issues an invitation to the world to participate actively in God’s rest. The Genesis
creation story thereby affirms the independent integrity and freedom of creation, but also seeks
to draw it into the peaceful community of divine presence. The God of Sabbath is deeply
enmeshed with creation, yet is not a coercive force within creation.33 A world governed with a
Sabbatical mentality, then, is one where sovereignty is externalized (as in Hobbes) but neither
arbitrary nor coercive (as is definitely not in Hobbes). Sabbath is a sovereign action of divine
liberation.
Moltmann finds this liberating dynamic in Jesus’ healings on the Sabbath in the New
Testament. By healing on the Sabbath, Jesus replicates the divine Sabbath keeping of Genesis by
giving rest to ill persons. Although Christian interpreters have often depicted Jesus as offering a
“higher ethic of love” that eliminated or subordinated the Sabbath command, Moltmann notes
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that Jewish rabbinic tradition agreed with Jesus that the “Sabbath was made for man, not man for
the Sabbath.”34 On this view, Sabbath and the love ethic are not opposed, but complimentary.
Sabbath exists to liberate human beings from material constraints that suppress life. Because
both Jesus and most Jewish traditions hold this point, Moltmann argues that Jesus’ Sabbath
conflicts reflect an intra-Jewish interpretive situation, rather than a Christian-versus-Jewish
situation.
However, this does not mean that Jesus’ Sabbath observance contributes nothing new to
an understanding of inoperativity. According to Moltmann, what Jesus proclaims through his
Sabbath behavior is not “a higher ethic” but “the imminent kingdom of God, whose unparalleled
closeness he authenticates through the signs of the messianic age.”35 Moltmann cites Matthew
10:7-8, according to which Jesus introduced this messianic age with particular actions: “The
blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the
poor have the kingdom promised to them.”36 By doing these actions on the Sabbath, Jesus takes
the future-pointing trajectory of the Sabbath and brings it to completion. Thus, according to
Moltmann, “Jesus never ‘transgressed’ the Sabbath commandment, and he certainly never made
it ‘a matter of indifference.’”37 What Jesus did do was take Sabbath a step further than some of
his contemporaries—he began to keep it as an anticipation of the kingdom of God, in which
everything in the world would be put right, including blind eyes and crippled spines. This is
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liberative inoperativity, because it is a herald of the kingdom which draws all nations into its
jurisdiction, and is relevant to both Jews and Gentiles.38
Political Implications
Once one realizes the significance of Sabbath in Moltmann’s theology, it becomes easy to
find reverberations of Sabbatical logic in other places in his work. In the context of political
theology, Moltmann’s vision of Sabbath as a depiction of the future world holds a direct
connection to ethics, especially the area of human rights.
Moltmann’s interest in human rights might seem odd for someone so focused on
eschatology. Rights-talk is usually associated with an emphasis on origins, because rights are
often grounded in on accounts of societal development—even if they are intentionally mythical,
such as Hobbes’ pre-Leviathan world, Rousseau’s world of the noble savage, or Rawls’ protohistorical “original position.”39 However, because Moltmann employs an anticipative
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eschatology, rather than simply a laissez-faire expectation of future change, what he says about
the future also pertains to the roles and responsibilities of human beings now. This approach is
parallel in many ways to a natural law ethic, only instead of “acting in accordance with their
nature” human beings must “act in accordance with their future.” However, Moltmann insists
that the future of human beings is also their true nature, because “the image of God is their real
future.”40
Because human beings are destined for perfect correlation to the image of God, they
possess inherent and inalienable dignity. The image of God is therefore the ground of human
rights. This is a common theological argument.41 Moltmann, however, revises it dramatically by
pointing out that the image of God is not an aspect of inherent human nature, nor is it a
mysterious future reality that was lost during the fall and awaits restoration. Rather, “the image
of God is human beings in all their relationships in life.”42 Ton van Prooijen argues that
Moltmann’s depiction of God’s resting has expansive implications in Genesis 2:1-3: “God also
rests in his creation.”43 In other words, the image of divine rest is a functional depiction of God’s
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action in the world. The image of God means that human beings “are persons before God and as
such capable of acting on God’s behalf and responsible to him.”44 Therefore, rest or inoperativity
is integral to understanding how a human being exists as imago Dei. If denied rest, the human
being is denied a fundamental aspect of the image of God, and is therefore denied a fundamental
right.
For Moltmann, this means that human beings must not only be inoperative at times, but
that rest must also become part of work. This point becomes clear in Moltmann’s discussion of
“the right to meaningful work.” In his work On Human Dignity, this right is the first concrete
human right he analyzes. Such privileging of labor-ethics initially appears odd, because most
books on human rights begin with “the right to life” or “the right to avoid bodily harm.”45
Moltmann certainly values these rights, but his account focuses on work because—as shown
above—rights are grounded in the human enactment of the image of God, which is a functional
image. In order for human beings to manifest God’s image, they must be given the opportunity to
act meaningfully (of course, a perceptive logician would immediately recognize that this
presumes the rights to life and evasion of bodily harm—but those points would go without
saying).
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What is “meaningful work”? Moltmann points out that much work is done simply for the
sake of survival, to gather sustenance and construct shelter. Moltmann notes that it is possible to
construe such work as neither fulfilling in itself, nor a particularly “creative” act—it simply
continues biological processes. Especially in ancient times, human existence had to be “wrested”
from a hostile environment, and as Moltmann puts it, “this struggle itself was not true life but
only its precondition.”46 In many ancient cultures, this was the only definition of “work”
available. Consequently, work was devalued, and those who did not have to work (such as rulers
or elite classes) would intentionally avoid degrading themselves in “common labor.” Work was
base, but rest was divine.
Moltmann points out that the Christian (and Jewish) Scriptures do not accept this
paradigm. In Genesis, God’s creative activity does not reduce God’s position in the hierarchy of
the cosmos, or make God less virtuous. Rather, God’s glorious identity is rooted in God’s
willingness to work for human liberation.47 God’s work is noble, and human beings should
model God in their work. However, for Moltman, God’s work can only be properly understood
as virtuous when linked with God’s rest. This is because godly work is participation in the innate
goodness of created being—goodness that can only be appreciated from the vantage point of rest.
In this way, rest redefines the concept of “meaningful work”:
Work is thus meaningful not because it alone provides the meaning of life, but
precisely because it is limited by the goal of rest and joy in existence. The
Sabbath does not simply interrupt work. Rather, work is understood and defined
through the Sabbath. There is more to this ordered relationship of work days and
46
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holidays than just mutual boundaries. Work day and Sabbath lie also on the same
temporal level. They concern the same people. They are not divided between
human beings and gods or between slave and free. Therefore, they also overflow
into each other and affect each other.48
God does not produce for the sake of production. God creates because God wishes to take joy in
God’s creation. It is this joy that brings purpose and vitality to work, and without it work would
be nihilistic endeavor, no matter how materially productive it might be. For this reason, as
Darrell Cosden notes, Moltmann’s theology of work is deeply opposed to utilitarian
reductionism.49
Because God’s creation-work forms the model for human work, Sabbath also stands as
the criterion for dignified human labor. It is not that human beings must have a Sabbath so that
they can go back to productivity more effectively. Rather, work exists to make Sabbath more
effective. Moltmann’s logic leads to an important ethical conclusion: “Therefore human work
cannot consist only in acting for purpose and usefulness. It must also encompass freedom for
self-presentation and thus playfulness.”50 In other words, human work must be Sabbatical as well
as materially fruitful. As Cosden puts it, Moltman offers “a picture of work seasoned with the
Sabbath; that is, a dynamic combination of the producing and presenting aspects of work.”51
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Work, Moltmann says, should have “not only production value but also existence value.”

52

Workers who absorb themselves in their own creative existence may find pleasure in their work,
but if this work is incompatible with a sense of purpose for life as a whole (not merely the
working parts), it is inhumane.
What does a truly meaningful, Sabbatical type of work look like? Obviously, such work
must have purpose and constructive creativity. But beyond those basic criteria, according to
Moltmann, such work must be free, because any type of work that a person is forced to do could
not allow that person to model God’s free creation. No one, on this account, should be forced to
work.53 The implications of this concept for service industries and forms of unpleasant labor
(garbage collecting, sewage maintenance, etc.) would rattle the senses of most Western
capitalists. Such societies take it for granted that people will not do sweaty, exhausting, or dirty
types of work unless they are provoked by economic necessity. Although slavery is de jure
banned in Western societies, these societies maintain many basic functions via circumstantiallyforced labor, which is perhaps formally but not materially different from slavery.
A Sabbatical perspective on work would also mean forming communities in which
productivity and work-success do not create hierarchy, as Meeks has pointed out.54 Such
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communities would counteract the tendency of production to create sovereign control. Of course,
the extent to which they could impact the overall nature of sovereignty in a capitalist world
remains open to investigation.
Summary
Moltmann’s theological reading of Sabbath-texts offers a view of inoperativity that
reframes the person’s relationship to sovereign governance. Inoperativity, for Moltmann,
represents the form of God’s sovereignty over history. On his account, inoperativity provides an
eschatological key to understanding the future of the world, as well as a tool for bringing that
world into the present. In anticipation of that world, Christians live in a Sabbatical way, and
participate in politics and culture in which Sabbath is the aim. This leads to a politics of giving
rest to human beings. The practical result, as I have briefly shown, is a different theological
anthropology—one that impacts the politics of labor.
Moltmann’s work suggests that rituals of inoperativity can entirely reorient
understandings of the person, altering typical conceptions of the person’s relationship to time.
This anthropology is not only found in Christian texts. Similar concepts are also drawn from
texts in the Jewish tradition by a thinker who—although he never engages Moltmann’s work—
authors remarkably parallel insights.
Abraham Joshua Heschel
Writing to Jewish communities in the Western world (principally in America), Heschel
seeks to present a religious philosophy that addresses the complexity of Jewish life in this
diverse and ethically-ambiguous world. A significant part of Heschel’s religious philosophy
connects to that unique one-seventh of Jewish existence, the Sabbath. Like Moltmann, Heschel
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draws on the Hebrew Bible in his exploration of Sabbath. However, he also uses sources from
Jewish midrash, rabbinical commentary, and other popular textual traditions. In what follows I
will give a brief account of Heschel’s theological method, followed by an explanation of how
Heschel understands the significance of Sabbatical inoperativity in the context of religious texts.
Then, I will show how this understanding politically influences his anthropology.
Method
Heschel’s approach to Jewish tradition focuses on applying the philosophical meaning of
ancient texts to modern life.55 Specifically, Heschel aims to identify ways in which Jewish
sources speak to questions about the human person.56 Like Moltmann, therefore, Heschel
employs a hermeneutic aimed at creating a practical anthropology. This point is essential for
understanding how Heschel’s understands the meaning of inoperativity. Heschel draws from
biblical and other textual traditions in order to articulate a view of inoperativity which is
simultaneously a view of human nature.
Heschel’s understanding of inoperativity is found mainly in his book The Sabbath: Its
Meaning for Modern Man.57 Despite its small size, this book holds mammoth status among
modern theologies of Sabbath. Part of its uniqueness stems from its creative straddling of genres.
55
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It is equal parts poem, philosophical treatise, midrashic interpretation, and theological
exhortation. But what makes it worth attending to most of all is its attempt to place Sabbath
squarely in the realm human self-understanding. Heschel does not argue for Sabbath-keeping as
a response to divine command, although he does not oppose such purely religious approaches to
Sabbath. Instead, he begins by interrogating human existence, exploring the complex relation
between space and time in human life. His goal is to show how Sabbath connects to the lived
reality of all persons, not just Jews (or Sabbatarian Christians). Specifically, Heschel connects
Sabbath to human life under the sovereign hegemony of American capitalism.
Heschel’s understanding of the Sabbath pivots on the idea of an economic relationship
between time and space. As he states at the beginning of The Sabbath, “In technical civilization
we expend time to gain space.”58 Human beings, he argues, inhabit both time and space, but in
the development of technical civilization we have placed primary value on space as the
dimension of ultimate value. Time, rather than being appreciated for itself, is subjected to the
purpose of space-mastery. In this way, human beings create a deep existential discordance: “Life
goes wrong when the control of space, the acquisition of things of space, becomes our sole
concern.”59
According to Heschel, this discordance has reached a point where human beings have lost
an awareness of time altogether. Through our emphasis on the realm of space, through our
building projects, artworks, bodily enhancements, and even literary pursuits, we have created a
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culture in which nothing matters without a spatial dimension. When time passes without a spatial
accomplishment, we call this “time wasted,” because time’s only value is in service to space.
Heschel calls this paradigm “thinginess.”60 Thinginess signifies the sense that time is merely the
“shell” in which things exist, and thus is “unvaried, iterative, homogeneous.”61 Through our allencompassing thinginess we who live in western contexts have—quite literally—lost track of
time.
In contrast to the space-obsessed Western world, Heschel claims that the “Bible is more
concerned with time than with space.”62 Heschel demonstrates this by referencing the Jewish
yearly festivals and feast days, which commemorate spatial events (the Exodus from Egypt, for
example), but do so by “hallowing” the specific times in which those events occurred.63 The
Sabbath is the pinnacle of the various Biblical time-celebrations, not only because it occurs
weekly, but also because it celebrates creation (“remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy . . .
for in six days the Lord created heaven and earth . . .”). Thus, to the extent that the day
“commemorates” something, it is existence itself, or rather “being as such” that is
commemorated. “It is a day on which we are called to turn from the results of creation to the
mystery of creation; from the world of creation to the creation of the world.”64 In his imperative
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to recall time as the commemoration of creation, Heschel seems to echo Martin Heidegger’s
allegation that western philosophy has largely forgotten the significance of Being (in contrast to
beings).65 This parallel is significant, for although Heidegger argues that our obsession with the
technical mastery of beings has drawn us away from the profound significance of Being as
such,66 he offers no practical corrective to this modern tendency. Heschel’s concept of the
Sabbath could very well be the practical solution to Heidegger’s philosophical problem—
namely, that through the sacred time of Sabbath we come to truly understand Being.
Heschel’s understanding of the Sabbath as the antithesis of Western culture’s apotheosis
of space is not merely philosophically important. At several points, Heschel asserts that our
infatuation with space not only confuses our understanding of the world, but also dominates and
oppresses our lives, for “six days a week we live under the tyranny of things of space.”67 We are
“captivated”—literally held captive—by the world of space, to the point where time frightens us.
“Most of us seem to labor for the things of space. As a result we suffer from a deeply rooted
dread of time and stand aghast when compelled to look into its face.”68 The perverse dynamic
Heschel describes here is reminiscent of traumatic bonding—the infamous “Stockholm
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Syndrome”—in which hostages become devoted to their captor. Western culture refuses to
recognize that time is not the problem; it is the thinginess which perversely dominates our time
that creates our angst. Heschel therefore argues that a life dominated by things is fundamentally
inauthentic: “Things, when magnified, are forgeries of happiness, they are a threat to our very
lives; we are more harassed than supported by the Frankensteins of spatial things.”69
These “Frankensteins” hold power over us because we have turned them into idols, as
Ken Koltun-Fromm argues in his reading of Heschel.70 According to Koltun-Fromm, the
domination of “thinginess” distorts properly functioning human vision, forcing us to impute
divinity to the spatial realm, and thereby legitimizing its totalitarianism. This distortion can be
rightly labeled idolatry, because “idolatry arises from seeing divinity in physical things. The
primitive gaze, as a mode of gaining technical control of space, stops at the object, as it were,
and discovers God therein.”71 Koltun-Fromm argues further that Heschel’s work on the Sabbath
must be seen as a critique of the latent idolatries of American Judaism, which experienced
remarkable material advancement in the 1950’s.72 In Heschel’s perspective, Jewish Americans at
this time were in danger of losing their spiritual foundations by installing property and currency
as their paradigm for meaning. The Sabbath would stand as a guard against this subtle divinizing
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of spatial reality—a seductive temptation to well-off Americans. The Sabbath would restore true
spiritual vision by pointing through spatial reality to the ultimate significance of things.
Heschel’s Understanding of Inoperativity
Sabbatical inoperativity, in Heschel’s view, saves human beings from the tyranny of
space by transforming our perspective on human nature. This seems like a lot to ask of a simple
day-off work. Heschel is fully aware that institutions of regular rest from labor are not foreign to
any culture, not even the blitzing business world of capitalist America. We must rest, or sacrifice
our long-term productivity. Hence, we have company retreats, summer vacations, and bean-bags
at Silicon-valley business headquarters. In this quotidian sense, therefore, one might say that
nearly every healthy American practices Sabbath in some form. Heschel notes that Philo
defended the Sabbath against its Roman detractors (who used it to inveigh against supposed
Jewish indolence), by appealing to this utilitarian aspect of Sabbath. Philo argued that “a
breathing spell enables not merely ordinary people, but athletes also, to collect their strength with
a stronger force behind them to undertake promptly and patiently each of the tasks set before
them.”73 Under this paradigm, in which the Sabbath is simply a weekly “breather,” Heschel’s
lofty interpretation of the Sabbath seems unduly flamboyant.
Heschel responds to Philo’s trivializing apologetic for the Sabbath by pointing out that
for Philo, “Sabbath is represented not in the spirit of the Bible but in the spirit of Aristotle.”74
Leisure taken for the sole purpose of enhancing labor is not wrong or unnecessary, but it is not
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Sabbatical at all in Heschel’s sense. The Bible and Jewish tradition, Heschel argues, depict the
Sabbath not as a means to an end (further work), but as an end in itself. “Man is not a beast of
burden, and the Sabbath is not for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of his work,” Heschel
asserts.75 Appealing to the biblical creation story in which the Sabbath concludes creation,
Heschel argues that metaphorically and literally, the Sabbath is the “end” of creation.76 This is a
point similar to Moltmann’s. Work serves to make way for rest; not the other way around.
However, Heschel goes further than Moltmann: For the former, not merely work but all of time
and even reality itself exists for the sake of Sabbath. In Heschel’s succinct words: “The Sabbath
is not for the sake of the weekdays; the weekdays are for the sake of Sabbath.”77
For a culture trapped in the domination of spatial things, this concept of Sabbath seems
frustratingly backward, even nihilistic. How can activity (which is the only category of “the real”
in a capitalist society) exist for the purpose of non-activity? Heschel’s answer is that the Sabbath
is not the cessation of activity, but activity in a different mode; it is a celebratory construct; a
“palace in time which we build.”78 We cease from spatial labor on the Sabbath because such
labor is not the ultimate telos of human beings. The Sabbath thus asserts (or rather, assumes) that
human beings are eternal in nature and that there is a “beyond” which human beings must
experience and celebrate. Heschel’s understanding of the Sabbath thus seems to imply that
although a human being could work endlessly in the spatial realm without Sabbath, such a person
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would not attain the fullness of what it is to be human; she or he would lack “the climax of
living.”79 Just as a queen does not receive her highest sovereignty until she moves into her
palace, so human beings do not attain their full potential until they enjoy the Sabbath.
Because the Sabbath is where we encounter our ultimate purpose as eternal beings,
Heschel notes that the goal of the Sabbath must permeate all of life. Throughout his book, he
recounts the rabbinic tradition of “love for the Sabbath,” anthropomorphizing it as a bride and a
queen, or even a king, which is long awaited and welcomed with jubilance.80 Such metaphorical
improvisation is possible because the Sabbath cannot be seen as a parenthetical block of time,
but as a venue for participating in humanity’s eternal being. Heschel explains, “To name it
queen, to call it bride is merely to allude to the fact that its spirit is a reality we meet rather than
an empty span of time which we choose to set aside for comfort or recuperation.”81 The custom
of vigorous preparation for the arrival of Sabbath, of cleaning the house, cooking exorbitant
meals, and dressing festively on Friday evenings (all practices still common in some Jewish and
Seventh-day Adventist communities), reflects Heschel’s notion of the Sabbath as an exalted
guest, or even a messenger or representative of the divine.
To welcome this divine guest, or to construct this “palace in time,” seems therefore to do
more than exercise a religious ritual (if a “religious ritual” is defined as a means to a religious
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experience of some sort, the likes of which may vary between religions and cultures).
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Heschel’s framework indicates that the Sabbath is indispensible for all human fulfillment. It is
not a culturally or religiously localized practice, as if it were merely “for the Jews” or “for the
Christians”—it is the condition of the possibility of full humanity for everyone. As Morton
Fierman observes, in his work on the Sabbath Heschel “has introduced to us a veritable
prescription for living, an itinerary for life, indeed a spiritual map for humanity.”83 For Heschel,
then, the biblical traditions of Sabbath thus present a theological anthropology—a way human
beings are supposed to be in the world.
Thus far, Heschel seems to idealize anthropological concepts that Moltmann also uses.
Human being should not exist as pure producers (homo faber), but should exist as persons for
whom production exists. However, Heschel takes the anthropological significance of
inoperativity even further by defining elements that suggest ways in which human beings are
supposed to exist as inoperative sovereigns. This is clear in several places in Heschel’s work.
One of the most revealing is Heschel’s discussion of the Friday evening service called kabbalat
Shabbat. Heschel introduces this service with a striking claim: “The Sabbath is the presence of
God in the world, open to the soul of man.”84 The Friday evening service, then, is the moment

Heschel explicitly contrasts the Sabbath with other Jewish rituals such as Yom Kippur: “Unlike the Day
of Atonement, the Sabbath is not dedicated exclusively to spiritual goals . . . Man in his entirety, all his faculties
must share its blessing” (Heschel, The Sabbath, 19).
82

83
Morton C. Fierman, Leap of Action: Ideas in the Theology of Abraham Joshua Heschel (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1990), 177.
84

Heschel, The Sabbath, 60.

36
when God’s presence enters the world. However, Heschel points out that the term kabbalat
Shabbat has two meanings:
The term kabbalah denotes the act of taking an obligation upon oneself. The term
in this sense has the connotation of strictness and restraint. Yet kabbalah in its
verbal form means also: to receive, to welcome, to greet. In the first meaning it is
applied to a law; in the second, to a person. The question arises, in what meaning
is the word kabbalah used when applied to the word Shabbat?85
Heschel is here interrogating the very essence of Sabbath, which is also the essence of
God.86 Because the Sabbath is divine presence, to understand what happens in the kabbalat
Shabbat is to understand the nature of divine presence. So, then, is it a legal entity or a
personal/spiritual entity? Heschel is clear:
The answer is, it means both; it has both a legal and a spiritual meaning; they are
inseparable from one another. The distinction of the Sabbath is reflected in the
twin meanings of the phrase kabbalat Shabbat which means to accept the
sovereignty as well as to welcome the presence of the day. The Sabbath is a queen
as well as a bride.87
The Sabbath is legal, represented by the ruling sovereign or queen. At the same time, it is a
bride—a personal presence. Here Heschel makes seismic theo-political claim: The Sabbathkeeper experiences God as a sovereign and as spouse. Perhaps one could collapse these two
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images into a concept of bridal sovereignty. The Sabbath keeper accepts God’s sovereignty in
the same way as one would accept the intimacy of a romantic partner.
This intimate quality of divine sovereignty is Sabbatical inoperativity. If, according to
Heschel’s analysis, the Sabbath is the day in which the eternal mode of existence prevails, and
God is enthroned in the palace of time, the dynamics of Sabbath reveal the nature of divine
sovereignty in an unparalleled way. God’s sovereign authority is typically grounded in both her
creation and sustaining of the world; thus, Heschel argues that the Sabbath is the means by which
God performs this sustaining task: “In the language of the Bible the world was brought into
being in the six days of creation, yet its survival depends upon the holiness of the seventh day.
Great are the laws that govern the processes of nature. Yet without holiness there would be
neither greatness nor nature.”88 Keep in mind that this is the holiness in which God does nothing.
The dynamics of control and production are not at play. God simply exists with creatures in the
mode of bridal companionship, and this is the nature of her sovereignty. Following the same
logic, then, we could say that human beings are only truly sovereign over each other or over the
world when they exist Sabbatically, in a state of inoperativity. Mutual companionship or “beingwith” becomes the image that defines human sovereignty.
What does this sovereignty look like? Heschel’s bridal sovereignty image strongly
emphasizes the concept of reciprocity. He uses a midrash featuring Rabbi Shimeon ben Yohai to
make this point. The rabbi observed that the first six days of creation are an even number; they
match each other in three neat pairs. Only the seventh day is left alone. Hence, “After the work
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of creation was completed, the Seventh day pleaded: Master of the universe, all that Thou has
created is in couples; to every day of the week Thou gavest a mate; only I was left alone. And
God answered: The Community of Israel will be your mate.”89 Although it is certainly proper to
speak of Israel needing the Sabbath, Heschel argues it is more primary to speak of the Sabbath
needing Israel.
With all its grandeur, the Sabbath is not sufficient unto itself. Its spiritual reality
calls for companionship of man. There is a great longing in the world. The six
days stand in need of space; the seventh day stands in need of man. It is not good
that the spirit should be alone, so Israel was destined to be a helpmeet for the
Sabbath.90
The idea that Sabbath needs humanity should be read in the light of one of Heschel’s main
overarching theological themes: God needs and craves humanity as well.91 This is not a
dominating craving, but a craving for human liberation. The Sabbath is thus a moment of divinehuman reciprocity.92 Once again, this same logic must apply to human beings. We are only
sovereign when we exist with others in reciprocal, mutual relationships, in which we desire the
liberation of others.
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This idea that God exercises Sabbatical sovereignty by desiring human liberation
connects with one of Heschel’s main practical points about the effects of Sabbath on human
nature: it counteracts the oppressive effects of coveting. Reflecting on the Decalogue, one might
notice a disjunction between the Sabbath command and the later command to refrain from
coveting. Israel is told to “keep” the Sabbath day holy. Keeping, or guarding, suggests covetous
desire. But then, Israel is told, “you shall not covet.” In true rabbinic fashion, Heschel claims that
“we must seek to find a relation between the two ‘commandments.’”93 The interpretive synthesis
he presents is stunning. The Decalogue’s injunction against coveting pertains to things of space:
the text says “you shall not covet” your neighbor’s house, wife, servant, livestock or “anything”
belonging to the neighbor. However, the command itself seems pointless on its own, for “we
know that passion cannot be vanquished by decree.”94 Desires cannot be negated by will.
Heschel points out that “the tenth injunction would, therefore, be practically futile, were
it not for the ‘commandment’ regarding the Sabbath day to which about a third of the text of the
Decalogue is devoted, and with is an epitome of all other commandments.”95 Desires cannot be
negated; they can only be ousted from the psyche by other desires. The Sabbath command
provides the means by which the coveting command is to be executed, because it directs
covetous desire to time rather than space. Heschel writes:
Judaism tries to foster the vision of life as a pilgrimage to the seventh day; the
longing for the Sabbath all days of the week which is a form of longing for the
eternal Sabbath all the days of our lives. It seeks to displace the coveting of things
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in space for coveting the things in time, teaching man to covet the seventh day all
days of the week. God himself coveted that day, He called it Hemdat Yamim, a
day to be coveted. It is as if the command: Do not covet things of space, were
correlated with the unspoken word: Do covet things of time.”96
Why is coveting space problematic, but coveting time is not? As I have shown, space for Heschel
is the realm of control and domination. Spatial entities control us, and we seek to control them in
return. In our modern era we own technology, but we know that our technology also owns us.
Covetousness of space is always connected to a drive for conquest and sovereignty—a nation
seeks to preserve its sovereignty over land in order to prevent outsiders from using that land, or
to manipulate the inhabitants of the land for particular purposes.
But covetousness of time is categorically different. To see why, consider the moral
difference between the propositions, I need you and I need time with you. The first proposition is
compatible with a variety of meanings, some of them potentially dominating (imagine a boss
saying, “I need you . . . to do something for me”). The second proposition suggests a much
different attitude. Presumably the speaker wants to elicit a response from the listener, perhaps to
do something concrete such as take a walk by the lake or go on a shared vacation. But the key
feature of the sentence is that it conveys a desire for the listener’s free response. The speaker
does not want the recipient of the proposition to be forced to spend time. The speaker wishes for
reciprocity—it is as if the speaker were saying, “I want to spend time with you, time that you
also want to spend with me.” Of course, it is conceivable that the speaker could, out of
frustration, seek to acquire the coveted time with the listener through manipulation or outright
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coercion. Survivors of sexual harassment know this all too well. But intrinsically, the wish itself
conveys a craving for mutuality, expressed through the freedom of the other.
Heschel’s analysis of Sabbatical coveting suggests that this is how sovereign power
works. If God covets the Sabbath, it is because God desires the freedom of God’s creation. God
does not want to possess human beings, but to possess time with human beings. This God uses
space, but does not covet it. This is how, for Heschel, God transcends creation.
Political Implications
Heschel’s theology of inoperative sovereignty has powerful implications in a Western
capitalist world whose entire existence seems predicated on spatial covetousness. Sovereignty in
this world focuses on matters of material acquisition, and the “state of exception” proclaimed in
this world always pertains to spatial or material concerns. Thus, although Heschel’s Sabbatical
understanding of the person may seem to be a theological abstraction, it is not without explicit
political reverberations.
One of the central political areas in which Heschel applied his political theology was that
of racial justice. In the 1950’s and 60’s, Heschel joined the fight for civil rights for African
Americans, forming a friendship with Martin Luther King, Jr. and speaking openly about the
“monstrosity” of racial inequality.97 Of course, Heschel’s primary ethical motivation for
speaking on behalf of desegregation was the moral demand of equality. He argued that all human
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beings are created in the image of God, and thus deserve equal rights. But Heschel also
recognized that America’s failure to provide equal rights stemmed from another politicaltheological problem: Spatial covetousness. Religious people in America had modeled themselves
on a deity who made certain spatial claims but seemed oblivious to the realities of injustice in
history. Against this theology, Heschel argued in his speech on “Religion and Race” that God’s
creative sovereignty seeks human beings who will create righteousness in the temporal domain:
Life is clay, and righteousness the mold in which God wants history to be shaped.
But human beings, instead of fashioning the clay, deform the shape. God needs
mercy, righteousness; His needs cannot be satisfied in space, by sitting in pews,
by visiting temples, but in history, in time. It is within the realm of history that
man is charged with God’s mission.98
Americans, by preserving God’s sovereignty over space, but neglecting God’s concern with
time, had created an idol useful to white interests. This spatially-covetous God could be confined
to churches and synagogues and kept away from the struggles for racial justice in the streets of
Selma or Birmingham. At the same time, such a deity could serve as the perfect model for the
sovereign white segregationist. After all, the various forms of white racism—red-lining, hyper
imprisonment of blacks, separate-but-equal schools—were (and are) the results of coveting
spaces. The deity that was needed to protect these spaces had been euphemistically described by
pro-segregationist preachers as far back as James Henley Thornwell and Robert Lewis Dabney
as a “God of order” who monitored the use of these spaces and ensured white domination over
them.99 Heschel, by contrast, believed in a God concerned with realities realized in history—
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righteousness, mercy, and justice. This God could neither be kept out of certain spaces (as
apathetic white liberals who refused to assist in the civil rights movement tried to do), nor used
as the pretext for spatial domination (as white supremacist Christians tried to do). In other words,
this was the liberating God of Sabbath.
Another social issue Heschel addressed with a Sabbatical approach was the problem of
(literal) space-domination. In the late 1960’s Heschel became skeptical of the billions of dollars
spent on space research. He held no animosity to astronomy as such, and he faulted none of the
scientists who sought to discover life on Venus or Mars, or stage multiple lunar landings.
However, he recognized that the political urge for a conquest of space sprang not from mere
curiosity and desire for wisdom, but from a claim to sovereignty. “We are exploring space,”
Heschel said, “not so much to seek scientific truths or because we are motivated by ennobling
philosophic insight, but largely because space exploration has political and military value for the
state.”100 Heschel noted that the Johnson administration planned to invest more than $5 billion in
space research, but only $1 billion in the war on poverty.101 This arose from spatial covetousness,
predicated on a theology of spatial sovereignty that was ultimately idolatrous, creating a type of
science that had become a deity in itself.102 Heschel’s moral challenge to space research thus
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arose from a Sabbatical political theology—a vision of sovereignty which promotes not the
grasping of more space, but the “letting be” of human beings.
Heschel’s Sabbatical political theology was perhaps most strikingly at play in his
response to the Vietnam War. Heschel realized that this war emerged from spatial
covetousness—the poverty and susceptibility to communism in South Vietnam had been
produced by colonial exploitation.103 Moreover, Heschel observed that the American government
refused to end the hopeless war in part because of national egoism: “Our government seems to
recognize the tragic error and futility of the escalation of our involvement but feels that we
cannot extricate ourselves without public embarrassment of such dimension as to cause damage
to America’s prestige.”104 In other words, the war was maintained by a particular vision of
sovereignty—and it was not Sabbatical sovereignty.
In speaking out against America’s corrupt violent and corrupt approach to sovereignty in
Vietnam, Heschel at one point directly appealed to the biblical vision of sovereign power, using
a passage that does not mention Sabbath, but directly displays its underlying logic:
When President Johnson expressed to veterans his consternation at the fact that so
many citizens protested against his decisions in Vietnam, in spite of his authority
as President and the vast amount of information at his disposal, I responded, at the
request of John Cogley of the The New York Times, that when the Lord was
considering destroying Sodom and Gomorrah, Abraham did not hesitate to
challenge the Lord’s judgment and to carry on an argument with Him whether His
decision was just. Can it be that the Judge of the entire universe would fail to act

“The more carefully I studied the situation in Vietnam, the more obvious it became to me that the root
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justly? For all the majesty of the office of the President of the United States, he
cannot claim greater majesty than God Himself.105
Here the sovereignty of the American government stands in sharp contrast to that of Abraham’s
God—a deity who acts only for the sake of justice and mercy, not conquest. Notice that
Heschel’s approach specifically models human sovereignty on its divine counterpart, but not in a
way that uses the latter as a pretext for magnifying the former. Since God is a sovereign who
curtails sovereignty by listening to Abraham, President Johnson should also curtail his own
sovereignty and listen to criticism. Although Heschel does not mention Sabbath in this passage,
his approach clearly proceeds from a Sabbatical political theology.
Summary
Heschel uses Jewish textual traditions to access a profound understanding of
inoperativity—one that establishes an anthropology that counteracts the tendency for human
beings to define themselves by spatial acquisition and spatial control. In Heschel’s view,
Sabbatical inoperativity demonstrates that persons are meant to exist for and with others, as
agents who exercise sovereignty through letting be. This theological anthropology is grounded in
a view of God as one who also exercises sovereignty in a Sabbatical mode. God “lets us be”
not—of course—as one who does not care about us (deism) but as a God who passionately
desires human freedom.
The Sabbath textual traditions Heschel employs therefore establish an anthropology that
opposes the “spatial covetousness” that marks many modern conceptions of the human being.
Heschel’s own practical work in political activism reveals that his own opposition to spatial
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covetousness was the basis for his prophetic critiques of racism, war, and economic injustice. For
Heschel, this inoperative or Sabbatical mentality is how an authentic concept of political justice
emerges from Jewish tradition.
Conclusion
Together, via their respective interpretations of Christian and Jewish textual resources,
Moltmann and Heschel offer a powerful theoretical framework for understanding how
inoperativity can inform political theory. They do so by each contributing elements of an
inoperative anthropology—a way of viewing the human being that de-centers production and
spatial acquisition. Because “the personal is political,” alterations in anthropology will also
change politics in specific in possibly dramatic ways. Moltmann suggests one important way in
which an inoperative anthropology grounded in biblical texts could influence a political
paradigm—by changing the way we view labor. For his part, Heschel subtly applies his
inoperative anthropology to a variety of issues, all of which he views as grounded in an
anthropology of spatial covetousness. These issues include racial injustice, the U.S. involvement
in Vietnam, and even the immoral prioritizing of outer-space acquisition at the expense of
America’s poor. At first glance, Heschel’s political views on these issues may seem to have
nothing to do with Sabbath or inoperativity. But a close examination reveals that they are deeply
intertwined.
Moltmann’s and Heschel’s work hints at a way forward between political paradigms of
control and subjugation (often expressed as benevolent paternalism) on one hand and apathetic
laissez-faire approaches on the other. A politics of inoperativity, grounded in a vision of God’s
rest with human beings, suggests a politics in which human beings maximize the humanity of
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themselves and others by working for the sake of being, rather than being for the sake of
working. Both totalitarian and libertarian political paradigms seek to maximize material output
as the ultimate aims of society. An inoperative politics, however, rests on an image of humanity
in which persons exceed these production-oriented criteria. What this means in detail I will
explain in chapter four.
There are key differences between Moltmann and Heschel, however; and these
differences are illuminating. At a basic level, Heschel’s theology of Sabbath is more developed
because he appeals to textual resources that Moltmann does not use (traditional Jewish sources).
More importantly, however, there seems to be a massive difference in the way Moltmann and
Heschel view temporality and the future. Heschel’s work does not appeal to any type of
eschatology in explaining the significance of Sabbath. Heschel, as I have shown, views Sabbath
as simply a “temple in time”—a way of seeing eternity in the present (although he does offer
eschatological hints in his work, these strands of thinking do not play a major role). Moltmann,
by contrast, centers Sabbath in eschatological time. Yet they arrive at similar views of the
significance of Sabbath.
It is almost as if Moltmann moves toward the same view by approaching time from
different vantage points. Heschel looks at the Sabbath and through it views eternity. Moltmann,
with his future-oriented perspective, looks at eternity and through it views the Sabbath. Both thus
end up seeing inoperative time as the way the world should be—a prescription for ethical
politics.
The fact that two thinkers who operate with such different hermeneutics can arrive at
similar interpretations of inoperativity suggests that there is an enormous potential for greater
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interfaith dialogue on the meaning of inoperativity within Jewish and Christian traditions. One of
the most glaring differences between Judaism and Christianity has to do with time and
eschatology. Christianity asserts that the Messiah has come, and Judaism rejects this claim.
Disagreements over the nature of the Messiah and the Messiah’s role in time are therefore at the
core of the theological distinction between Judaism and Christianity. Nevertheless, Sabbath as
“messianic time”—which is to say, time that pulls future justice into the present—could be a
time in which the two communities experience the same phenomenon. Sabbath could be a
theological and ritual meeting point for these communities, possibly a time for a shared
existence. More research needs to be done on the interreligious significance of Sabbath for
Jewish and Christian communities.
The fact that two thinkers from different traditions arrive at a similar political theology
of Sabbath also suggests that inoperativity has a significance that transcends religious categories
altogether. In the next chapter I will explore why this is the case, from a philosophical
perspective.

CHAPTER II
INOPERATIVITY IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
JEAN-YVES LACOSTE AND GIORGIO AGAMBEN
Thus far, we have seen that the religious traditions of Judaism and Christianity offer a
rich field of reflection for the political meaning of inoperativity. However, inoperativity has not
only been a conceptual resource for traditional theologians like Heschel and Moltmann. Modern
philosophers, too, have pondered ways of thinking about human beings from the perspective of
inoperative rituals. This chapter analyzes two key thinkers who utilize inoperativity as a central
motif in their thought: Jean-Yves Lacoste and Giorgio Agamben. Both of these thinkers find
inoperativity to be a central concept in creating a new form of political thought. Lacoste explores
inoperativity “from below” by doing a detailed phenomenology of liturgical acts that involve
non-action. Agamben, on the other hand, approaches inoperativity from an overarching
standpoint that attempts to investigate “life” itself, suggesting that inoperativity could be a means
of changing the political conceptions of life that uphold Western political theory.
The following discussion will explore Lacoste’s and Agamben’s contributions to a theory
of inoperativity. Together, they offer mutually complimentary insights into inoperativity, with
Agamben complicating a core idea Lacoste offers.
Lacoste’s Phenomenology of Inoperativity
Unlike Agamben, whose work spans vast categories and whose method is sometimes
seemingly inscrutable (see below), Lacoste focuses intensely on the phenomenology of religious
worship, or liturgy. According to Lacoste, liturgy displays inoperativity as one of its central
49
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features. In the following three sections, I will outline the methodological background for
Lacoste’s work on inoperativity, describe Lacoste’s understanding of inoperativity, and finally
explain its implications for an understanding of Sabbath and sovereignty.
Method
The philosophical understanding of inoperativity Lacoste builds draws upon on a long
lineage of continental thought. Several thinkers throughout the twentieth century use
inoperativity as a key concept. Georges Bataille describes inoperativity as the self-limiting that
sovereign powers must use in order to preserve power.1 Drawing on Bataille’s concept of
inoperativity, Jean-Luc Nancy formulates a notion of an “inoperative community” based on the
open space or “borderlands” between finite singular beings.2 Against the idea that community
consists in an aggressive “coming together” of such beings through vigorous “political will” (as
in various totalitarian movements), Nancy finds community as formed through the very absence
of such efforts. This type of community arises as human beings let each other exist freely. The
community dwells together without a telos or operative goal. This concept of inoperativity is
radically expanded in a response to Nancy’s work written by Maurice Blanchot.3 Likewise
drawing on Bataille, Blanchot, agrees with Nancy that community forms only through the

See Georges Bataille, “Le temps de la revolte,” in George Batailles—Essential Writings, ed. Michael
Richardson (London: SAGE Publications, 1998), 191; Georges Bataille, Literature and Evil, trans. Alastair
Hamilton (London: Calder & Boyers, 1973), 134. On this idea of sovereign self-limiting see also Georges Bataille,
The Absence of Myth, trans. Michael Richardson (London: Verso, 1994), 272-274. Bataille envisions a sovereign
who does not work, and by doing so maintains control of the work of others. For another example of this type of
inoperativity see Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share, Volume III: Sovereignty, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:
Urzone Books, 1993), 247-249.
1

2

Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, ed. Peter Connor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1991).
3

See Maurice Blanchot, The Unavowable Community, trans. Pierre Joris (Barrytown, NY: Station Hill
Press, 1988).
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absence of work, or inoperativity. However, Blanchot goes even further, arguing that the
acceptance of being in a community is “bound to an equivalent refusal or rejection” of
community, because to belong to a community “means nearly immediately to form a countergroup, to renounce it violently.”4 Blanchot implies that real community requires forceful
distancing of oneself from others, not in order to truly become distant and lonely, but in order to
preserve the space between persons and resist the urge to mindless conformity that
simultaneously creates and destroys communities.
While these thinkers explore inoperativity by analyzing social interactions, Lacoste takes
a different approach. His theory of inoperativity emerges from an account of human beings’
interactions with God in the context of worship. In his major work, Experience and the Absolute,
Lacoste describes how inoperativity plays a central role in liturgical experience.5 Lacoste
distinguishes liturgical experience from “religious experience,” which he claims is too easily
categorized in post-Schleiermacher theology as simply a realm of feeling.6 Liturgy is an action, a
structure of human involvement with the world. Religious experience tends toward an
assessment of internal dispositions and psychological states, neither of which directly concern
Lacoste. By focusing precisely on the liturgical, rather than the “religious” or “sacred,” Lacoste
compliments and also distances himself from other phenomenologists of religion.7 In an
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5
Jean-Yves Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute: Disputed Questions on the Humanity of Man, trans.
Mark Raftery-Skehan (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004).
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This is not to suggest that other philosophers working in phenomenology ignore liturgy. Some who have
engaged with liturgical themes include Jean-Louis Chretien, “The Wounded Word: Phenomenology of Prayer,” in
Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: The French Debate, ed. Dominique Janicaud (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2000), 147-175; and Michel Henry, I Am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, trans.
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important essay, Lacoste argues that the human experience of God (in the phenomenological
sense) is not what happens during transcendent experiences, because human beings do not grasp
God immediately, but instead are placed before God—God is a “limit” of their experience.8
Because “liturgy” means being before the Absolute as the maximal limit of human
experience, the word “worship” is not broad enough to encapsulate what liturgy means for
Lacoste. He defines the term as “the logic that presides over the encounter between man and God
writ large.”9 In other words, worship is not simply an isolated encounter with a numinous reality
(a discrete worship-experience), but a confrontation of a person’s total self with the Absolute. By
distancing himself from theologians of worship-experience (such as Schleiermacher or Otto),
Lacoste intends to escape the type of theology that views human beings as living “shells” of
monadic engagements with the divine. He also, like Jean-Luc Marion, wants to avoid depicting

Susan Emanuel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). For an overview of phenomenological approaches
to religion and liturgy see J. Aaron Simmons and Bruce Ellis Benson, The New Phenomenology: A Philosophical
Introduction (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 157-176. For an example of a rejection of phenomenological methods
that utilize liturgy see Nathan R. Kerr, “From Description to Doxology: The Dogmatic Bases of Christian Vision,”
in Transcendence and Phenomenology, ed. Conor Cunningham and Peter M. Candler (London: SCM Press, 2007),
174-200.
Lacoste asserts that the very nature of transcendence prohibits it from being “felt” in the way nontranscendent objects are felt: “I may feel something, I may feel the transcendental conditions of experience (‘that is,
what Heidegger calls the ‘world’), I may be affected by the world while hearing this or that, but I cannot both feel
myself as being-in-the world and feel some transcendent entity.” See Jean-Yves Lacoste, “Perception,
Transcendence and the Experience of God,” in Transcendence and Phenomenology, ed. Conor Cunningham and
Peter M. Candler (London: SCM Press, 2007), 1-20. Here Lacoste argues specifically with William Alston, who
alleges that “Christian Mystical Experience” is analogous to sense perception. See William P. Alston, Perceiving
God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). On Lacoste’s
distancing himself from the phenomenologists of religion see Jean-Yves Lacoste, “Phenomenology and the
Frontier,” in Quiet Powers of the Possible: Interviews in Contemporary French Phenomenology, ed. Tarek R. Dika
and W. Christ Hacket (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 188-210.
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God as a phenomenon like any other. Lacoste follows Heidegger in understanding human
beings as embedded in a world of action, even before they can isolate individual human
experiences.11 “The world has already taken possession of Dasein prior to any conscious action
or awareness,” Lacoste explains.12 For this reason, Lacoste strives to consider religious actions
themselves, not merely the particular emotions or actions they evoke.
Because human beings exist in and through action, analysis of religious action reveals a
unique form of existence as well. Looking at what people do in worship displays what they are.
This logic is not merely confined to the human realm. In an analogical way, religious action
speaks to God’s form of existence, because God’s being is disclosed in the human/divine nexus
portrayed in liturgy. Indeed, as Kevin Hart points out, Lacoste follows a long stream of Catholic
thought (influenced notably by Karl Rahner and Henri De Lubac) in which reality itself is
“graced” such that all human experience is experience of God, though not as if God were a
datum within experience.13 Hence, although the ostensible purpose of Experience and the

For an example of Marion’s work in phenomenology that attempts to avoid this tendency see Jean-Luc
Marion, Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jefferey L. Kossky (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2002).
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Heidegger posits that human being is “being-there” (Dasein), which means that existence involves not
eternal traits imprinted on the core of human reality, but on actions and various forms of involvement with the
world. For his introduction of this key concept see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 78-90. For overviews of the concept of Dasein see Wayne
Martin, “The Semantics of ‘Dasein’ and the Modality of Being and Time,” in The Cambridge Companion to
Heidegger’s Being and Time, ed. Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 100-128; and
Nate Zuckerman, “Heidegger and the Essence of Dasein,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 53, no. 1 (2015): 493516.
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heavily on action and not on traditional religious experience. Lacoste seems to anticipate this critique, and
immediately grants it: “There is, of course, no being-in-the world that is not reflected in a consciousness.

Hart writes: “To dwell liturgically is not just one option out of many for human beings; it is our essential
possibility because—and here Lacoste is close to Henri de Lubac—we are always and already oriented towards
God.” See Kevin Hart, “Religious Experience and the Phenomenality of God,” in Between Philosophy and
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Absolute is highly philosophical, Lacoste cannot avoid raising theological questions also,
because any attempt to understand the human act of worship will involve implications about the
God who is worshipped. In Lacoste’s framework, this is the essential link between philosophy
and theology. Both fields, he argues in his later work From Theology to Theological Thinking,
are the results of the interpretation of life, and thus must inevitably coincide.14 To interpret lived
experience is the purpose of phenomenology. But since lived experience unavoidably includes
worship, phenomenology cannot elude theology (and vice versa).15 Liturgy is thus a datum
meriting close theological evaluation, particularly because it is the locus of everything pertaining
to what it means to be human, and also everything connected to what human beings can know
about God.
As a microcosm of the totality of human existence, liturgy unveils much more about
human existence than phenomenology has realized. Although liturgical activity encompasses
only a small aspect of human life—perhaps taking up merely a few hours a week for even the

Theology: Contemporary Interpretations of Christianity, ed. Lieven Boeve and Christoph Brabant (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2010), 142. Hart argues that Lacoste turns in a different direction than Rahner, because the former
interprets “orientation toward God” not as experience of God, but rather as experience of being in the place of Christ
in relation to God. See Kevin Hart, “The Liturgical Reduction,” Josephinum Journal of Theology, 15, no. 1 (2008):
41-66.
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Jean-Yves Lacoste’s Phenomenality of God,” Bijdragen, International Journal in Philosophy and Theology, 71, no.
1 (2010): 87-92.
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most religious people—its massive significance cannot be ignored. Liturgy reflects human
beings greatest struggles to apprehend the beyond in their experience of reality. Because these
struggles are never resolved, liturgy appears fruitless in certain respects. However profound their
rituals may be, human beings never grasp the Absolute through liturgy. Perhaps the best analogy
for this experience is one that Jean-Louis Chretien also employs to describe prayer: Jacob’s
wrestling with the angel in the book of Genesis.16 Jacob does not win the wrestling match (he
gets his hip dislocated—a fairly damning occurrence in any martial contest), and thus is not able
to possess or control the divine. The worshipper encounters a simultaneous presence and distance
of the divine.
For Lacoste, this distance from the divine is accompanied by a simultaneous distance
from the world. Thus, though liturgy is a diversion from pressing worldly realities, it is
nevertheless a diversion that does not hide us from the world, but expands the boundaries of our
world. This is because the experience of the Absolute is not separable—but is distinguishable—
from other categories of experience.17 We may encounter liturgical elements in many parts of our
lives, but not in such a way that the liturgical element dissolves completely. Because of this
uniqueness, liturgy distracts the human being from regular life, but not in a way that
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Fordham University Press, 2002), 122.
17
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58. See also Jean-Yves Lacoste, Présence et parousie (Geneve: Ad Solem, 2006), 17-46.
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impoverishes or negates the significance of that life. This element of Lacoste’s liturgical
18

analysis is essential for understanding the role of inoperativity.
Lacoste’s Understanding of Inoperativity
According to Lacoste, liturgy is both useless and vital at the same time. “We have better
things to ‘do’ than pray, and when we pray we actually ‘do’ nothing,” Lacoste admits. “But the
world from which liturgy diverts us is not a world over which goodwill reigns, and, at bottom, it
is this world from which we must take leave, in a meantime, so as to discover our responsibilities
in the world.”19 The futility of liturgy is for Lacoste the essence of its importance, and what
makes it fit strangely into an otherwise production-oriented society. Furthermore, grasping this
futility is crucial because it is only way we can understand our being-in-the-world completely.
This essential uselessness of liturgy is what Lacoste calls “liturgical inoperativity.” He
appeals to the phenomenon of the night vigil as an example. When keeping a night vigil, a
worshipper is deliberately unproductive. Night is usually reserved for sleep, which is technically
a form of productivity (because the worker needs sleep in order to continue working well). But,
as Lacoste argues, the night vigil “is neither a time of salaried work (negotium) nor a time
appropriate for leisure (otium), for which “free” days would be better suited than sleep-deprived
nights.”20 By participating in a night vigil the worshipper acts in a strictly unnecessary way

As Joeri Schrijvers notes, “Liturgical experience is constituted through an exodus from the Heideggerian
world and earth. The liturgical reduction, then, places everything which keeps the human being at a distance from
God (namely the world, the earth, and history) ‘there’ or existing only for God—coram Deo.” See Joeri Schrijvers,
An Introduction to Jean-Yves Lacoste (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 143.
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describe everyday human diversions. However, it is important to point out that worship itself can be a form of
“leisure” as Josef Pieper points out. According to Pieper, there are legitimate forms of leisure focused on the
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(unnecessary from the perspective of being in the world). In other words, the worshipper simply
exists in a state of nothingness, analogous in many ways to St. John of the Cross’s “nocturnal
experience.”21
This nothingness or lack of necessity in the night vigil is also displayed in the fact that, in
Western society, such ritual activities are essentially free. That is to say, no one can be truly
compelled by anyone—divine or human—to keep a night vigil or observe a religious activity of
a similar type. Although Lacoste does not explore the phenomenological significance of religious
freedom in Experience and the Absolute, his analysis seems to presuppose it, for the simple
reason that a worshipper who was fulfilling an obligation to the deity by performing the liturgical
act would be demoting the deity from a position as the Absolute to one in whom there could be
deficiencies or dependencies. A liturgy done before the Absolute, then, cannot be conceived as a
means to obtaining a divine return of some type, since the logic inherent in such an act would
contradict the idea of an Absolute itself. This is why the idea that God needs or benefits from
human praise is not a praiseworthy way of speaking about God.22 Similarly, compulsion from
of leisure and to sloth (in its old metaphysical and theological sense).” See Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of
Culture, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 48. Pieper defines leisure as “everything which,
without being merely useful, is an essential part of a full human existence” (Pieper, Leisure, 49). Under this
definition, Lacoste’s night vigil would also constitute leisure.
Lacoste himself makes a clear connection between inoperativity and the nocturnal experience in “De la
phénoménologie de l’esprit à la Montée Du Carmel,” Revue Thomiste 97, no. 1 (January-March 1989): 5-37. John
of the Cross describes this nocturnal experience as a type of aridity in which the soul seeking God should renounce
earthly affections. See John of the Cross, Ascent of Mt. Carmel, trans. E. Allison Peers (Mineola: Dover, 2008).
Throughout his works, Lacoste appeals to John of the Cross’ work frequently. Perhaps this is because the Spanish
mystic relies heavily on themes of emptiness and absence, while also emphasizing a simultaneous presence of
God—a paradoxical tension that also characterizes Lacoste’s work. On this see Matthew David Farley, “Jean-Yves
Lacoste on John of the Cross: Theological Thinker Par Excellence,” Modern Theology 32, no. 1 (January 2016): 319.
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human authorities to bow before the Absolute would be woefully self-defeating. In a strict sense,
in order to maintain its integrity, liturgy must be without purpose—decidedly inoperative.
This sounds like an irresolvable paradox, and Lacoste struggles to articulate its meaning.
What are the implications of the idea that the human relationship to the absolute is characterized
by inoperativity? One thing becomes immediately clear: In liturgy the worshipper reveals that
her/his being is not summed up by activity or production. Lacoste connects this existential reality
with the language of rights:
Once our inevitable allocation of work, whose distribution is necessary,
foreseeable, and commonplace, has been completed, and once our daytime duties
have been fulfilled, the decision to keep vigil proves that we remain in possession
of a fundamental right: that of proving, by the content we give to our vigil (which
we can spend doing philosophy, writing poetry, or praying—and many other
things besides), the surplus of meaning we give to our humanity.23
For Lacoste, liturgy intentionally contradicts the tendency to sum up a person’s being by gauging
that person’s productivity, suggesting that we have a “right” not to be defined in this way. In
other words, human beings have a right to a “surplus” of meaning.24
Lacoste suggests that this surplus of being could stem from the very nature of the
Absolute. Boldly, he claims that the non-necessity of the liturgy is “the same as that in which the
Absolute is itself not necessary.”25 In other words, the God of the night vigil is not the God of

Literature, 1975). See also Christina Gschwandtner, “Toward a Ricoeurian Hermeneutics of Liturgy,” Worship 86,
no. 6 (2012): 482-505.
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necessary action (actus purus)—or, least, this God cannot be fully reduced to such action. At
first glance, there appears to be irony in Lacoste’s use of the term “Absolute” to describe God,
for if the Hegelian “Absolute” is anything at all, it is certainly necessary.27 But the paradoxical
“unnecessary Absolute” captures a bold insight from the phenomenology of liturgy: The
worshipper encounters God, but this God is not the static form of “pure actuality” often
attributed to Neo-Scholasticism. This God is both less and more than pure actuality. Between the
categories of “unnecessary” and “Absolute” is the “excess” of the inoperative God. Lacoste’s
framing of the worshipper as existing in a state of excess is similar to Marion’s depiction of the
subject as purely a “recipient” (adonné) of “saturated phenomena” that always overwhelm or
exceed the subject’s intention.28 Perhaps the key difference between Lacoste and Marion is that
the latter attempts to place the subject in a middle place between pure passivity and active
engagement with the given, whereas the former places the worshipper in a position of pure
passivity before the inoperativity of the Absolute.29 For Lacoste, there is no sense in which the

The idea that God’s being is unnecessary or “beyond the necessary” is a point Lacoste derives from
Eberhard Jungel, God as Mystery of the World, trans. Darrell Guder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983).
26

27
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between Aquinas’s and Hegel’s understanding of the necessity and actuality of God see Emilio Brito, Dieu et l’etre
d’apres Thomas d’Aquin et Hegel (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), 114-133.
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See Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent
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Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
29
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worshipper may grasp or actively engage the Absolute in worship. Worship is simply an
experience of being before a phenomenon of overflowing grace. Lacoste sums up the theological
implications of this understanding of liturgy: “Liturgy will perhaps be able to offer us the bread
necessary to life. But it first offers us the wine of the kingdom.”31
This “wine”—an unnecessary surplus—is not a side benefit or epiphenomenon of liturgy,
as if the worshipper were truly aiming at some concrete social or psychological goal of worship
but ended up with a happenstance ritual treat.32 This “wine” is a surplus of nothing—it is an
experience of an absence.33 The worshipper does not experience a thing or element of sense
perception upon which to act. One simply exists in a state of beholding, without grasping or
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Although Lacoste seems to insist on this point, there is an obvious sense in which Lacoste would
probably admit an active role for the worshipper in encountering the Absolute. After all, worshippers do show up to
liturgies, and must actively choose inoperativity. Perhaps this is a way in which Lacoste might be led to agree with
Marion’s claim for a level of activity in the reception of the gift (see footnote 29, above).
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As Schrijvers notes, the one who prays (in Lacoste’s interpretation) “has an experience of ‘praying
despite everything’ even if this prayer does not grant the one praying what he or she wants or desires.” See Joeri
Schrijvers, “Introduction,” Modern Theology 31, no. 4 (October, 2015): 638-640. Schrijvers’s comment points to a
challenge for Lacoste, which is how to explain forms of worship which seem to deliberately attempt to enact certain
outcomes (the most obvious of which is the act of praying “for” something or someone). Lacoste’s analysis appears
to suggest that these types of liturgy could only be idolatrous (because they would claim to grasp or modify the
Absolute in some way), yet this is not how Christian tradition has understood them. Perhaps the only way to
understand such liturgies is to frame them as attempts to align oneself with the Absolute, thus creating changes in
the world, but not by virtue of productive operations.
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The theme of “excess” as an element of human experience of worship is also a central point in Lacoste’s
Étre en danger (Paris: Cerf, 2011). By this “excess” Lacoste means an element that cannot be accounted for, a
beyond that is still experienced by its absence. As Robyn Horner points out, this excess bears significant similarity
to what other philosophers have understood to be “the gift”—which Jacques Derrida argues is also the presence of
an absence (because a gift entails more than its own being). See Robyn Horner, “What Does the Gift Reveal?”
Louvain Studies 39 (2015-16): 315-336. See also Jacques Derrida, Given Time. 1: Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy
Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); The Gift of Death, trans. David Willis (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2007). Another key thinker who explores the gift as unaccounted-for excess is Jean-Luc Marion; see
his “On the Gift,” in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. M. Scanlon and John D. Caputo (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1999), 56-66; Negative Certainties, trans. Stephen Lewis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2015).
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manipulating that which is beheld. In many ways, this mirrors Aquinas’ vision of the ultimate
end of human worship. Notwithstanding Aquinas’s description of God as pure act, his
description of the ultimate goal of human existence in the exitus-reditus format of history is a
form of inoperativity—the beatific vision—in which the human being accomplishes nothing
except existing in the incomparable beauty and goodness of the divine.34 It would constitute an
eisegesis to say that Aquinas depicts human beings as made to “do nothing,” but in a sense, this
must be true.35 Lacoste merely adds a simple deduction: God’s being must also reflect this
ultimate inoperativity.
The act of praising God in liturgy also reflects divine inoperativity. It is obvious that God
does not need human adoration. Of course, there is always a luring superstition which asserts that
praise will please the deity, resulting in various useful blessings. Yet in its institutionalized form,
praise persists despite the fact that human beings recognize its uselessness. This parallels the fact
that the early Christian movement recognized the ineffectiveness of temples in housing God, yet
continued to pray at the temple.36
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See W.J. Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas’ Doctrine of God as Expounded in the Summa Theologiae
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 136-142.
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William J. Hoye argues that for Aquinas, the purpose of the beatific vision is not one more dynamic
action but rather the summing up of all action in the perfection of existence. This means that the human being in the
beatific vision becomes united with God, not merely observing but participating in the divine existence. See William
J. Hoye, Actualitas Omnium Actuum: Man’s Beatific Vision of God as Apprehended by Thomas Aquinas
(Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1975), 145-146.
36
See Acts 7:48-50 vis-à-vis Acts 2:46. The tension in these passages may not be as pronounced as it first
appears. As Ben Witherington observes, Stephen’s speech in Acts 7:48-50 does not rail against the temple itself, but
against a distorted view of the temple which made it a means to possess God’s presence. This critique of temple
worship was not anti-Jewish, but well in line with the precedents of the Jewish prophets such as Isaiah and Ezekiel.
See Ben Witherington III, The Acts of the Apostles: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1998), 261-263. See also Robert Tannehill, The Narrative Unity of Luke-Acts: A Literary Interpretation, vol. 2
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 93.
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Political Implications
Lacoste does not immediately and seamlessly move into the social/political implications
of inoperativity. His goal is simply to examine inoperativity at the heart of the phenomenon of
worship. One looks in vain through Lacoste’s corpus to find the type of political speculations one
might find in other thinkers such as Blanchot or Nancy.
Yet by making inoperativity central to the experience of the Absolute, Lacoste’s work
entails a massive shift in the topology of political theology. This is because it relocates the
fulcrum of God’s ruling action. Usually, theologies of divine action speak of God as acting upon
the world as a moving agent, whether an unmoved one (Aristotle) or one who is moved upon by
the world to some degree (process theology). These frameworks all raise the question of a
“causal nexus” of divine action on the world. Deistic accounts of divine causality place this
causal nexus far back at the beginning of creation, thereby shrouding it in mystery. Process
theologians—for whom God’s action on the world is a present reality—find this question more
pressing, and have offered interesting answers. Philip Clayton, to give one example, posits that
God’s causal nexus on the world is analogous to that of mind on body.37 However, Lacoste’s
image of an inoperative sovereignty points toward another option: God’s does not act “on” the
world as a causal force. Rather, God “lets the world be” from a position at the borderlands of the
world.38 God does not push the world from above, below, or behind, but accompanies the world
as a liberating presence.
Clayton refers to this as “emergent causality.” See Philip Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit: God, World,
Divine Action (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008). See also Philip Clayton, The Problem of God in Modern Thought
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000). For another process perspective that addresses the problem of the divine causal
nexus see Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984).
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Christina Gschwandtner highlights Lacoste’s tendency to describe liturgy as a space where God freely
makes Godself available, but always as One who respects the limits of the human world, even while subverting
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God’s sovereignty as non-coercive accompaniment of the world is a political implication
of inoperative liturgy that also emerges in a fascinating chapter Lacoste writes on monasticism
and topology.39 This chapter discusses how inoperative liturgy seems to place a worshipper both
within and without the world.40 A contemplative who sits in a cell establishes an attitude of
distance from place as such, even while paradoxically inhabiting a very distinct and deliberate
place. “By dint of consenting to be-there, the recluse actually disposes of place in order to be
nowhere, or almost nowhere,” Lacoste observes.41 This image is reminiscent of the Jesus’ prayer
in the Gospel of John, in which he spoke of his disciples being “in the world” but not “belonging
to the world” (John 17:14-15).42

them: “Liturgy can welcome God’s presence but it does not make it automatic; it welcomes a gift but it does not
control it.” See Christina Gschwandtner, “The Vigil as Exemplary Liturgical Experience: On Jean-Yves Lacoste’s
Phenomenology of Liturgy,” Modern Theology 31, no. 4 (October 2015): 648-657.
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The chapter is called “Place and Nonplace” in Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, 23-39.

According to Joseph Rivera, this in/out paradox that forms the core of Lacoste’s work. It is also, per
Rivera, an experience that also reflects the nature of the Church, as well as the sacraments. Rivera faults Lacoste (as
well as Marion and Henry) for using extra-worldly encounter “to minimize rather than celebrate the ineluctable tie
Christ has to the world itself.” See Joseph Rivera, “Corpus Mysticum and Religious Experience: Henry, Lacoste, and
Marion,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 14, no. 3 (July, 2012): 327-349. Another thinker who has
similarly argued that extra-worldly experience should not negate the connection of God to the world is James G.
Hart, Who One Is: Book 2: Existenz and Transcendental Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 544.
Although I agree that Lacoste’s work can easily lend itself to this problematic interpretation, for reasons I will
continue to explain I do not think that Lacoste’s point necessarily entails world-negation. Lacoste’s analysis portrays
the human being in an unstable yet coherent place of encounter with a limit—one which ultimately directs the
human being back toward the world.
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There may be something to this parallel, but not too exactly. Jesus is not talking about phenomenology.
The term “world” has several meanings in the Johannine literature, some of which refer to groups of people (all
people and some malevolent people, specifically) and others to ontological aspects of the world (“the things of the
world” in 1 John 2:15). In part, then, John’s understanding of world could connect with Lacoste’s ontological
definition of “world.” See Stanley B. Marrow, “Kosmos in John,” The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 64, no. 1 (January
2002): 90-102. See also Bill Salier, “What’s in a World? Kosmos in the Prologue of John’s Gospel,” The Reformed
Theological Review 50, no. 3 (December 1997): 105-117.
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According to Lacoste, this uncanny, dizzying form of inoperativity characterizes Christ’s
incarnation as well. He points to countless liturgical icons or statues in which the infant Christ is
depicted holding a globe in his hands, symbolizing the world or the universe.43 There seems to be
a double paradox here, in that (1) Christ rules the world not as an adult, but as an infant and (2)
that as an infant Christ was historically within the cosmos, and yet here Christ is depicted
holding the cosmos from without. These combined paradoxes point toward a fascinating spin on
the Christus Victor atonement model: Christ conquers the world, but not as the stereotypical
imperialist who expands the borders of his empire through violent domination. He vanquishes
the earth not by pushing against its borders, but by negating the opposition between heaven and
earth. To do this, he “infiltrates” the world, but not as a foreign invader. Entering the world as a
fully human infant, Christ does not annihilate the powers that establish the “friend/enemy
distinction,” but instead subverts the concepts of “within” and “without,” uniting mundane
humanity with extra-cosmic divinity. The result is a political theology in which God’s governing
force functions through passivity—what Lacoste’s commentator Kevin Hart refers to as a
“kenotic existence”—and what I would call, in the context of sovereignty, a “letting be.”44
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Hart explores the theme of “ontological poverty” in Lacoste, which refers to the state of emptiness that
the worshipper encounters before the Absolute. “We can properly dwell on earth only beneath the Cross, Lacoste
insists, for it is there that the disappropriation of death and the disappropriation for God converge and diverge. To
live merely marked by death is to experience poverty for nothing; yet to divest ourselves of everything so that we
can live for God is to experience poverty as openness to everything.” See Kevin Hart, “Poverty’s Speech’: On
Liturgical Reduction,” Modern Theology 31, no. 4 (October 2015): 641-647. This “openness to everything” is the
positive side of inoperativity that forms the key to ethics. It allows one to renounce the possession of works, and
thus returning to their proper use. The result is a form of politics that renounces domination, a via crucis. For a
similar argument see Stanislas Breton, The Word and the Cross, trans. Jacquelyn Porter (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2002). Obviously there is an enormous overlap here what we have seen Moltmann doing
(especially in The Crucified God), except that Moltmann pulls his argument from a dogmatic Christian narrative,
rather than from phenomenology. My point is that both thinkers arrive at a complimentary place, even from such
different angles.
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At this point, Lacoste’s notion of inoperativity might appear to be politically quietistic.
The sovereign simply pulls back, creating tranquility in human affairs by doing nothing. Peace
on earth comes through nothing happening. But this is not the case, according to Lacoste’s
summary: “Pursued to its ultimate consequences, the liturgical experience prevents man from
dwelling peaceably on the earth—but every form of liturgy must learn this lesson.”45 Lacoste
points to the flip side of liturgical inoperativity: Although it accomplishes nothing (in the worldly
sense of “use” as production), it is incredibly effective at disrupting and upending political
processes within the world. Liturgical inoperativity makes the worshipper a foreigner within the
world, and foreigners—by virtue of their very existence—change the dynamics of a society or
nation. Because they put themselves outside the regular patterns of human existence, they form
spaces of disjunction that neutralize the claims society typically makes on a human being.46 “He
who prays is symbolically nowhere,” Lacoste emphasizes, and for this reason “he refuses to
participate in the dialectics that make up history; and he declares the phenomenological ground
of his historiality powerless to determine what he ultimately is.”47 Politics requires identification
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Stephanie Rumpza observes that for Lacoste, “the symbolic activity of liturgy interrupts the closure of
the world to make space for the eschatological arriving from beyond it. This symbolism does not work itself out by
contradicting or destroying the structures of Dasein, but by ‘subverting’ them from within by a ‘a work of
overdetermination’. The possibility of this overdetermination can only be realized at a certain cost: violence to the
order that we take to be essential to humanity. When liturgy attempts to reject the closed-off structures of the world
in order to place them before God, it can at most live these structures in a deliberate and marginalized way.” See
Stephanie Rumpza, “The Ascesis of Ascesis: The Subversion of Care in Jean-Yves Lacoste and Evagrius Ponticus,”
The Heythrop Journal 58 (2017): 780-788, 781. Rumpza’s use of the term “violence” to describe the effects of
Lacoste’s liturgical reduction may be too strong, although to speak of “rendering inoperative” a structure does seem
to imply a sort of violence.
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with a certain place, time, and productive activity. Liturgical inoperativity takes the worshipper
out of this matrix, and in doing so creates a governmental problem.
This problem becomes particularly clear when Lacoste raises the implications of
inoperative liturgy for Hegel’s famous “master/slave” dialectic.48 For any dialectic of this sort to
work, the master and slave must occupy distinct spaces. But what happens if those spaces are
dislocated? This is another way of asking: What happens if master and slave keep Sabbath
together? This is, after all, precisely what Exodus 20:8-11 and Deuteronomy 5:12-15 envision
with their stipulation that “you . . . and your male and female slave” must rest. If we apply
Lacoste’s logic to this mandate, we find that Sabbath does not merely provide a break for tired
servants. By keeping Sabbath together, master and slave erode the distinction between them, and
not only for the temporary moment in which they engage in the liturgy. Because they keep
Sabbath with and before the Absolute, who is also inoperative, they show “their true face”
through their rest. Sabbath, then, is not an exception to normal human life, but its governing
principle. The master and slave cannot finish their Sabbath liturgy and continue life as usual. The
suspension of normal social order made visible in the Sabbath will not let them “resign
themselves” to the distinction between them; it will haunt the entirety of their social existence,
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The idea of the master/slave, or lord/bondsman dialectic can be found in G.W.F. Hegel, The
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Michael Inwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), paragraphs 178-196.
Hegel’s argument is that the master dominates the slave through superior force, yet is dependent on the slave for
survival, and hence must grow to recognize the slave’s existence, despite simultaneously attempting to suppress and
marginalize that existence. The dialectic is fundamentally about recognition and the struggle to achieve it. For an
account of various theories of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic see Philip Moran, Hegel and the Fundamental
Problems of Philosophy (Holland: Gruner, 1988). The most prominent theorist to emphasize the importance of the
master/slave dialectic in history is Alexander Kojeve, who postulated that history moves on the basis of the dialectic,
and ends when the dialectic ends. This interpretation could suggest that a “Sabbath” is another term for the end of
history, when master and slave keep Sabbath together. I do not have space to pursue this idea here, but it deserves
further research. See Alexander Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. Raymond Queneau (New York:
Basic Books, 1969).
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restoring the dignity of the slave and stalking the conscience of the master. This type of reading
suggests Sabbath could function as one option to the end of history, and the ambiguous “last
man” heralded by Francis Fukuyama could potentially be a liturgical celebrant.49
This depiction of the resolution of the master/slave dialectic is radically different from
Hegel’s. For him, the master attains a free, independent consciousness by subjecting the slave to
labor, and the slave can only reverse this inequality by “doing”—actively reducing the inequality
through productive action. “Through work,” Hegel says, “it (the servile consciousness) comes to
its own self.”50 According to one interpretation, Hegel envisions a scenario in which the slave
gradually overcomes the inequality simply by virtue of the fact that the slave holds access to the
natural necessities of survival; the master is dependent on the slave in this sense.51 In another
interpretation, the slave overcomes the hierarchy by actively resisting it, working negatively to
topple it.52 Both of these interpretations have in common that the master and slave only achieve
unity through exertion of force. Lacoste offers an alternative: the master and slave may rest
together before God. This would not be a unity achieved through the harmonious functioning of
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Of course, Fukuyama might argue that an era of liberal Sabbath-keeping and night-vigil attendance
would not provide the thymos, or sense of recognition that human nature craves. This passion for thymos is what
Fukuyama—following Kojeve—claims is the root of the instabilities and contradictions of liberal capitalism. See
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Notwithstanding
Fukuyama’s cynicism, it is interesting to read the final chapters of his famous work with the question of
inoperativity and ritual in mind. Could ritual have something to offer in addressing the angst of liberal democracy?
This is an especially relevant question in light of the problem of climate change—a problem rooted in thymos as
well. The fourth chapter of this work will address this question in part, although I do not have the space here to bring
Fukuyama into complete dialogue with a theology of inoperativity, as fascinating as that would be.
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For a description of this interpretation see J.M. Fritzman, Hegel (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2014), 39-40.

This, of course, would be the interpretation of the “young” or “left” Hegelians. See Rocio Zambrana,
“Dialectics as Resistance: Hegel, Benjamin, Adorno,” in Hegel and Resistance: History, Politics and Dialectics, ed.
Bart Zantvoort and Rebecca Comay (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 59-77.
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a machine-like system, but through the peace of rest—submitting to the sovereignty of an
inoperative God.
The result of this, of course, is an enormous political obstacle, insofar as politics is
conducted on the basis of friend/enemy distinctions and up/down hierarchies. Because liturgy
thrusts the worshipper outside of the regular order of human values, it gives the worshipper a
perspective that relativizes the boundaries that establish political objectives. In consequence, the
worshipper cannot return to life as usual. We could perhaps compare this interpretation of
liturgical inoperativity to “stepping out of a game,” suspending its control over life and meaning,
and enabling those who go back into the game to do so with fairness and justice.53
Of course, as Lacoste admits, there are dangers lurking in this politics of inoperativity.
Such a politics can easily be conducted through the evasion of responsibility. One imagines
politicians playing golf during national disasters or police officers standing by idly while the
populace engages in violent outbursts. Could we not say that Pontius Pilate took a “Sabbath” by
washing his hands and declaring “I am innocent of this man’s blood?” Indeed, per Lacoste,
liturgical experience can furnish an alibi for those “who dwell on the world without respect for
liberty, justice, and their promotion.”54 Do we truly want political leaders who keep Sabbath as
such?
Lacoste refuses to offer a blithe, commercial-esque response to this objection. The danger
of irresponsibility in political inoperativity is real. According to Lacoste, “we admit to having no
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As Joseph Rivera points out, the liturgical reduction leaves one in a “fragile” and unstable place, because
through liturgy one has renounced or bracketed the world, only to be faced once again with being in the world. See
Joseph Rivera, “Toward a Liturgical Existentialism,” New Blackfriars 94, no. 1049 (2012): 79-96.
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choice but to confess to a certain liturgical ‘unhappiness’ of consciousness.” By this term he
55

refers to the phenomenon described by Hegel in which an “endless nostalgia” for an
“unattainable beyond” creates an inability to realize the “peace of unity.” The theological
temptation in the face of this objection is to deny that otherworldliness is an aspect of Christian
liturgy, and Lacoste cannot do this.
However, Lacoste points toward an outcome of liturgical experience that forbids the
worshipper from evading the obligations of justice. In liturgy, the worshipper discovers that
“being-in-the-world and being-before-God are thoroughly intertwined.” Liturgical inoperativity
causes a participant to become more fully human, not to escape from humanity.56 This is
because, as Lacoste puts it, “liturgy is the remarkable regional experience in which we do not
simply engage one characteristic of our being-in-the-world, but its reality in its entirety.”57 There
is something like Nicholas of Cusa’s “coincidence of opposites” in the phenomenon of liturgy:
The worshipper turns away from the world, and in doing so is confronted all the more directly
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This point addresses a long-standing debate between Lacoste and Emmanuel Levinas. The latter argues
that human beings are fundamentally oriented toward the infinite not through an orientation toward God (defined as
the Absolute or infinite), but through an orientation toward the face of the other. Lacoste, obviously, posits liturgical
experience as the site through which a human being encounters the infinite, without explicit ethical engagement. If
what I argue here is correct, there is a sense in which these two perspectives are complimentary. The Absolute does
reveal itself as utter limit, revealed in inoperative liturgy. Yet, this inoperativity thrusts the worshipper back into a
sense of obligation to the other. For this reason, it is not incorrect to see the world of ethics and the world of
inoperativity as mutually reinforcing. For Levinas’ views on ethics and the other see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality
and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969); Entre Nous: Thinking-of-theOther, trans. Michael Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). For Lacoste’s
arguments with Levinas see Being and the Absolute, 50, 71-72. As Robert Reed argues, Lacoste may have
significantly overlooked the fact that his liturgical experience and Levinas’ ethical experience may be different ways
of speaking about the same reality. See Robert C. Reed, “Experience and the Absolute Other: Why Lacoste Should
Look Again at Levinas,” Journal of Religious Ethics 44, no. 3 (2016): 472-494.
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with the world. Paradoxically, inoperativity could be necessary for genuine action in the world.
Only from a standpoint in the margins can one truly act—and thus rule—within the world.
Rule from the margins is related in many ways to democracy, but the two are not
identical. Democratic politics creates rule from the center, from figures and ideas grounded in the
midst of a stable majority. An inoperative sovereign is not disconnected from majority interests,
but is more concerned with “the least of these” in a given political scenario. Because this
sovereign’s task is to “let be,” the sovereign focuses more on those who struggle for existence
than on those whose existence is secure. To those whose interests’ “matter” from the perspective
of power and prestige, actions done for the sake of such semi-existent persons may appear to be
“nothing.” The inoperative sovereign may literally appear then to be “doing nothing.” Yet this is
the result of encounter with Lacoste’s “Absolute”—the first shall be last, and the last shall be
first.
Summary
Through a careful phenomenology of worship practices, Lacoste’s work offers a
depiction of the human relationship to the Absolute as characterized by inoperativity. The
worshipper simply exists before the Absolute—neither contributing productive work nor
receiving tangible benefits. Although Lacoste does not directly seek to formulate a political
theory of inoperativity, his understanding of liturgy straightforwardly creates a political
application: the Absolute reveals itself in practices of letting-be. This reframes the way human
beings see themselves in relation to production, and it also potentially transforms how human
beings attempt to govern others in hierarchical relationships.
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As I have shown, by describing liturgy as a site for a reframing of human relationships
within hierarchies, Lacoste claims that he is describing not just parochial events (night vigils,
religious holidays, etc.) but reality in its entirety. This suggests that inoperativity might not only
describe sundry moments in human existence, but human life as a whole. This raises the
question: May we speak of an inoperativity within human life itself? Could life as a whole enter
into a Sabbath, whereby liturgy and reality coincide completely? What would be the impact of
such a vision? In answering these questions, Agamben’s work becomes central.
Agamben: Inoperativity as a Form of Life
At the risk of sounding pejorative, one may describe the Italian philosopher Giorgio
Agamben as a squirrelly thinker.58 His work fits broadly into the category of political
philosophy, but he pilfers ideas from innumerable other disciplines, including ancient historical
anthropology, literary theory, poetry, the Bible, and church history, and he moves from one
discipline to another rapidly. The reason for this massive scope of Agamben’s investigations is
that his topic is proportionally massive: He seeks to analyze “life” itself. Specifically, he wants
to explore how human beings come to think about “life” in politically significant ways. In the
course of doing so, the theme of inoperativity emerges repeatedly. This section first describes
Agamben’s “method”59 for approaching inoperativity, and then assesses what an inoperative life
would look like and what type of politics would arise from it.
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Thomas Carl Wall describes the structure of Agamben’s book The Coming Community as “crazy, slightly
drunk (even as the thinking in it is precise and delicate).” See Thomas Carl Wall, Radical Passivity: Levinas,
Blanchot, Agamben (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), 121.

I place “method” in quotes because Agamben does not have a clearly recognizable approach in the same
sense that Lacoste does. This does not mean that Agamben fails to utilize a consistent, rigorous approach to
philosophical problems. It does mean that his works tend to address issues in a less systematic way.
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Method
It is not possible to give a firm, overarching description of Agamben’s method for
describing inoperativity—if by “method” we mean a linear process of reflection. That being said,
as Leland de la Durantaye observes, there is a “unity” to the various works Agamben has
written.60 Ancient and early modern texts form the basis for many of Agamben’s works, and he
examines them with the question of political ontology in mind: How to describe “life.”61
Life, according to Agamben, may be categorized in two different ways (a distinction he
draws from ancient Greek thought, specifically Aristotle): as zoe and as bios.62 Zoe, the first form
of life, refers to “bare” life, the life of a subsisting creature. It is characterized by an unadorned

According to Durantaye, “Agamben has written some 20 books on topics ranging from aesthetics to
politics, poetics to ontology. This diversity of topic is coupled with a unity—albeit an evolving one—of method.”
See Leland de la Durantaye, “On Method, the Messiah, Anarchy and Theocracy,” afterward to Giorgio Agamben,
The Church and the Kingdom, trans Leland de la Durantaye (London: Seagull Books, 2012), 49. This unity often
revolves around drawing from ancient sources in order to demonstrate a trajectory in Western thought toward a
particular political outcome. For example, by citing obscure ancient Roman sources in his Homo Sacer series,
Agamben hopes to point to seeds of totalitarianism rooted in the Western political mind. As Colby Dickinson and
Adam Kotsko put it, “in Homo Sacer, we learn that the entire history of Western political thought was always
heading towards the horrors of totalitarianism.” See Colby Dickinson and Adam Kotsko, Agamben’s Coming
Philosophy: Finding a New Use for Theology (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 4. One could certainly
argue that this method is speculative and arbitrary, and as scientific historical theory goes, this might be correct.
However, Agamben’s approach utilizes ancient sources not so much as “proofs” for historical theorems as
paradigms or case studies of recurring realities in history. In other words, it is not the case that contemporary
sovereigns directly have in mind the ancient figure of the homo sacer when making political pronouncements, but
rather that they find themselves reenacting the underlying idea phenomenon of the homo sacer.
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Matthew Abott argues that Agamben’s work on poetry, language and aesthetics is not merely a critical
investigation into the quirks of those disciplines, but a study of the political results of the question of human being,
or what might be called a “political ontology.” See Matthew Abott, The Figure of this World: Agamben and the
Question of Political Ontology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).
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Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); The Open:
Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); and particularly the first chapter of
The Use of Bodies, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 3-23.The zoe/bios
categorization is also important for Michel Foucault, a thinker with whose work Agamben often engages, as well as
for thinkers such as Roberto Esposito. See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume One, An Introduction,
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1978). See also Roberto Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and
Philosophy, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).
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functioning on the earth, prior to complex forms of socialization. Human beings are, in many
ways, discrete biological systems, with certain basic needs and drives, summarized by social
scientists in terms of the “Four F’s”: feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction. However,
human beings do not stay as such. We form another kind of life, designated with the Greek term
bios. This is political life, life under law, corresponding to life within the polis for Aristotle.63
Bios arises from the making and enforcing of institutions of law, whether they be states, local
governments, churches, universities, or social clubs. Much of Western political philosophy, from
Hobbes and Rousseau up to Rawls and Nozick, seeks to describe how zoe should be transformed
into bios—how human beings in a “state of nature” should form political institutions that
establish laws, and thereby ensure rights.
Ultimately, these institutions become marked by the exercise of sovereignty. For
Agamben, the sovereign is the one who guarantees that a person is more than merely zoe, but
also bios. This creation and enforcement of a certain type of bios is what Agamben, following
Foucault, calls “biopolitics.”64 In most Western states, this happens visibly in the process of
citizenship. The United States, for example, was ostensibly founded on the premise of ensuring
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Agamben’s use of Aristotle on the differentiation between different forms of life is provocative,
particularly since Aristotle is not often viewed as a thinker within the “social contract” tradition. On Agamben’s
understanding of bare life and Aristotle’s categories see James Gordon Finlayson, “‘Bare life and Politics in
Agamben’s Reading of Aristotle,” The Review of Politics 72 (2010): 97-126.

Agamben makes the argument that biopolitics begins with the “sovereign exception.” See Agamben,
Homo Sacer, 6. Biopolitics often connotes forms of political power that rely less on overtly hierarchical systems
and more on organizing life in such a way as to force human beings into certain political frameworks. This does not
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“inalienable rights” to human beings, by granting these rights to U.S. citizens. As a citizen, I
have the capacity to play a role in political action, through voting, petitioning elected officials,
and taking advantage of those freedoms guarded for me by the government. The sovereignty of
the U.S. government preserves these rights for me.
But even the briefest examination of political history reveals that no rights are ever
always considered inalienable. The sovereign is also the one who declares the state of exception
over who may be considered purely as bios, and there are many such states of exception.65 In
most western countries, the sovereign stands under the authority of the law, but may
paradoxically suspend the law when doing so is necessary to preserve the institution of
sovereignty. Sovereigns usually describe these events as “states of emergency,” but such
emergencies may easily morph into permanent conditions. An example of this would be Hitler’s
suspension of the Weimar Constitution, which ultimately created his capacity as a dictator.
Another example would be the U.S. government’s decision under George W. Bush to hold
potential “terrorists” in detention centers such as Guantanamo Bay indefinitely without trial,
thereby creating a clear violation of the writ of habeas corpus.66

Here Agamben follows Schmitt’s understanding of the “state of exception,” with the key difference being
that for Agamben, the state of exception morphs into a permanent feature of political engagement, because the state
of exception is involved in the construction of the human person as such. In this respect one can see the influence of
Arendt’s work on human existence in relation to power on his thinking. See Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. For an overview of Agamben’s connections to Arendt see Anthony
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(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 3-22. On the significance of Agamben’s understanding of sovereignty
for understanding these types of deprivations of human rights see John Lechte and Saul Newman, Agamben and the
Politics of Human Rights: Statelessness, Images, Violence (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 49-76.

75
In the state of exception, the sovereign may categorize certain human beings as bare life,
or at least on the border between zoe and bios. Agamben uses the ancient Roman example of the
homo sacer—a human being who, according to ancient sources, “could be killed but not
sacrificed” as the model of this atypical form of existence.67 The homo sacer was human,
undoubtedly, but did not fall into the category of a fully human being who would thus be eligible
for ritual death. Agamben’s modern example of a site where this reduction of life happens is the
concentration camp, where persons live as human beings, but with their biopolitical humanity
negated. Another modern example that could be added to Agamben’s analysis would be the
condition of many refugees, whose native governments fail to provide them with adequate
protections for their rights, but who are also denied entry into other countries.68 Such “stateless
persons” become subhuman, but in a fascinating and disturbing way. We all recognize that they
are human beings in their physical nature, but they lack the capacity for “life” in the sense that
citizens possess it.69 Stateless persons are rendered inoperative, an inoperativity made visible in
the vivid images of refugee camps at borderlands, where impoverished families mill about
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Here, as Lechte and Newman observe, we encounter a paradox: Bare life is not “real” life, but we cannot
escape its call on us as life. Using the example of slavery in Aristotle’s Politics, Lechte and Newman write, “Not to
be human in any way would make the slave entirely outside any possible status hierarchy. The natural slave, in
Aristotle’s terms, must still be human, otherwise slavery has no meaning. The slave, in other words, has to be
included as human, in order to be excluded from every existing form of social life.” See Lechte and Newman,
Agamben and the Politics of Human Rights, 50. By positing zoe life “on the threshold” of human society in this
manner, Agamben’s work differs from Arendt’s, who portrays the life of persons such as slaves as still having a
place in society, without the freedoms and capacities of a full member. See Arendt, The Human Condition, 177-179.
For Agamben, by contrast, the slave or refugee dwells in an “exclusive inclusion” rather than a full exclusion or
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whose significance to their host country is often that precisely because they are not members of the society, they can
be treated with measures to which citizens would not be subjected.
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waiting to see whether they may be admitted into a new country. Many similar examples of
biopolitical inoperativity could be adduced to these, including the conditions of minorities under
racist voter-suppression laws, persons with disabilities, young children, and, in many cases,
women.70
The typical neo-liberal response to these states of exception is horror at the flagrant
violations of constitutional law they embody. It seems dramatically unfair to dehumanize certain
arbitrary groups of people. According to this vein of thought, the sovereign must be held
accountable for ensuring inalienable rights for those within the sovereign’s jurisdiction.
However, under a biopolitical paradigm, it seems impossible to prevent the sovereign from
ushering a permanent (or at least semi-permanent) state of exception, in which certain human
beings are rendered inoperative as life on the threshold of zoe and bios. The distinction always
sneaks in underneath every call for human rights. Agamben points to Aristotle’s analysis of
slavery in the Politics, where the slave’s existence as threshold life used by the slave master is
necessary for the latter’s fully bios-life: “The slave in fact represents a not properly human life
that renders possible for others the bios politikos, that is to say, the truly human life.”71
According to Agamben, western political thought has taken for granted that the exemplary
subject is bios-life, forgetting the existence of those human beings who reside at the threshold
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between the two forms. These human beings are essential to the political order, as invisible as
72

they often are. It is easy to forget, in a society without chattel slavery, that there are numerous
persons whose practical existence is slave-like, in the sense that they cannot make free decisions
about the type of labor they will do, and are often subjected to dehumanizing conditions while
doing it. They are barred from fully bios-life, yet they enable that life to attain itself. As Colby
Dickinson observes, this situation is marked by what could only be called “precariousness.”73
This precarious quality emerges from the fact that pursuit of ideal “human” goals only proceeds
by diminishing certain human forms of life. Congress, one might say, could not run long without
the capitol sewer-plumbers and sanitation workers.
For this reason, the solution to the problem of sovereignty cannot be an increasing
emphasis on enhancing rights for bios-individuals. This standard liberal approach seems noble,
but it inadvertently creates conditions whereby certain persons face a reduction of their
humanity. To give one example, a policy to increase welfare benefits for citizens in order to
preserve their rights to shelter and education is an admirable humanitarian idea, but it often leads
to populist tendencies to keep poor migrants out of the country, lest they cripple extensive
welfare provisions. Sovereigns preserve power by pitting the poor against the poor, as refugees
become the nemeses of lower-class native citizens. Within the biopolitical paradigm, laws that

Agamben makes a striking observation: “The anthropology that we have inherited from classical
philosophy is modeled on the free man. Aristotle developed his idea of the human being starting from the paradigm
of the free man, even if this latter implies the slave as his condition of possibility” (Agamben, The Use of Bodies,
20).
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are founded on a zoe/bios distinction inevitably reinforce that distinction, forcing persons who
live on the threshold or below it into a violent suppression, what I will call (using Agamben’s
terms, though not his precise formulation) a “sovereign inoperativity.” This type of inoperativity
maintains a stasis of hierarchy, ensuring that those who have the freedom of full humanity may
continue in that role, while those who do not will remain in a perpetual state of subjugation.
What is the solution to the woes of the biopolitical paradigm? If simply attempting to
extend the realm of bios-life and prevent sovereign inoperativity will not work, what other
options do we have? Agamben has no thoroughly developed political proposal to offer.
However, he does point toward a solution, and it is another type of inoperativity.
Agamben’s Understanding of Inoperativity
So far, I have referenced one type of inoperativity Agamben analyzes: Sovereign
inoperativity. However, there is another type of inoperativity at play in Agamben’s thought, one
that often appears when Agamben dwells on the category of the “messianic.”For this reason, it
might be called “messianic inoperativity.”74 In what follows I will describe both of these forms
of inoperativity, in order to show how for Agamben the second form is the remedy for the
problems of the first.

As mentioned in my discussion of the term “messianic” in connection to Moltmann’s work, it is
important to clarify what this word means in the context in which Agamben and I will use it. Dickinson emphasizes
that “(t)there are few religious terms that have received such heavy traffic in recent philosophical usage as ‘the
messianic’” (Dickinson, Agamben and Theology, 86). According to Colebrook and Maxwell, Agamben’s
understanding of the “messianic” “is drawn from Walter Benjamin’s attempt to think about a messianic event that is
not some future fulfillment of this fallen world, and is instead the ‘happiness’ of this world lived elsewhere”
(Colebrook and Maxwell, Agamben, 51). For further analysis of Agamben’s indebtedness to Benjamin see Adam
Kotsko’s chapter “Reading the ‘Critique of Violence,’” in Dickinson and Kotsko, Agamben’s Coming Philosophy,
41-50. On Benjamin’s development of this and related themes see Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 4, ed.
Marcus Bollock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 250. I will explain below what a
“messianic” understanding of inoperativity means in detail for Agamben. At this point, I will only point out that this
specific understanding of the term entails that a “messianic” politics should not be confused with any particular
dogmatic or confessional definition.
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Sovereign Inoperativity
In his most explicitly theo-political work, The Kingdom and the Glory, Agamben points
out that in theological and monarchical tradition, the sovereign, or God himself, is permanently
inoperative. Agamben finds this visible in the liturgical phenomenon of “glorifying God.”
According to Christian tradition, God is infinitely perfect, the instantiation of glory itself. But if
this is true, why glorify glory? The worshipper who proclaims “glory to God in the highest”
therefore accomplishes nothing by worshipping (this was substantially Lacoste’s point, as we
have seen). Glorification is essentially useless. What does this say about the nature of God’s
being?
Agamben’s answer to this question is clear: the inoperativity of worship reveals the
nature of pure sovereignty, which is itself inoperativity hidden behind glory. Agamben explains:
Inasmuch as it names the ultimate ends of man and the condition that follows the
Last Judgment, glory coincides with the cessation of all activity and all works. It
is what remains after the machine of divine oikonomia has reached its completion
and the hierarchy of angelic ministries has become completely inoperative. While
in hell something like penal administration is still in operation, paradise not only
knows no government, but also no writing, reading, no theology, and even no
liturgical celebration—besides doxology, the hymn of glory. Glory occupies the
place of postjudicial inoperativity; it is the eternal amen in which all works and all
divine and human words are resolved.75
Agamben argues that the ritual institution of Sabbath is a “grandiose image” of this divine
inoperativity. He cites the first creation story in Genesis, in which creation climaxes not with the
act of creating itself, but with God’s rest on the seventh day. Agamben quotes the Jewish
philosopher Philo (“only God truly possesses inoperativity”) and the author of Hebrews, both of
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whom present an image of divine Sabbath-keeping. For Agamben, God’s Sabbath rest is the core
of God’s sovereignty—which is hidden behind the veil of glory. As Agamben puts it,
(T)he center of the governmental apparatus, the threshold at which Kingdom and
Government ceaselessly communicate and ceaselessly distinguish themselves
from one another is, in reality, empty; it is only the Sabbath and katapausis—and,
nevertheless, this inoperativity is so essential for the machine that it must at all
costs be adopted and maintained at its center in the form of glory.76
Simply stated, inoperativity is the stasis of sovereign rule—the essential “pointlessness” of
sovereign power. If all things exist for God, then God’s rule over all things is a self-reflective
circle. The humming of the universe has no external end. The great chain of being is immobile,
and it is as if a permanent caste system is embedded in the cosmos, with God at the top,
preserving a steady-flow of top down power throughout the system.
How can a totalitarian power be inoperative, and still be sovereign? Here it is helpful to
think of the rule of medieval nobles and other ruling classes, who for much of history were set
apart in the hierarchy by the privilege of avoiding labor—being inoperative. Their job was, in
essence, to preserve the distinction between themselves and those lesser persons who were stuck
lower in the hierarchy. The role of the throne in classical monarchy is immensely relevant in this
regard. The one who rules does not engage in vigorous action, but simply sits adorned in
majesty. Even today, the “effortlessness” of political leaders constitutes their ultimate panache.
During a time of crisis, the president may appear before a camera, calmly addressing the people
from a comfortable chair behind a desk. Just as God is the unmoved mover, the ultimate authority
does not act but instead exists as the reason why others are forced to act. Through inoperativity,
the sovereign remains raison de etre of the governmental apparatus.

76

Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, 242.

81
Rituals of inoperativity, such as Sabbath, could be taken as tokens of sovereign
inoperativity. To put it bluntly, the divine command to keep Sabbath could function as a
reminder of God’s dominance. Perhaps some Biblical accounts would fit such a reading, such as
the obscure story in Numbers 15:32-36, in which an unnamed Israelite is stoned for gathering
firewood on the Sabbath (the execution is carried out in direct obedience to divine command, as
if the sovereign deity himself were offended by the man’s act). If this is the case, it would also
overthrow Lacoste’s affirmative framing of liturgical inoperativity, which he claims reveals the
“non-necessity of the Absolute.” Rather than upsetting the idea of God as pure act, Lacoste’s
night vigil would reassert the sovereign activity of God—only this time as the sovereign whose
actions spring from a core of inoperativity. Rituals of inoperativity such as Sabbath would thus
be a way in which the zoe/bios distinction could be preserved.
Of course, this reading of inoperativity as an institution of divine glory is not the only
interpretation of inoperativity and the creation story available. As we have seen in Moltmann’s
work, the Sabbath of creation could also be the sign of God’s restful solidarity with creation—
God’s symbol of creative freedom or “letting be.” Such a reading of Genesis might also
harmonize better with modern science, which depicts the origin of the world less as an act of a
cosmic magician and more as the outcome of free events. This leads us to the second type of
inoperativity Agamben discusses.
Messianic Inoperativity
The concept of messianic inoperativity in Agamben’s work is tantalizingly vague.
Agamben stimulates the reader with hints at its qualities, without ever summarily describing it.
While describing the way Christian theology has understood sovereign inoperativity, Agamben
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cites an intriguing passage from Augustine’s De Civitas Dei, where Augustine posits an “eternal
inoperativity”: “After this period (the end of time) God shall be inoperative on the Sabbath, when
he shall make inoperative itself that very Sabbath that we shall be.”77 Agamben comments:
“Here, in a stuttering attempt to think the unthinkable, Augustine defines the final condition as a
sabbatism to the nth degree, a making the Sabbath take rest in the Sabbath, a resolving of
inoperativity into inoperativity.”78 Although Agamben never fully clarifies what this means, his
language suggests a new type of inoperativity which is not the substructure of the glory of
sovereignty. Rather, this inoperativity renders inoperative the very suspension of activity which
constitutes sovereign authority.
Such a self-negating dialectic of inoperativity seems to shed additional light on
Agamben’s exploratory inquiry near the conclusion of The Kingdom and the Glory: “Is it
possible to think inoperativity outside the apparatus of glory?”79 Agamben leaves this question
without a solid answer, but he points to the Jewish and Christian concepts of eternal life and a
messianic age as starting points. As is clear from Augustine’s text, the messianic age is a future
time when inoperativity will itself become inoperative—the glory will no longer shroud the
sovereign deity’s dominant inoperativity, but will be borne by all the blessed in the form of the
stephanos, or crown of righteousness. However, Agamben points out that for Paul, the messianic
age is not merely future, but extends into the present through Jesus Christ. “This life,” Agamben
argues, “is marked by a special indicator of inoperativity, which in some ways anticipates the
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sabbatism of the Kingdom in the present: the hos me, the ‘as not.’” In a sense, just as for the
80

author of the book of Hebrews (who claims that “today” is the time to enter God’s Sabbath rest
in Hebrews 4:7-8), the ultimate, non-sovereign inoperativity of the Sabbath is available now.
This tension between the already and not-yet is a direct result of the work of the Messiah.
Agamben further elaborates:
In the same way that the Messiah has brought about the law and, at the same time,
rendered it inoperative (the verb that Paul uses to express the relation between the
Messiah and the law—katargein—literally means ‘to render argos,’ inoperative),
so the hos me maintains and, at the same time, deactivates in the present all the
juridical conditions and all the social behaviors of the members of the messianic
community.81
The Messiah does not suspend law altogether. That would constitute a sovereign form of
inoperativity, or the Schmittian state of exception. The Sabbath, understood as a divine command
to suspend action in deference to the authority of the Deity, would constitute such a state of
exception. But this is not what the Messiah does. The Messiah suspends the law of suspension
itself, refusing to negate it, but behaving as if it were not a sovereign authority. Agamben tries to
describe this mysterious existence: “To live in the Messiah means precisely to revoke and render
inoperative at each instant every aspect of the life that we live, and to make the life for which we
live, which Paul calls ‘the life of Jesus’ appear within it.”82 This is Agamben’s interpretation of
what Benjamin called “now-time” (jetzeit), a time of “emergency” that counteracts the
permanent state of emergency called by the sovereign.83 Such a messianic form of inoperativity
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Benjamin writes: “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we
live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that accords with this insight. Then
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does not create a new form of dominance or sovereignty, but creates the possibility for a new
political order.84 In Agamben’s words, “The messianic life is the impossibility that life might
coincide with a predetermined form, the revoking of every bios in order to open it to the zoe tou
Iesou.”85
What does a messianic type of inoperativity look like? How does it differ from the
hegemonic Sabbath of sovereign inoperativity? Agamben offers no precise answer. In a sense,
because it is characterized by potentiality—a “still to come” element—a messianic inoperativity
is impossible to fully articulate. Nevertheless, since the messianic future also extends into the
present, some notion of a messianic inoperativity should be available for reflection. Agamben
posits a decisive hint: messianic inoperativity is a form of praxis that reveals and enables basic,
common human being—what Agamben calls “the Whatever” or “Whatever being,” which also
correlates with what he calls a “form of life.”86 In his later work, Agamben harnesses the term

we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in
the struggle against Fascism.” See Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed.
Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), 253-264 (quote taken from thesis VIII). On
Benjamin’s attempt to create a “state of emergency” opposed to the sovereign state of emergency see Michael
Löwy, Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin’s “On the Concept of History, trans. Chris Turner (New York: Verso,
2005).
In The Use of Bodies Agamben comments (in the context of a discussion of slavery in Paul’s thought):
“The Pauline ‘as not,’ by putting each factical condition in tension with itself, revokes and deactivates it without
altering its form (weeping as not weeping, having a wife as not having a wife, slaves as not slaves). That is to say,
the messianic calling consists in the deactivation and disappropriation of the factical condition, which is therefore
opened to a new possible use. The ‘new creature’ is only the capacity to render the old inoperative and use it in a
new way: ‘if one is in the messiah, a new creature: the old things have passed away, behold they have become new’
(2 Corinthians 5:17).” See Giorgio Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 56.
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understanding of this “Whatever” or passivity in Agamben points toward a form of life without predicates or
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“use” to describe this type of praxis. In The Use of Bodies, where Agamben places inoperativity
in the category of use, he attempts to explain the complicated relationship between inoperativity
and potential:
Use is constitutively an inoperative praxis, which can happen only on the basis of
a deactivation of the Aristotelian apparatus potential/act, which assigns to
energia, to being-at-work, primacy over potential. Use is, in this sense, a principle
internal to potential, which prevents it from being simply consumed in the act and
drives it to turn once more to itself, to make itself a potential of potential, to be
capable of its own potential (and therefore its own impotential).87
Later in the same context Agamben claims that the inoperative work “will expose in the act the
potential of acting.”88 But how exactly does it do this?
In Nudities Agamben includes an essay on “The Glorious Body” that sheds light on this
question. Drawing from the ongoing medieval-to-modern theological debate over what the postresurrection human body will be like, Agamben asks a probing question: What would be the
significance of the reproductive and nutritive organs in a glorious body which will need neither
sexual activity nor sustenance? For an answer, Agamben turns to the Angelic Doctor: “Aquinas’s
strategy is clear: to separate organs from their specific physiological functions. The purpose of
each organ, like that of any instrument, is its operation; but this does not mean that if the
operation fails, then the instrument becomes useless (frustra sit instrumentum).”89 Even by doing
nothing, the bodily organs function as a “display”—they reveal the virtuous or “glorious”

identities. Wall thus links Agamben to the “unavowable” community posited by Blanchot (see the section on
Lacoste above).
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capacity corresponding to their form. For this reason, according to Agamben, “the glorious body
is an ostensive body whose functions are not executed but rather displayed. Glory, in this sense is
in solidarity with inoperativity.”90 Here, completely deactivated sexual organs correspond to the
glorious inoperativity of the sovereign Sabbath. This is the inoperativity of sovereign power.
After discussing the obvious aspects of the glorious body, Agamben quickly moves into
an articulation of the other type of inoperativity—the messianic form. He makes a crystal-clear
exposition of the distinction between the two types:
Glory is nothing other than the separation of inoperativity into a special sphere:
that of worship or liturgy. In this way, what was merely a threshold that granted
access to a new use is transformed into a permanent condition. A new use for the
body is thus possible only if it wrests the inoperative function from its separation,
only if it succeeds in bringing together within a single place and in a single
gesture both exercise and inoperativity, economic body and glorious body,
function and its suspension.91
The type of inoperativity that that Agamben seeks is not the type that freezes into glory, but
rather opens up potential for new use. In the case of the sexual organs, this new type of
inoperativity corresponds to sexual pleasure without procreative ends; and in the case of the
human body as a whole, it corresponds to dance, in which regular, goal-oriented movement is
translated into “pointless” movement which exceeds the natural potential of the body as such.92
Neither non-procreative sex nor dance are opposed to natural movements in a direct, agonistic
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Agamben, Nudities, 59.
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Agamben, Nudities, 101-102.

In Agamben’s words: “This is precisely what amorous desire and so-called perversion achieve every time
they use the organs of the nutritive and reproductive functions and turn them—in the very act of using them—away
from their physiological meaning, toward a new and more human operation. Or consider the dancer, as he or she
undoes and disorganizes the economy of corporeal movements to then rediscover them, at once intact and
transfigured, in the choreography” (Agamben, Nudities, 102).
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way (contra some natural-law theologians), but they suspend “from within” the natural
trajectories of the body in order to create new, “playful” possibilities.93 This is why in The Time
That Remains, Agamben argues that in Paul’s writings, the significance of Christ’s work is a
“messianic inversion of the potential/act relation.”94 Paul’s messiah renders the works of the law
katargoumen (inoperative) he “gives potential back to them,” and in doing so preserves them (in
a different way).95 Here Agamben builds upon and extends similar insights made by Jacob
Taubes about how the “messianic” element of Paul’s thought inserts relativity into the
Jew/Gentile distinction.96 The Messiah is therefore not anarchic in such a way as to remove
governmentality and prepare the way for fascism, as Mitchell Dean critically suggests.97 The

Agamben explicitly refers to the significance of “play” in this respect in his work Infancy and History,
trans. Liz Heron (New York: Verso, 1993), 70. Kevin Attell argues that play, for Agamben, points to a type of
activity which escapes both sacral as well as practical economic significance, pointing to a more basic level of
being. See Kevin Attell, Giorgio Agamben: Beyond the Threshold of Deconstruction (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2015), 260-61.
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Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia
Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 97.
95

See Agamben, The Time That Remains, 99-101.
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See Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of St. Paul, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2004). Taubes’s “negative” political theology holds many resemblances to what Agamben
attempts to accomplish, particularly in his use of Paul. On the concept of a negative political theology see Marin
Terpstra and Theo de Wit, “ ‘No Spiritual Investment in the World as It Is’: Jacob Taubes’s Negative Political
Theology,” in Flight of the Gods: Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Theology, ed. Ilse N. Bulhof and Laurens
ten Kate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 320-53.

Sharply critical of Agamben’s discussion of inoperativity in The Kingdom and the Glory, Dean writes,
“we might ask whether it makes sense for all ‘profane powers,’ including those of public bureaucracy and states, ‘to
be deactivated and made inoperative’ (p. 166) when they form an important limit to the glorification of the economy
and the civil havoc this wreaks. Was it not, after all, the collapse of state authority and a ‘transcendent’ sovereignty
in the face of the anarchic spiralling (sic) of an economy in crisis that prepared the way for fascism, as Agamben
himself indicates?” (Mitchell Dean, “Governmentality Meets Theology: ‘The King Reigns, but He Does Not
Govern,’” Theology, Culture, and Society 29, no. 3 (2012): 145-158, 157). I submit that Dean misunderstands
Agamben’s proposal. Agamben wishes not for complete deactivation in the sense of a sovereign state of exception,
but for a suspension of the state of exception itself.
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Messiah’s goal is to create a new potential for life at the threshold of distinctions, not simply to
annihilate currently existing order.98
What, then, is the solution to the problem of sovereign inoperativity? It is the type of
inoperative praxis which upends from within the old model of glorious sovereignty displayed
through sovereign inoperativity.99 Messianic inoperativity does not negate the law or make it
obsolete. Rather, it is a force of praxis that opens up new potentialities for inoperativity (here one
cannot help but think of Jesus’ attitude toward the Sabbath described in the Gospels—a theme I
will return to in chapter 4). In this sense, this type of inoperativity could be “liturgical”—but in a
way that circumvents the tendency to loop inoperativity together with glory, in the way seen in
the liturgy that Agamben analyzes in The Kingdom and the Glory. Messianic inoperativity is
certainly a religious ritual, but also at the same time a political “founding” act—or perhaps a

In The Open, Agamben describes how the “anthropological machine” that governs political life may be
rendered inoperative in a way that is profoundly nonviolent—he uses the example of lovers in a Titian painting, who
display a “neutralized” relationship—neither fully human nor animal but without work (senz’opera). See Agamben,
The Open, 85-87.
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The qualification “from within” is main feature of Agamben’s understanding of inoperativity vis-à-vis
political structures, and it is also an element of Agamben’s philosophy that is contested by his critics, particularly
Ryan Hansen. According to Hansen, Agamben’s messianic inoperativity (particularly as elucidated in his
Agamben’s study of Paul in The Time that Remains) stays within a plane of pure immanence, meaning that the
messianic force opposes current powers of sovereignty within this plane. Hansen, by contrast claims that the Pauline
approach to the messianic force is rather an “apocalyptic” one, entailing a transcendence that constitutes “the
fullness of Christ” that “fills all things.” For Hansen, this means that Paul’s politics is not competitive in the way
Hansen understands Agamben’s interpretation of Paul. For Hansen, “The end of one age and the other and of the
other age exist on the same plane in a non-competitive transcendence, such that the old is opened up and made
porous to the new, non-antagonistically.” See Ryan Hansen, “Messianic or Apocalyptic? Engaging Agamben on
Paul and Politics,” in Paul, Philosophy, and the Theopolitical Vision: Critical Engagements with Agamben, Badiou,
Žižek, and Others, ed. Douglas Harink (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010), 217-218. Although Hansen’s claim that
Paul posits a “transcendence within immanence” of the messianic force seems true, his claim that this does not
involve a competitive relationship between the messianic force and sovereign power does not seem accurate with
regard to Paul. The “principalities and powers” of the present age are clearly an enemy for Paul, entailing a
confrontation between the immanent-and-transcendent power of the messianic and the sovereigns of the world.
Hence, although Agamben’s “flat” reading of Paul may not be accurate, the results he deduces from it could be.
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deconstructive act.
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It is similar to religious rituals heralding redemption—in that it points

toward a world made new—but it is a ritual of redemption accomplished through what is truly
“profanation,” as Dickinson points out.101 Paradoxically, it “functions as a state of exception
without any form of sovereignty being associated with it.”102 Inoperative rituals such as Sabbath
could function as forms of political/religious “gesture”—a nonviolent praxis pointing to a
different way of being human.103 Lacoste’s liturgical inoperativity thus still has value for
subverting sovereignty—but only as a practice that undermines sovereignty’s attempt to preserve
itself through glory-veiled stasis.

Dickinson points out that for Agamben, “politics would seem to be an almost religious ritual of sorts, a
continuous reenacting of the exclusive inclusion performed upon the self in order to constitute some sense of
sovereign being in relation to the others (both persons and animals) surrounding this newly formed humanity.” See
Dickinson, Agamben and Theology, 72. My argument is that the messianic Sabbath is an analogous religious ritual
to this founding act, except that it obliterates the distinction created by the “exclusive inclusion.” Perhaps one could
call it an “anti-religious” ritual, in this sense.
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Dickinson calls Agamben’s contemplation of the human being as completely inoperative a “profaning
gesture” (Dickinson, Agamben and Theology, 140). In a sense, a “profaning gesture” is precisely what I am arguing
inoperative rituals may be. Agamben’s concept of profanation does not point to a derogatory act, as in what English
speakers might call “profanity.” Rather, profanation involves rejecting the sacred/non-sacred binary that parallels the
bios/zoe binary, and that takes part in the machine of biopolitics. In this sense, it is similar to what Harvey Cox
called “profanity”—a type of mundane existence lived without reference to any higher goal or other world. See
Harvey Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective (New York: Macmillan,
1965), 60-61. The difference between Cox’s notion of “profanity” and Agamben’s “profanation” is that the latter is
not a rejection of a sacred identity or external purpose, but an attempt to move beyond the boundary between the
two. By extolling profanity and rejecting supra-mundane realities, Cox in effect remains within the binary.
Nevertheless, there is something in Cox’s attempt to advocate for a mundane life (which he believes secularization
provides) that is reflective of what Agamben aims at. On the role of gesture more broadly see footnote 103 (below).
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Dickinson, Agamben and Theology, 91.
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“Gesture” as such is a repeated theme in Agamben’s work. It refers to a more basic, primal
communication that does not succumb to the rigid differentiations and stratifications inherent in language. For an
overview see Anthony Curtis Adler, “The Intermedial Gesture: Agamben and Kommerell,” Angelaki 12, no. 3
(2007): 57-64. See also Alastair Morgan, “A Figure of Annihilated Human Existence: Agamben and Adorno on
Gesture,” Law Critique 20 (2009): 299-307. On the significance of gesture as an alternative to forms of violent
signification in Agamben’s philosophy see Dickinson’s chapter “Gestures of Text and Violence,” in Dickinson and
Kotsko, Agamben’s Coming Philosophy, 51-65.
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Political Implications
In order to understand what Agamben’s messianic inoperativity means for politics, we
must return to the zoe/bios distinction at the heart of his political philosophy. Keep in mind
that—as tempting as it is—simply attempting to preserve human beings’ claim to bios is unlikely
to be a workable method around the problem of sovereignty. Ritual inoperativity, on the other
hand, could point to a different solution altogether. Understood through a messianic lens,
inoperativity could be a way to deactivate the distinction between zoe and bios, enabling human
beings to escape either classification.
This “crossing out” of the biopolitical divide would lead not to a type of bestial life (pure
zoe), but to a life without the need for the divide, a life divorced from identity, or rather a
connection to identity that Agamben calls an “intimacy without relation.”104 Thus, the political
implications of Agamben’s inoperativity hint at a destabilized state of existence, in which life is
liberated from the constant attempts to pin it down into categories. Agamben’s work suggests
that a political breakthrough could be reached if human beings could frame themselves neither as
elevated into bios, nor as debased into zoe, but as caught precariously in an indefinable state,
characterized by the “potential” as opposed to the “actual.” The type of political ethics this type
of framework would entail is best captured by a literary figure Agamben finds himself drawn to:
Melville’s Bartleby the scrivener, who could write but “would prefer not to.”105 This is a politics

According to Agamben, “Form-of-life is this ban that no longer has the form of a bond or an exclusioninclusion of bare life but that of an intimacy without relation.” See Agamben, The Use of Bodies, 236.
104
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See Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 246-7.
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of inaction—one that rejects a vision of how human beings are supposed to be. It involves
looking at other persons without expectation, simply allowing them to exist in their potentiality.
All these ideas sound serene and nice. But the main problem with Agamben’s political
vision is how to think about it practically. This problem itself is, in a certain sense, indicative of
the type of political program Agamben seeks to avoid. The word “practical” connotes creating or
producing in action a theoretical vision; and how does one create or produce a political
framework that aims at the cessation of creation and production? (I will return to this problem in
relation to the work of Roberto Goizueta in chapter three.) One could easily imagine asking
Agamben, “Could you describe practical ways of putting into action your political program of
inoperativity?” and hearing him reply, “I would prefer not to.”
As delightfully truculent an answer as that would be, it would not do justice to
Agamben’s own thought. Clearly, he has described a political problem, and has attempted to
envision a solution. Although his “inoperative” philosophical perspective resists incorporation
into a political paradigm (he might point out that a “philosopher king” could easily turn
totalitarian), it is important to reflect on the political outcomes of what a practical inoperative
“form of life” might look like. To do so, I think it is essential to point to specific practices or
rituals that create the type of inoperativity Agamben characterizes as messianic, or a bringing in
of the time that remains.
Obviously, Sabbath is one such ritual, yet strikingly, the actual practice of Sabbath
keeping and the ancient literature around it does not appear as often in Agamben’s writing as one
might expect, with the exception of The Kingdom and the Glory. (I may be speaking too soon; I
have a strong hunch that Agamben may yet publish a book-length work on the Sabbath in the

92
future.) Matthew Abbott does see a repeated exaltation of the “refusal of work” in Agamben’s
writing—a tendency Abbott thinks calls for a “practice of inoperativity” which is not simply
inert but is also creative.106 This could be a consequence of Agamben’s own oversight, possibly
connected to his tendency to focus on Christian sources rather than Jewish ones. It could also
spring from the fact that Sabbath as an institution has a fundamental ambivalence about it. There
are, as we saw in Kingdom and the Glory, two different theological types of “Sabbath” in
Agamben’s thought. The one, corresponding to sovereign inoperativity, is a Sabbath of stasis or
actuality. It is the rest of the king for whom all reality exists and to whom all creation gives
glory. On the other hand, there is the messianic Sabbath, the Sabbath of potential and liberation.
Perhaps Agamben fears that Sabbath as a ritual drifts too quickly toward the sovereign form of
inoperativity?
Such fears, if they exist, would not be without warrant. The political history of Sabbath
observance in the West (particularly in Protestant Christianity) is littered with examples of
coercive “rest” imposed on persons not as liberation, but as a fixed form of life to which they
must correspond as a divine obligation.107 It is legitimate to hold reservations about Sabbath
entering politics. Seventh-day Adventists have long worried that Sabbath-keeping will become a

See Matthew Abbott, Glory, Spectacle, and Inoperativity, 42. On the concept of a “refusal of work” as
an alternative both to capitalism and “productivist Marxism” see Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work: Feminism,
Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 99.
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This was the approach to Sabbath made infamous by Puritan practice in North America. According to
Michael Borg’s assessment, the purpose of Sabbath in the minds of Puritan theologians such as Nicholas Bownde
was to provide space for glorification of God. Summarizing Bownde, Borg concludes that “unhindered worship is
the basis for rest in the fourth commandment.” See Michael Borg, “The Morality of the Sabbath,” Puritan Reformed
Journal 6, no. 1 (2014): 227. See also Nicholas Bownde, Sabbathum Veteris et Novi Testamenti (London: Feli
Kyngston, 1606). For an overview of Sabbath theology among the Puritans see James T. Dennison, Jr., The Market
Day of the Soul: The Puritan Doctrine of the Sabbath in England 1532-1700 (New York: University Press of
America, 1983).
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locus of control and persecution by religio-political powers. Nevertheless, it is obvious that
Sabbath was originally not intended to play such a role, and was instead aimed at being a
messianic force. Therefore, the political question that confronts us in response to Agamben’s
work is: How do we encounter a truly messianic Sabbath? In other words, how do we keep
Sabbath as a source of potentiality, rather than as a means of inducing a hierarchical stasis or
coercion?
The answer to this question will form a large part of chapter 4. For now, I will point out
that such a Sabbath must be able to suspend itself. As Agamben says, it should be a “sabbatism
to the nth degree,” one in which Sabbath itself takes rest in Sabbath. For this reason, Sabbaths
that are enforced by legislative authority could never be messianic Sabbaths. If a ritual is
observed because it is commanded, this will run the risk of making it a mechanism of
hierarchical stasis. Sabbath must be a time of “weakness”—ritual that by its essential nature
could never be enforced. It would constitute what Paul Griffiths calls a “quietist” political
institution.108 To give a concrete illustration of this, it would be absurd for legislatures to
mandate Sabbath observance with so called blue laws that forbid work on Saturday or Sunday,
because in order to enforce such commands it would be necessary to make police officers work
extra to enforce them. For this reason, the legal prescription to keep the Sabbath is a law that, in
Agamben’s terms, can only fall into the realm of “use” or “play.” It could constitute what

Griffiths argues that Agamben’s understanding of “law that suspends itself” points to a form of activism
that is “quietist” in the sense that it call for no enforcement of “realistic” political ends, but simply a type of
suggestion. See Paul J. Griffiths, “The Cross as the Fulcrum of Politics: Expropriating Agamben on Paul,” in Paul,
Philosophy, and the Theopolitical Vision, 179-197. The main challenge I find with Griffiths’ quietism is that it
seems to convey a sense of dispassion, which is unfortunate.
108
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Agamben scholar David Kishik might call an “art” that is also “a potent form of insurgency.”

109

Sabbatarians may insist that Sabbath be made into law, while—with no inconsistency—holding
that such a law must never be made obligatory for the public.
Another political element of truly messianic political inoperativity, per Agamben, is that
it would need to gradually negate its own boundaries. This suggests that any religious ritual that
insists on its own separation from normal or “secular” time could never qualify as a messianic
Sabbath, because messianic inoperativity could not abide by any hard distinction between sacred
and secular. Agamben, unlike philosophers such as Gianni Vattimo or theologians such as
Harvey Cox, is not a proponent of secularizing tendencies—but not because he seeks to uphold
the category of the “religious” or against the “secular.”110 On the contrary, his thought leads
toward a negation of the division itself. Sabbath should neither be sacred nor secular. It should,
on this account, reject the categorization. For Agamben, the keeping of Sabbath would emerge
conjointly with the rise of a new type of life, one that is neither zoe nor bios, neither “worldly”
nor “heavenly” but in the space of negation between them. It would be a Sabbath of the
threshold. Paradoxically, then, Sabbath would cease to exist if a truly Sabbatarian humanity
emerged, because Sabbatical time would be indistinguishable from normal time.
The politics of this Sabbath would also need to focus on transcending or “overlooking”
the binary oppositions that inhere to typical ritual institutions of time. Rituals tend to be sites of
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Kishik finds in Agamben’s work a pursuit of the type of destabilizing poetry that Plato once deplored.
Art, in the form of Sabbath, could be a force that does nothing (it is purely aesthetic) but also upends the political
order. See David Kishik, The Power of Life: Agamben and the Coming Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2012), 12.

On Vattimo’s understanding of “weak thought” (which parallels Agamben’s project in many ways) and
its connection to secularization see Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. Luca D’Isanto (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002).
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contention and dispute in religious communities. They are places which harden and preserve
their identities. Sabbath, of course, is a classic example of this. But the type of Sabbath
Agamben’s work points toward would consist in a collapse or re-division of these divisions. It
would therefore require a type of collaborative or ecumenical quality. This would not be a
collaboration based on confessional insouciance—the unfortunate connotation of Agamben’s
concept of “the Whatever” celebrated by Wall.111 It is not a matter of making ritual differences
easily negotiable. Rather, this dwelling between identities in ritual would celebrate and applaud
these differences, while inhabiting a space of openness toward the plurality of ways in which
inoperativity can be explored. I will return to this theme in chapter 4.
Summary
Agamben’s distinction between different forms of inoperativity adds a unique vantage
point for understanding the significance of inoperative rituals. If, as Agamben argues, some
forms of inoperativity can reinforce forms of domination, it is essential to make a careful
analysis of any form of inoperative ritual, to ensure that participating in it does not unwittingly
cause us to fall into such political traps.
At the same time, Agamben’s rich characterization of messianic inoperativity points to an
enormous significance behind ritual that perhaps even Agamben has himself has not yet realized.
This significance will become clearer as we move through this investigation.

Wall’s understanding of “the Whatever” may sound dismissive or excessively nonchalant toward
individuality, but in fact the purpose of this form of life is to highlight the particularity or singularity of persons. See
Wall, Radical Passivity, 125.
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Conclusion
Lacoste and Agamben together offer a rich depiction of inoperativity as a political
concept that destabilizes Western concepts of sovereign power. Lacoste explores inoperativity
from the local vantage point of liturgy. In the act of worship, according to Lacoste, the human
being confronts the Absolute not as an active force, but as inoperativity—that which “lets be.”
Liturgy thus opens up a relationship to sovereign power characterized by a liberating
inoperativity. Masters and slaves who engage in liturgy together find their relationship
fundamentally changed because their locations in the hierarchy are relativized. Sovereigns find
themselves moved to positions in the margins.
Agamben’s work builds on and problematizes this framework by revealing that there are
different types of inoperativity at work in liturgy. There are sovereign Sabbaths and messianic
Sabbaths. The former reinforce the zoe/bios distinction, by hardening the division between Jew
and Greek, slave and free, male and female. These distinctions require maintenance by force, and
the sovereign Sabbath may be inflicted on a population by authorities with vested interests in
“law and order.” In this way, inoperativity can take the form of a quietness and “order” imposed
by a brutal, unchallenged regime.
Or, Sabbath can take the form of a messianic inoperativity, a law that suspends itself.
Inoperativity, framed this way negates the distinctions that turn into mechanisms of control and
domination. A Sabbath of this sort would “dissolve” into a new type of human life. This Sabbath
corresponds to the type of inoperativity Lacoste observes in the night vigil.
Before constructing a political paradigm built on a practice of inoperativity, it is crucial
to ask how religious practices of inoperativity actually “function”—that is, how experiences of
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inoperativity practically lead to political frameworks. The thinkers explored thus far make
helpful theological and philosophical points about the nature of inoperativity in relation to
politics, but their work falls short of this ultimate end. Hence, we turn to two thinkers on
inoperativity for whom practice is the major concern.

CHAPTER III
INOPERATIVITY AS PRACTICE
RAV KOOK AND ROBERTO GOIZUETA
The challenge with abstract reasoning about inoperativity is that it can cause us to forget
that political theology emerges from the life of communities. Theories about ritual can never
emerge fully formed ex nihilo from the minds of genius theologians. Just as doctrinal beliefs
must arise from liturgical actions (lex orandi, lex credendi), any theory of inoperativity must pay
close attention to the ways in which religious traditions practically engage with inoperativity.
For this reason, this chapter addresses this practical element by examining two forms of
inoperativity celebrated by Jewish and Christian traditions, respectively: shmita and fiesta. Why
do I choose to focus on these two rituals, as opposed to the more commonly recognized
observance of the weekly Sabbath? Although the weekly Sabbath is obviously a communal
activity, it is easy to drift into an individualist perspective on how it is celebrated. Shmita and
fiesta, on the other hand, are strikingly communal activities, impossible to theorize about without
reference to persons engaging with each other. I focus on these two rituals in order to highlight
the ways in which inoperativity creates overtly political realities. The insights garnered from this
exploration will be relevant to understanding the more common and widely-known weekly
Sabbath, which I address in the next chapter.
To draw insights about the practical political theology of these two rituals, I will examine
the works of two thinkers who provide classic treatments on their political significance. Rav
Kook, a Jewish mystic and philosopher, is known for authoring a central text on the Sabbatical
98
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year. Roberto Goizueta, a contemporary Christian theologian, reflects extensively on the popular
Latino/a practice of fiesta. My approach in this chapter will be to offer an overview of each
thinker’s method for addressing these practices, followed by an assessment of the political
implications of their work. I will conclude with a comparative summary. As I will show, the
practical results of inoperativity articulated by each thinker provide crucial resources for
understanding why inoperativity deeply changes contemporary notions of sovereignty.
Rav Kook
Because of his breadth of interests and his diverse roles as rabbi and scholar, Kook’s
work covers enormous conceptual territories.1 For the purposes of this chapter, it is primarily his
short Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz (the Sabbath of the land) that will occupy my attention.2
Despite its brevity, this work contains dense reflections on the meaning of the shmita for the
Jewish people’s self-understanding—reflections that also build on the concept of Sabbatical
sovereignty I have introduced above. In order to understand the political implications of Kook’s
approach to shmita, it is necessary first to give a brief account of the nature of the institution, and
explain how Kook became involved in an important historic controversy about it.

For a more expansive biographical account of Kook’s life see Yehudah Mirsky, Rav Kook: Mystic in a
Time of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).
1

Abraham Isaac Kook, Rav Kook’s Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, trans. Julian Sinclair (New York:
Hazon, 2014).
2
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Background of Shmita
The first references to shmita, or the Sabbatical year, are found in Exodus and Leviticus.
These passages articulate how the people of Israel should relate to the arable land they find when
they enter Canaan:
For six years you shall sow your land and gather in its yield; but the seventh year
you shall let it rest and lie fallow, so that the poor of your people may eat; and
what they leave the wild animals may eat. You shall do the same with your
vineyard, and with your olive orchard (Exodus 23:10-11).
The purpose for this command is directly humanitarian: The land should not be cultivated “so
that the poor of your people may eat” along with the wild animals. A similar rationale is
articulated in Leviticus 25, with an accent on God’s possession of the land.3 Of course, this raises
numerous interpretive and historical questions. Specifically, how does not cultivating the land
help the poor to have more food? One would assume that if the land were not cultivated the poor
would have less to eat rather than more. Such considerations have led scholars such as Leon
Epsztein to posit that “the land could not have been left fallow. It was cultivated, but once the
harvest was reaped, it was not taken in; the corn was left spread on the ground to be there for
those who needed it.”4 Norman Habel disagrees, arguing that the text clearly points to a cessation

The Leviticus passage reads: “When you enter the land that I am giving you, the land shall observe a
Sabbath for the Lord. Six years you shall sow your field, and six years you shall prune your vineyard, and gather in
their yield; but in the seventh year there shall be a Sabbath of complete rest for the land, a Sabbath for the Lord; you
shall not sow your field or prune your vineyard. You shall not reap the aftergrowth of your harvest or gather the
grapes of your unpruned vine; it shall be a year of complete rest for the land. You may eat what the land yields
during its Sabbath—you, your male and female slaves, your hired and your bound laborers who live with you; for
your livestock also, and for the wild animals in your land all its yield shall be for food” (Leviticus 25:2-7).
3

4

Leon Epsztein, Social Justice in the Ancient Near East and the People of the Bible (London: SCM Press,
1986), 132.
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of agriculture in every respect. The latter position is also affirmed by John Dominic Crossan
who points out that Josephus records an absence of sowing in Israel during the seventh year.6 I
do not have space here to delve into the question of how the shmita was practically conducted in
ancient Israel. Here we must only observe that shmita emerged as a means of communal justice.
The purpose of the command is to restore community by leveling inequality, both at the
human/human level as well as the human/animal. This is an important point for understanding
Kook’s approach to shmita.
Obviously, among Jews not residing on land in Israel, shmita was not widely practiced.
However, toward the end of the nineteenth century when Jews began returning to Palestine and
commencing agricultural activity, the question of how and whether to implement shmita became
a central issue. Within the state of Israel, this debate continues to this day.7 This controversy over
an ancient Jewish practice is the context in which Kook’s contribution emerges.

5

See Norman Habel, The Land is Mine: Six Biblical Land Ideologies (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995),

103.
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John Dominic Crossan, The Birth of Christianity (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1999), 190. For
Josephus’ record of first century shmita observance see his Jewish Antiquities, 14: 202.
7

For an account of the various parties arguing for and against sundry details of shmita practice in modern
Israel, with particular reference to political challenges to shmita, see Amihai Radyzner, “Israeli Legislation as Both
Halakhic Problem and Its Solution: The Complicated Case of Heter Ha-Mekhira,” Jewish Studies 14 (2018): 1-35. It
is important to note that the following investigations of shmita in this chapter are not meant to resolve the ongoing
questions about how shmita should or should not be observed in the land of Israel—questions that are outside my
scope of scholarly expertise as well as outside my religious confession. My goal through this investigation is simply
to draw from Rav Kook’s understanding certain principles for understanding the practical role of inoperativity
within communities. Whether Kook’s specific recommendations for shmita hold to be applicable today is another
question altogether.
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Method
In 1904, Kook—an accomplished philosopher and Talmudic scholar—accepted a
position as a rabbi in the newly formed Jewish community in Jaffa, Palestine. Immediately he
was caught between two opposing groups of Jews, with different philosophical frameworks.8 The
first was known as the Old Yishuv who consisted primarily of orthodox Jews who had sojourned
to the land of Israel for the purposes of piety—to pray, study Torah, and generally lead a
traditional Jewish life.9 They put little effort into the economic development of the area, relying
more on charitable contributions from European Jews. The other group was the more secular
Zionist pioneers also known as the New Yishuv, who were intent on building up local Jewish
institutions within the land. They focused on establishing a strong agricultural presence in the
area.10 The New Yishuv disdained their counterparts as hyper-religious loafers, while the Old
Yishuv branded their opponents as shameless, ritually lax yuppies. It was a volatile situation.
Kook sat uneasily in the middle. He appreciated the New Yishuv’s enthusiasm for
economic development and their commitment to the long-term success of the Jewish homeland.
At the same time, he recognized the importance of maintaining the traditions that would sustain
Jewish identity, and prevent the type of toxic nationalism that a purely secular mentality could
produce. Kook believed that a healthy soul for the Jewish nation could only be formed by

For an account of Kook’s ongoing arbitration in this situation see Jacob B. Agus, High Priest of Rebirth
(New York: Bloch, 1972).
8

9
According to Mirsky, the Old Yishuv was marked by two facets: “enthroning Torah study at the very
pinnacle of religious life, and hastening the Messiah’s advent by human action.” See Mirsky, Rav Kook, 45.
10

For an account of the various aspects of New Yishuv activism see Mirsky, Rav Kook, 46-47.
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drawing the two philosophies together. This became his life-long project, to which he applied all
the powers of his mystical imagination.
This imagination was informed by the Lurianic Kabbalah, which most scholars believe
was the “backbone” of Kook’s worldview.11 This framework of Jewish mysticism was named
after the distinguished Rabbi Isaac Luria (1534-72) who taught that the universe was pervaded
with “sparks” of divine light which are the remnants of an explosive event at the beginning of
creation.12 According to Luria, infinite divine energy was poured into vessels which could not
hold them and shattered.13 Although the sparks can be found everywhere, they are usually
shrouded by kelipot, shells of darkness that hide the divine energy. The aim of Jewish
spirituality, in this paradigm, is to liberate the sparks. Because of the ubiquitous character of
these sparks, anyone who seeks to unveil them must never hide from any source of spiritual
truth, whether it be religious or secular.14

11
See Julian Sinclair’s introductory chapter, “Rav Kook and the Meaning of Shmita,” in Kook,
Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz 43.

Luria’s work builds on earlier forms of kabbalah based on the Zohar and the works of mystics such as
Azriel of Gerona and Moses Cordovero. Isaac Luria himself wrote nothing, but his ideas were carried on through his
disciples. For historical background descriptions of the kabbalah and specifically the Lurianic variety, see Daniel C.
Matt, The Essential Kabbalah: The Heart of Jewish Mysticism (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1995). For a detailed
account of Luria’s life and work see Lawrence Fine, Physician of the Soul, Healer of the Cosmos: Isaac Luria and
His Kabbalistic Fellowship (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
12

13

For early accounts of this model of creation in the Lurianic Kabbalah see Hayyim ben Joseph Vital,
Kabbalah of Creation: Isaac Luria’s Earlier Mysticism, trans. Eliahu Klein (North Vale, NJ: Jason Aronson
Publications, 2000).
As David Shatz observes, this hermeneutic of synthesis is central to Kook’s approach to every aspect of
theology. In a Jewish version of the Christian patristic idea of “plundering the Egyptians,” Kook sought to derive the
best aspects of any philosophy into his work. “Kook,” Shatz notes, “exhorts Jews to open themselves to the realm of
general culture, confronting and engaging the full range of secular teachings and disciplines.” See David Shatz,
Jewish Thought in Dialogue: Essays on Thinkers, Theologies, and Moral Theories (Boston: Academic Studies
Press, 2009), 93.
14
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Kook applied the logic of this Kabbalistic paradigm to his understanding of Jewish
existence. The Jewish people, he believed, had the purpose of extending love to all people as part
of the project of revealing divine light. This purpose entailed the rejection of a certain type of
exclusive sovereignty:
As long as each one exalts himself, claiming I am sovereign, I and none other—
there cannot be peace in our midst . . . All our endeavors must be directed toward
disclosing the light of general harmony, which derives not from suppressing any
power, any thought, any tendency, but by bringing each of them within the vast
ocean of light infinite, where all things find their unity, where all is ennobled, all
is exalted, all is hallowed.15
This preference for universal harmony as a replacement of individual sovereignty is a
direct outcome of Kook’s Kabbalistic mysticism. A genuine awareness of the divine
sparks in all human beings must preclude a sense of opposition in human relationships
(what Carl Schmitt would call “the friend-enemy distinction”). Furthermore, this
harmonious replacement for standard sovereignty could only result from a type of
universalism—a “letting be” of all things, and thereby releasing the sparks within them.16
This was not universalism in the cosmopolitan sense. Jewish identity was important,
specifically because the clearest radiance of truth was found in the Torah, held by the Jewish

15
Rav Kook, Orot Hakodesh, vol. II, 588, as cited in Ben Zion Bokser, “Introduction,” in Abraham Isaac
Kook: The lights of Penitence, the Moral Principles, Lights of Holiness, Essays, Letters, and Poems, trans. Ben Zion
Bokser (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 8.
16

It is important to note that in the Kabbalist texts from which Kook draws his inspiration, the concept of
unity (yichud) is preeminently revealed in the Sabbath. This unification is modeled on divine unity, and it draws
earth toward heaven. Norman Lamm summarizes this dynamic: “The unification within God on the Sabbath is
reflected in a corresponding unification within man on the Sabbath. To this day Hasidim, who follow the Sephardic
version of the liturgy, recite, on Friday nights, the passage from the Zohar beginning ke’gavna . . . . ‘even as they
unite above in the One, so is there a unification below . . . one corresponding to one . . .” See Norman Lamm, “On
the Unity Concept,” in Essays on the Thought and Philosophy of Rabbi Kook, ed. Ezra Gellman (New York: Herzl
Press, 1991), 21-22.
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people. According to Gershon Winer, for Kook, “Jewish nationalism is elevated to universal
significance.”17 This Jewish identity could not be closed-minded, and it always had to maintain a
consciousness that it was for-others, tasked with liberating the divine light in all people.18 This
Kabbalistic mysticism also forged a deep sense of hope in Kook’s approach to Jewish life. The
sparks, after all, could not stay hidden forever. And shmita would be one of the ways in which
they would finally emerge.
Kook’s Understanding of Shmita
The situation that provoked Kook’s writing on the Shabbat Ha’aretz was an aggressive
dispute between the Old and New Yishuv on what to do with agricultural projects in Israel every
seven years. The argument kicked off in 1888, when the New Yishuv realized that their survival
within the land of Israel depended on continuing to profit from the land during the Sabbatical
year. They asked several significant European rabbis (most notably Yitzak Spektor) about how to
resolve the problem, and were told that it would be acceptable to work the land during the
shmita, as long as the land was sold to non-Jews.19 At the end of the shmita year, the land would

Gershon Winer, “On Religious Nationalism,” in Essays on the Thought and Philosophy of Rabbi Kook,
(211-218) 215.
17

David Shatz explains Kook’s connection of Jewish nationalism with universalism in the following way:
“Each nation has its distinctive talents, he explains; but the talent distinctive to the Jews is their capacity to absorb,
synthesize, and transform the best elements in surrounding cultures. Israel is, thus, ‘the quintessence of all
humanity.’ The mission of the Jews in history is to exercise their talent for integration and creativity and then to
bring to the outside world the new product they have fashioned. Only in that way will Israel be able to execute its
sacred task; to elevate all of humanity and all of existence” (Shatz, Jewish Thought in Dialogue, 93).
18

More specifically, according to Michael Nehorai, the heter mekhira contained two stipulations: “(1) That
the land be sold to a non-Jew by way of circumvention, as we are accustomed to do with unleavened bread on
Passover; and (2) that all manner of agricultural work—to begin with—be done by non-Jews, and that even in a
situation of duress all modes of work that are biblically prohibited should not be done by Jews.” See Michael Z.
Nehorai, “Halakhah, Metahalakha, and the Redemption of Israel: Reflections on the Rabbinic Rulings of Rav
Kook,” in Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook and Jewish Spirituality, eds. Lawrence J. Kaplan and David Shatz (New
York: New York University Press, 1995), 128.
19
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be sold back to the original Jewish owners, at a modest gain to their non-Jewish partners. This
20

compromise, known as the heter mekhira, triggered caustic debates between the traditional
orthodox Jews, and the New Yishuv. The former alleged that this was nothing more than a
faithless abandonment of Jewish tradition, while the latter insisted that it was unavoidable if
Jews wanted to maintain a space in the land.
The debate over the heter mekhira continued to grow in intensity every seven years,
becoming especially vehement in 1909-10, when the Jewish agricultural establishments had
grown in size, and could by no means survive a complete cessation of labor for the entire year. It
was in this context that Kook wrote his Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, in which he argued in
favor of the heter mekhira. Kook openly admitted that this provision was innovative, without
solid backing in halacha. His publication of this work marked a change in perspective—while
living in Europe, Kook had initially opposed the heter mekhira.21 However, he argued that the
renovation of the Jewish homeland was itself an unprecedented, revolutionary event, requiring
unprecedented measures to sustain its existence. If Jews halted their agricultural production

20

As Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser observe, this meant that the sale of the land was essentially
“fictitious,” since the sale involved an agreement that the land would be bought back after the shmita year. On the
technicalities of this process see Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, “The ‘Sabbatical’ Year in Israeli Politics: An
Intra-Religious and Religious-Secular Conflict from the Nineteenth through the Twenty-First Centuries,” Journal of
Church and State 52, no. 3 (2010): 454-475. The fictitious nature of the heter mekhira is part of what made the
practice so controversial among more traditional Jewish settlers in the land of Israel.
21
See Daniel Z. Feldman, “A Brief Overview of Some of the Issues Related to the Hetter Mekhira,”
Tradition 47:3 (2014): 9. Feldman emphasizes that it was Kook’s relocation to the land of Israel that facilitated his
change of thought on this issue.
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every seven years, the entire project would fall apart, and thus a degree of ormah, or halachic
ingenuity, was necessary.22
Naturally, Kook’s pro-heter mekhira stance earned him harsh criticism from the members
of the Old Yishuv. One of his most prominent adversaries was Rav Ya’akov David Wilovsky,
rabbi of Tzfat. Wilovsky claimed that the “compromise” inherent in the sale of the land to nonJews was really no compromise at all, and that it was simply an act of disobedience to the clear
shmita directive.23 In response, Kook continued his insistence that the provision was necessary
for the survival of the agricultural industries. At bottom, the debate was less about shmita
specifically and more about the legitimacy of the secular Jews who formed the greater part of the
New Yishuv. Willowsky and his allies saw these newcomers as heretics, whose attempt to dodge
an explicit Torah commandment should be recognized as blatant unfaithfulness.24 Kook, on the
other hand, approached the New Yishuv with a mentality informed by his Kabbalistic
predispositions. There were sparks of divine holiness in these secular Jews, Kook believed, and

22

The concept of ormah is a complicated issue in the study of Jewish practice. Some Jewish scholars have
translated it “deviousness,” giving it the connotation of illicit play in the loopholes of Jewish law. It has a long
history, particularly in the form of small concessions given by halachic interpreters to carry out compromises such
as permitting the sale of leavened bread to non-Jews during Passover, so as to prevent financial losses by Jewish
bakers during this time. Other scholars have defined ormah as ingenuity in the face of difficulties, necessary and
admirable. On the application of ormah to shmita see Cohen and Susser, “The ‘Sabbatical’ Year in Israeli Politics,”
457-458. On the role of ormah more broadly see Elana Stein, “Rabbinic Legal Loopholes: Formalism, Equity, and
Subjectivity,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2014.
23

24

See Mirsky, Rav Kook, 75.

Of course, not all the criticisms of the heter mekhira (a topic which continues to be debated in Israel to
this day) are rooted in biases on the part of traditional Jews against secular Jews. Many of the arguments against the
practice were rooted in other concerns, such as a desire to create greater community reliance. Daniel Feldman
describes a long list of pro and con arguments that continue to recur in discussions about the heter mekhira,
including the concern that the sale of the land would constitute a violation of the prohibition in Deuteronomy 7:2 of
selling land to non-Jews. See Daniel Feldman, “A Brief Overview of Some of the Issues Related to the Hetter
Mekhira,” 18-19.
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this divine essence must be allowed to emerge. Ousting them from the holy land by forbidding
them an essential compromise with the shmita mandate would only set back the progress of the
divine light.
At this point, it might seem that Kook had little use for the shmita, at least as opposed to
agricultural prosperity. Indeed, this was the reaction of his opponents.25 But nothing could be
further from the truth. The primary purpose of Kook’s Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz was to
magnify the importance of shmita in the consciousness of both secular and orthodox Jews. In line
with this aim, the text presents itself as a lyrical celebration of the transformative potential of
shmita for the life of the Jewish people. Kook attempted to combat a tendency on both sides of
the heter mekhira debate to view shmita as a purely dogmatic issue, either to be dispensed with
or defended viciously. By contrast, Kook saw the shmita as a creative institution, which should
be cherished and nurtured so that it could eventually take root in Jewish society, and from there
transform the world. Shmita was not simply a religious obligation, but an instrument of change
(teshuvah) that would renovate human existence.26 It would do so by offering a different vision
of sovereignty in Jewish life.

25
David Krantz also points out that “Kook’s shmita workaround of heter mechira may have been a
pragmatic solution that overpowered his idealistic perspective on shmita. Since the public did not absorb Kook’s
idealistic introduction on shmita, and simply focused on the workaround, heter mechira combined with the Talmudic
rulings to strip shmita of nearly all its components.” See David Krantz, “Shmita Revolution: The Reclamation and
Reinvention of the Sabbatical Year,” Religions 7:8 (2016): 10. For this reason, Krantz’s view is that Kook’s
aspirations to see shmita revived were a failure. However, one this does not discredit the legitimacy of those
aspirations—it simply points to the communicative inadequacy of Kook’s expression.
26
For Kook, teshuvah (often translated “repentance”) was both change in actions and change at a higher
level—the mystical soul. Both of these needed to work together to create genuine transformation. See Lawrence A.
Englander, “Rav Kook’s Understanding of Teshuvah,” Judaism 34, no. 2 (1985): 211-220.
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From Kook’s perspective, the opposing camps within the Jewish people had approached
the shmita debate with an end of using it (or not using it) to establish their own individual
sovereignty. The Old Yishuv wanted to reinforce the sovereign power of tradition in Jewish life,
while the New Yishuv wanted to dispense with religious institutions such as shmita so that they
could pursue economic advancement, resulting in a form of financial sovereignty. Although
Kook sided with the New Yishuv on the specific question of the heter mekhira, he wanted to
challenge their paradigm. Kook was not generally lax in his interpretation of halacha.27 He
grounded his willingness to compromise not in an insouciant attitude toward the institution, but
in a firm belief in its spiritual power. He believed that in the process of fiercely debating the
technicalities of the shmita, both sides could lose sight of its medicinal purpose for the soul of
the people.
What was this healing purpose? Kook provides a handy formula: “What the Sabbath does
for the individual, shmita does for the nation as a whole.”28 Just as the Sabbath sustains the
individual laborer’s life and well-being, the Sabbatical year sustains the core of Jewish identity
in its collective life. For Kook this identity was not ethnic, nor was it simply a set of dry
traditions tied to a set of textual interpretations. Rather, this identity was found in divine
imitation, a “godly” life.29 Kook emphasizes that “the light and salvation of each person depends

For an account of Kook’s generally rigorous application of halacha see Arye Edrei, “From Orthodoxy to
Religious Zionism: Rabbi Kook and the Sabbatical Year Polemic,” Dine Israel: Studies in Halakhah and Jewish
Law 26 (2009): 45-145. In light of Kook’s generally strict readings, Gerald Blidstein hears an “anguish” in Kook’s
writing on the heter mekhira, because of a longing for a fulfilled practice of the institution. See Gerald J. Blidstein,
“Man and Nature in the Sabbatical Year,” Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought 9, no. 4 (1966): 51.
27
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Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 95.

As Avinoam Rosenak points out, Kook’s holistic approach to halacha focused on not merely applying the
rules, but accessing the spirit of the precepts so as to “wake amidst the sleeping,” creating a different spiritual
29
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on the depth of this imprinting awareness that the value of life is in its godliness.” This
30

godliness, springing from divine light, is the core of Jewish existence: “The essential quality of
the Jewish people’s collective soul is its divine nature.”31 This is what shmita would exemplify,
restore, and preserve.32
How would the Sabbatical year bring out the divine nature in the Jewish people? Kook
explains:
This national treasure that is imprinted deep within us, the image of a world that is
good, upright, and godly—aligned with peace, justice, grace, and courage, all
filled with a pervasive divine perspective that rests in the spirit of the people—
cannot be actualized within a way of life that is purely secular. Such a life, full of
frenetic action, veils the glory of our divine soul, and the soul’s clear light is
blocked from shining through the overpowering, mundane reality. The impulse
toward growth and self-realization needs space to come to fruition.33
Here Kook gently chides the secularists of the New Yishuv for envisioning a collective existence
marked by ceaseless production. Such a “purely secular” development would make the pioneers

outlook. In this sense, although Kook was strict in his observance, he was the opposite of a legalist. See Avinoam
Rosenak, “Hidden Diaries and New Discoveries: The Life and Thought of Rabbi A.I. Kook,” Shofar 25:3 (2007):
11-147.
30

Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 89.
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Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 91.
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In a sense, one could call Kook’s framework a type of “mysticism of the state,” since he believed that the
“collective soul” of the Jewish people was incarnated through their presence in the land of Israel. At the same time,
he did not dissolve the personal element from this collective soul—the individual mystic played a crucial role in the
building up of this soul. The result is a tension in Kook’s thought between the world of the nation as a whole and the
individual thinker. On the complexity of this tension see Ben Zion Bokser, “Rav Kook: The Road to Renewal,”
Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Thought 13, no. 3 (1973): 137-153. The idea of the collective soul and its
relationship to the individual was also carried on by Rav Kook’s son, Zvi Yehudah Kook. For an overview of the
idea of the “collective soul” in Zvi Kook’s work, and its relationship to that of his father, see Uriel Barak, “The
Collective Soul: Some Remarks on R. Zvi Yehudah Kook’s Readings of the Maharal of Prague and R. Avraham
Azulai,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 24 (2016): 300-317.
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Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 93.
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unchallenged sovereigns over the land, and perhaps even over certain sectors of the middleeastern economy, but the result would be a loss of the Jewish soul—the element of “peace,
justice, grace, and courage.” The practitioners of this form of sovereignty would find themselves
increasingly alienated from each other and from their land. The type of harmony that
characterizes the gentleness and kindness of the divine life would be impossible. Only through
shmita could the Jewish people cultivate a national identity marked by these qualities.
Ultimately, for Kook, this identity would transform the Jewish conception and enactment
of sovereignty. Although Kook does not explicitly discuss the question of sovereignty in
philosophical terms, his assessment of the purpose of shmita is deeply interlaced with this
question. In a context in which traditional orthodox Jews were attempting to force their will on
their neighbors, and pioneering secular Jews were attempting to force economic prosperity, Kook
observes that the shmita challenges human notions of forcefulness altogether:
On the shmita, our pure, inner spirit may be revealed as it truly is. The
forcefulness that is inevitably part of our regular, public lives lessens our moral
refinement. There is always a tension between the ideal of listening to the voice
inside us that calls us to be kind, truthful and merciful, and the conflict,
compulsion, and pressure to be unyielding that surround buying, selling, and
acquiring things. These aspects of the world of action distance us from the divine
light and prevent its being discerned in the public life of the nation.34
Keep in mind that the “pure, inner spirit” is the essence of the divine sparks. Its qualities are
those of God. The style of existence displayed in shmita, therefore, reveals God; and the
celebrants of shmita model the divine existence through the ritual. Shmita would transform their
souls after the divine pattern.

34

Kook, Introduction to Shabbat Ha’aretz, 96-97.
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This, obviously, raises a question that would have almost certainly run through the minds
of Kook’s more traditional Old Yishuv critics: If shmita is effective in changing the soul of the
people, why not start observing it right away? Why permit the heter mekhira to hamper the
people’s embrace of godliness, preventing the transformative effects of this Sabbatical ritual?
Kook’s answer is that doing so would destroy the original purpose of the shmita, which was to
restore the people’s connection to the land and create community. Because of economic
circumstances, the rabbis who instituted the heter mekhira “realized their historical obligation to
smooth the path of the new settlements and, as much as possible, not to let the mitzvot that are
connected to the land be obstacles.”35 If the shmita was a suspension of activity to make way for
life, in this case the people needed a “suspension of the suspension” in order to fulfill the intent
of shmita. This dynamic is precisely what Agamben calls the “Sabbath of Sabbath.” For Kook,
the only way to preserve the Sabbatical sovereignty of the shmita is to cancel the sovereignty of
shmita.
Paradoxically, Kook even argues that the lack of observance of shmita can be a way to
preserve its memory and significance. “Since the evasion is carried out according to the
prescriptions of the law, it constitutes a remembrance of the precept so that the law will not be
forgotten, and when the time comes again for them to observe the biblical law, all the laws will
be known.”36 The point was to study and celebrate the principles of shmita, as well as enact any
parts of the relevant halakha that were within the grasp of possibility. Doing so would gradually
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renovate the vitality of the collective Jewish soul, making possible a progressively greater
celebration of shmita. The Jewish people should not treat shmita as a dogmatic dictate that must
be served as if it were a slave-master. The shmita was made for liberation; thus the people
should—in this case—liberate themselves from it, temporarily.37
As the people gradually adopted this Sabbatical spirit into their collective soul, even
without practicing every shmita precept, Kook believed the rigor of shmita observance would
increase. Over time, the divine light accruing every seven years in the spirit of the people would
grow, reaching the Kabbalistic equivalent of a “critical mass.” The result would be the yobel, or
year of jubilee, which, according to the Talmud, could only occur when all the inhabitants of the
land of Israel were living there.38 In Kook’s paradigm, the yobel would fundamentally alter the
entire category of sovereignty for the Jewish people. This is visible in the biblical discussions
about the yobel’s impact on property and labor. As land and slaves returned to their owners,
domination of one person over others would entirely cease. A new world would be created. Kook
is eager to emphasize, however, that the yobel would not be a sudden, cataclysmic operation:
This freedom does not erupt like some volcano; it emerges gradually from the
inner holiness. It is not a radical exception to the regular social order but flows
from within it, nurtured by the life of the shorter, preceding periods until,
reinforced by the revelation of our choices for good, it has the power to repair past
injustices.39
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This did not mean that settlers in the land of Israel must utilize the heter mekhira. As Simcha Raz notes,
Kook “made sure that those farmers who wanted to adhere to the laws of Shemittah would be able to do so, not
letting anyone force them to rely on the heter. He even urged farmers to refrain from working the land, if they could
afford to do so, and he set up a special fund to assist them.” See Simcha Raz, Angel among Men: Impressions from
the Life of Avraham Yitzchak Hakohen Kook (Jerusalem: Kol Mevaser Publications, 2003), 31.
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For Kook, yobel cannot become a pretext for procrastination about dealing with injustice. Rather,
a yobel would not even be possible unless Israel embraced the shmita/yobel spirit into its regular
existence, allowing the form of sovereignty entailed by these mitzvot to display itself. The people
could not attain this outcome by forgetting shmita, but neither could they attain it by a haphazard
enforcement of the command, such as the opponents of the heter mekhira were trying to do.
Kook’s endorsement of the heter mekhira is thus not an example of a type of “antinomianism”
that Dov Schwartz ascribes to Kook.40 As Rosenak argues against Schwartz, Kook’s willingness
to suspend shmita was not because of a disdain for laws and principles, but because of a view
that those institutions did not exist for their own sake, but for the benefit of humanity.41 In
Kook’s mind, inoperative ritual was still commanded and necessary. But it had to render itself
inoperative in order to become more fully operative.
Political Implications
In Kook’s mind, those who favored an immediate enforcement of shmita were
themselves falling victim to the type of perverse theo-political sovereignty that shmita was
intended to counteract. Kook corrects their error when he justifies the heter mekhira with the

See Dov Schwartz, The Religious Genius in Rabbi Kook’s Thought: National “Saint”? trans. Edward
Levin (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2014), 129-135. Schwartz finds numerous examples of antinomianism in
Kook’s aphoristic, spiritual writings. In the reading posited by Schwartz, Kook sees the saint as someone with a
certain “double life,” with a bifurcation between holiness and everyday existence (yet one that is dialectically
overcome). Schwartz argues that this “provides an opening for antinomianism” in which the saint can set aside the
Torah commandments (132). This may be true with regard to the personal psychology of the saint, but it seems to
have little connection to the significance of the heter mekhira for Kook. His argument, as I have noted above, was
not that the shmita ought to be left behind in favor of a higher holiness, but that the heter mekhira was the only way
to fully realize the end purpose of the shmita.
40
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According to Rosenak, “It is the fate of zaddikim, in Rabbi Kook’s view, to observe the commandments
in great distress, not for the sake of their inherent vitality but for the sake of the world and of society and for
educational purposes.” See Rosenak, “Hidden Diaries and New Discoveries,” 122.
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observation that “God does not make tyrannical and unreasonable demands of His creatures.”

42

At the root of the traditionalists’ insistence on rigid adherence to the shmita mandate was a
failure to understand the sovereignty of the God who gave the mandate. The people’s
relationship of sovereignty toward the land would parallel God’s relationship of sovereignty
toward them. Forcing Jews to keep shmita, endangering their capacity to live in harmony with
each other and to survive in the nascent Jewish homeland, would reflect an image of a sovereign
deity who exercised unilateral power over others without concern for their freedom.
Kook’s understanding of the political logic behind the heter mekhira is inseparable from
his mysticism, as Abraham Shemesh has pointed out in an important article.43 Kook believed that
shmita was part of a restoration of the people’s “inner character” and that its political function
was tied to this mystical goal. Because the mystical reality of a transformed soul within the
Jewish people could not be imposed from outside, neither could shmita. Hence, according to
Shemesh, Kook promoted the heter mekhira as a way to draw non-Jews and secular Zionists into
a collaboration—one that would eventually result in a full observance of shmita.44 This
mysticism originated in “a combination of the sacred and the mundane” ultimately aimed at a
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Shemesh emphasizes that Kook’s insistence on the heter mekhira, as well as his nuanced views on other
administrative questions in the land of Israel, “derives from his grasp of Zionism as a sign of the coming of the
Messiah. He perceived the development of the country by the pioneers, despite their being non-observant, as a deep
human partnership in the universal cosmic process of bringing the redemption.” See Abraham Ofir Shemesh, “‘For
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(2018): 58.
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Shemesh points out that Kook’s concern for Muslims and a desire to draw them into mutual community
in the land of Israel could also have been a factor in his promotion of the heter mekhira. See Shemesh, “‘For the
Public’s Improvement and for the Benefit of the Town,’” 59.
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type of inoperativity with practical value. If one believes, as Kook did, that the right form of
45

inoperativity arises from a fundamental focus on human well-being as part of larger whole in
which ritual and ecological concerns play a part, it makes sense that inoperativity must
sometimes suspend itself in order to fulfill its broader function. The sovereignty of shmita must
be the authority of a deity who mystically transforms the soul, rather than coercively commands
it. As Tamar Ross notes, this same mystical idea of “the intrinsic value of noncoercion” was
evident in other policies Kook commended, such as his methods of addressing heterodox
members of the community.46 The kabbalistic idea of sparks within each person that need only to
be flamed into action sets the stage for a mode of interpersonal ethics in which “letting be”
becomes the paradigm for politics as a whole.47
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The type of sovereignty Kook envisioned through the suspension of shmita is also one in
which the rights of poorer persons are central. This connects to the central meaning of shmita in
the original Biblical texts, as noted above. In Kook’s time, it would have been possible for
wealthy pioneers in the land of Israel to practice shmita.48 In such situations, it is easy for the
privileged to project their own capabilities onto others. This logic often plays out whenever the
rich look on persons under economic duress and condescendingly exclaim, “If I were in their
place, I would . . .” while being grossly under-informed about all the factors that create financial
insecurity. At the core of Kook’s vision of sovereignty is an awareness of the struggles of the
less-fortunate. For Kook, sovereignty requires the ability to place oneself in the position of those
whose lack of privilege hinders their ability to carry out tasks that seem easy to members of
higher classes. By making the observance of shmita contingent on the financial ability of all the
Jews in the land of Israel, and simultaneously working for the eventual restoration of shmita
observance, Kook essentially argued for a campaign for economic equality. In a way that
parallels the Christian “preferential option for the poor,” Kook’s shmita formulated a key
principle of sovereignty—no action that fails to account for the interests of the poorest in the
land holds validity.
In a sense, then, Kook’s shmita was the political kernel from which a much larger sociopolitical plant was supposed to emerge. Metaphorically, through the heter mekhira, Kook wanted

Feldman sees in Kook’s defense of the heter mekhira a concern to prevent something like a spiritual
inequality emerging in the land of Israel. Wealthy farmers would have spiritual access to the soul-reviving powers of
shmita because they could afford to take a year off. On the other hand, “on a spiritual level, there is the concern that
non-observant farmers will cease to have any connection to shemitta, were the hetter to be unavailable.” See
Feldman, “A Brief Overview of Some of the Issues Related to the Hetter Mekhira,” 27.
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to bury this seed in the ground, enabling the transformative power dynamics of a Sabbatical logic
to germinate. This would happen as the people who worked the land during the shmita year
anticipated fervently the arrival of the ultimate year of rest, and finally the jubilee year. They
would study shmita’s meaning, and “learning itself leads to action . . . “from one year to the next,
more and more people will be caught up in enthusiasm.”49 The result would be a “butterfly
effect” on Jewish institutions of sovereignty. Kook believed this political dynamic proceeded
from the essential uniqueness of the Jewish people, and that this was the gift Jewish existence
could give to the world.
What does Kook’s theological analysis of the Jewish Sabbath of the land in Palestine in
the early twentieth century offer for Christians attempting to develop a political theology of
inoperativity in America and elsewhere in the West in the twenty-first century? Here I can offer a
few observations that could be helpful.
First, Kook’s work suggests that a practice of ritualized inoperativity—deliberately doing
nothing as an imitation of divine existence—can directly alter a people’s conception of
sovereignty, and thus their politics. Christians in the West may not find shmita a useful ritual for
this purpose, but the idea itself could be pivotal (as I will argue in chapter five). According to
Kook, ritualized inoperativity can dampen the spirit of material acquisition and ceaseless
production that marks Western (and especially American) attitudes toward land. In the United
States, land is the site of competition and relentless grasping for power. The values of shmita
could upend this paradigm.
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Second, Kook’s understanding of shmita depicts a type of sovereignty which can suspend
itself for the sake of human well-being. Through the heter mekhira, Kook wanted to suspend
various aspects of shmita observance, not to abolish shmita but to bring its intended purpose to
fruition. This may also be connected to what Lawrence Kaplan describes as a process of
“affirmation and negation” that is a key feature of Kook’s understanding of holiness.50 Faith,
according to Kaplan’s reading of Kook, is a phenomenon that opens itself by being suspended—
as Kook claims happened during the Aqedah.51 As I noted above, this is exactly what Agamben
calls the “suspension of suspension” or a “negative dialectic.” In this political framework,
sovereign power freely destabilizes itself.
Third, Kook’s understanding of the heter mekhira is also a site for fruitful interreligious
cooperation. In order for this exception to shmita to work, Jews needed to work together with
non-Jews, by selling the land to non-Jews during the Sabbatical year. Since, according to Kook,
the heter mekhira was ultimately a way for shmita to gradually realize itself, non-Jews were
helping Jews to carry out their religious practices by participating in the heter mekhira.52 Kook’s
theology of shmita thus offers an example of how religious rituals can open themselves to a
broader community of different religious faiths. For Christians living in the religiously diverse

50

See Lawrence Kaplan, “The Love of God in Maimonides and Rav Kook,” Judaism 43, no. 3 (1994): 227-

239.
Kaplan claims that for Kook, the Aqedah was God’s suspension of the faith-command for Abraham to
become the father of many nations, and yet it was through this suspension that the fulfillment of the command took
place. The same is true for other forms of faith, per Kook. See Kaplan, “The Love of God in Maimonides and Rav
Kook,” 233-236.
51

52

This point was made eloquently in a discussion I had with Prof. Devorah Schoenfeld of Loyola
University Chicago, to whom I am indebted for it.

120
West, this is instructive. Such communities should consider how their own practices of
inoperativity can suspend themselves (if necessary) to affirm the well-being of others. For
example, this is why a mandatory Sunday law (such as the much disputed “blue laws” of
nineteenth century America) would not be an appropriate way to display the sovereign
inoperativity of a Christian Sabbath.
Finally, Christians in the Western world can learn something from Kook’s ideal of
gradual spiritual development in communal life. Although Christian theologians such as Martin
Luther King have vilified the “fallacy of gradualism” that postpones and ultimately derails
urgent social changes, there is something to be said for Kook’s long-term view of how shmita
would take hold of the Jewish collective soul and bring about a new form of ethical existence.
Although history often seems to change in sudden spurts, these developments could also be the
product of slow moving shifts. Kook’s believed that “the mitzvot of today are a means to the
higher ethics of the future, which will reach beyond Judaism toward all humanity and even to the
animal and natural worlds.”53 One does not have to embrace all the metaphysics of the kabbalah
to see that this vision is deeply resonant with a many Christian visions of ethical change. This
does not mean that Christians should stall on important social justice issues. It does mean,
however, that they should invest in simple actions that could transform the “soul” of their
communities. For example, by embracing forms of ritual inoperativity, Christians could induce
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these types of long-term shifts in spiritual mentality, grounded in a vision of the inoperative
sovereignty of God.54
The idea of a long term, inner change in a collective consciousness does raise the
question of whether Sabbath (like shmita in this case) should be understood as an interruption of
a social system, or simply as one beneficial component within it. Although Kook does not
directly address this question, it seems that his answer might be “an interruption, but one that can
interrupt itself.” As I have argued above, Kook did not understand the heter mekhira as a
diminishment or abandonment of the shmita, but as a suspension of shmita on the basis of its
own principles. The original goal of shmita was harmony between the people and the land,
achieved through the elevation of the poor. As such, shmita must interrupt any economic
structure that would hinder this outcome. The heter mekhira would be simply a way for this
interruption to gain a foothold within society.
Kook’s vision of shmita thus gives us an applied example of what Lacoste’s inoperative
resolution to the master/slave dialectic might look like. By gradually building rest into their
societal development, Kook believed the Jewish people would be able to reorient themselves
toward sovereign power and the drive toward coercive political subjugation that undergirds it.
Kook’s understanding of the politics of inoperativity differs from Lacoste’s in that the former
focused on explicitly on communities engaging together in inoperative rituals, while the latter
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focuses on individual relations to the Absolute, but the dynamic is the same. Kook’s shmita
would halt the competitive master/slave dialectic by providing a means for the community to
exist together in a state of inoperative harmony.
This harmony would not be achieved by a sudden, totalitarian imposition of the
inoperative ritual. Such a form of inoperativity would have constituted a revival of sovereign
power, as Agamben’s work emphasizes, and would have driven poor farmers into a greater state
of destitution, forcing them into a position of zoe life. The heter mekhira thus functions as a
concrete example of how Agamben’s “suspension” of the machinery of modern politics might
work. The shmita—operating through the suspension of itself via the heter mekhira—would
interrupt the political system, but not in a way that mimics the mechanism of sovereign power.
This interruption would finally take the form of an ultimate collective Sabbath, the fiftyyear jubilee, or yobel. Because Kook is primarily concerned with social relationships among
Jews in the land of Israel, his work tends to focus on this collective Sabbath. However, this work
presupposes an understanding of the Sabbath’s impact on individual personal existence, for “the
personal is political.” How we live together as political communities is inseparable from how we
live as individuals within families. For these reasons, Kook’s vision of the collective Sabbath is
intimately related to the more “individual” weekly Sabbath. The insights Kook offers for
understanding the significance of the shmita and yobel, and their partial suspension in the form
of the heter mekhira, are applicable also to understanding smaller-scale forms of inoperativity.
Summary
The Sabbath of the land is for Rav Kook an experience that transforms the community’s
attitude toward themselves, each other, and the world at large. His hope was that, as the Jews in
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Israel continued to strive for a greater celebration of this form of ritual inoperativity, they would
find themselves increasingly blossoming into the spirit of the yobel, or jubilee. To make this
happen, however the ritual needed to suspend itself as a way to create the practical outcome for
which the ritual was originally intended. In exactly the way that Agamben envisions a “Sabbath
of Sabbath,” Kook’s promotion of the heter mekhira thus describes a process through which the
shmita would accomplish its goal through a type of self-reduction, or what Agamben might call
“poverty.”55
This notion that inoperativity has a “goal” raises questions. Kook’s work, as well as that
of several of the thinkers we have examined thus far, advocates that inoperative ritual must have
a purpose, or function. Naturally, this is important for my overall argument, which is that
inoperativity may play a key role in political transformations. Nevertheless, as I have already
hinted in this work, the idea that inoperativity “functions” or has a practical purpose, appears
paradoxical, if not contradictory. We now turn to a thinker who analyzes a different form of
inoperativity, and argues that it in fact has no purpose whatsoever.
Roberto Goizueta: The “Useless” Fiesta
The Catholic theologian Roberto Goizueta writes from a distinct practical vantage point:
the experiences of Latina/o56 communities in the United States. Such communities—finding
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themselves often displaced—seek survival through the affirmation of human relationships.
Goizueta’s work reflects on the various ritual and philosophical approaches Latino/a Catholics
have devised to address this need. One of these approaches is a distinct understanding of
inoperativity.
To explain how Goizueta develops his view of inoperativity (though he does not use this
term), I will first provide an overview of his methodology, then give an account of his
understanding of inoperativity, and finally reflect on its political consequences.
Method
Goizueta’s theological method emerges from several sources. The first is his locus
theologicus within U.S. Latina/o communities. Goizueta recognizes that all theology results from
dialogue with the theologian’s personal background and life experiences, and that no theologian
can interpret a doctrine or text apart from these personal factors.57 Hence, his work is a reflection
of his own experience within the odd setting of U.S. Latina/o culture. This culture is not
homogeneous or easily categorized, since cultures designated “Latina/o” or “Hispanic” may arise
from diverse locations. Furthermore, the social categories bearing these titles display immense
internal variation in culture, religion and race. This means that persons lumped into the
“Latina/o” box by the larger Anglo-American society may actually display a much more
complex, hybrid identity—what Goizueta and other theologians sometimes refer to as mestizaje
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or “hybridity.” Goizueta himself is an immigrant from Cuba, who has spent much of his time
58

among Mexican communities in the U.S. This unique and complex identity is the site from
which Goizueta speaks.
Despite the immense variation within Latina/o communities, Goizueta focuses on a
common element that seems pervasive in these communities, and that influences his thinking
prominently. This is the importance of popular religion, especially within Catholicism. As a
precise term, “popular religion” is difficult to define—a challenge Goizueta understands.59 At
first, the term can seem to indicate religion that is “popular” in the sense of common, well-liked,
or trendy, in a way analogous to “popular music.” This is not the sense in which Goizueta uses
the term. The popular religious elements in Latina/o Catholicism can be either widespread or
parochial, and may be well-known or somewhat hidden. In Goizueta’s theology, therefore, “the
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adjective (popular) refers to the socio-historical fact that these religious symbols, practices, and
narratives are of the people.”60 In other words, the popular religion of Latina/o Catholicism
emerges directly out of the everyday experiences of marginalized and diverse communities.
A major aspect of popular religion is the importance of sacramentality within its
theological framework. Goizueta points to the research of scholars such as Orlando Espín and
Mark Francis, who have shown that the Catholicism of Latina/o Catholics stems from Iberian
traditions that predated modern Catholicism. This type of Catholicism was more “medieval” in
character, which means that it did not display the focus on conceptual and doctrinal specificity
that characterized the Catholicism of the counter-reformation.61 Hence, Latina/o Catholics are
more apt to see God within their symbols, rather than ascribing merely descriptive significance to
these symbols.62 This will become important for understanding the significance of inoperativity
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within Goizueta’s thought, because the sacramentality of inoperative practices is important for
understanding their political implications.
Much of Goizueta’s work can also be understood as a constructive critique of certain
strands of liberation theology. Goizueta agrees with the fundamental trajectory of liberation
theology—identifying Christ with the poor and the marginalized. “For Christians,” Goizueta
says, “the significance of the crucified and risen Christ is precisely that God is found, in some
special way, among those people who continue to be crucified today—the poor, the hungry, the
naked, and the outcast.”63 Gustavo Gutierrez famously formulated this method in liberation
theology by claiming that theology is a “critical reflection on praxis” and that theology could
only be verified by “orthopraxis.”64 This procedural prioritizing of praxis characterizes liberation
theology pervasively, although defining the relationship between theology and praxis is not
without difficulty, as shown in a key study by Clodovis Boff.65 Goizueta, for his part, provides a
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detailed assessment of the role of praxis in theology, and this is where his views on the nature of
inoperativity become important.
Goizueta’s Understanding of Latina/o Inoperative Praxis
Commenting on liberation theology’s reinstatement of praxis at the heart of Christian
faith, Goizueta asks a simple question that has easily been overlooked: What is praxis?66 Both
liberation theologians and their critics often assume that praxis is simply “doing something,” and
that the point is to figure out how to do it. But this level of analysis is insufficient, because there
are a variety of ways of understanding what “doing” means.
Goizueta observes that Karl Marx, whose work has had some influence on liberation
theology (though not as much as some critics have maintained), defined praxis as making or
production—useful activity. This type of activity is the central hallmark of human nature. “In
creating an objective world by his practical activity, in working-up inorganic nature, man proves
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himself a conscious species being,” Marx says. By production, a human being gives form to
67

substances, and concomitantly gives form to him or herself.68 The result is that, when human
beings produce goods to be sold on the market, the very selves of the producers are being sold.
This is the core of what Marx calls alienation.69 Implicit, then, within Marx’s critique of
capitalist structures is an anthropology in which “the human person is homo faber.”70
However, according to Goizueta, this definition of praxis as production is not the only
definition available. Goizueta points to Aristotle, who makes a key distinction between praxis
and poiesis. The latter term refers to production or making—“human action whose end is
external to itself.”71 Praxis, for Aristotle, refers to behavior aimed at internal ends—that is,
action done for its own sake.72 Goizueta uses several analogies to illustrate the difference
between praxis and poiesis. Someone who makes a guitar engages in poiesis, because the object
Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C.
Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978), 76 (cited in Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 81).
67

Marx puts it very straightforwardly: “He (the human being) begins to distinguish himself from the animal
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producing food, man indirectly produces his material life itself.” See Karl Marx, Writings of the Young Marx on
Philosophy and Society, ed. Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 409 (as cited in
Goizueta, Caminemos con Jesús, 81).
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created is intended for another purpose (playing music). Someone who plays the guitar on the
other hand, engages in praxis, because the act of musical production is an end in itself (unless, of
course, the player attempts to use the guitar music only to accomplish some other end, such as
earning money). Another, subtler analogy Goizueta uses is the distinction between “making a
house” and “making a home.” Someone who fixes boards together with concrete creates a space
that will be used for another purpose: living. This externally-oriented act is poiesis. However, the
persons who eat, sleep, and enjoy themselves within the house engage in praxis. Their living is
an end in itself.73
Modern Western society, in Goizueta’s evaluation, has largely neglected Aristotle’s
definition of life-as-praxis in favor of the Enlightenment perspective of life-as-production—the
view that Marx also adopted. The result has been a tendency to instrumentalize human persons,
to depict their value in terms of their ability to transform their world. Of course, Marx deeply
opposed the reduction of human beings to work-objects. Yet he could not avoid the influence of
production oriented thinking, even in his opposition to the inevitable exploitation that resulted
from such thinking. The same thing is true of liberation theologians influenced by Marx,
according to Goizueta. Although he agrees with the work of pivotal figures such as Gustavo
Gutierrez and the Boff brothers in restoring the primacy of praxis into Christian theology,
Goizueta argues that this concept has been built from an Enlightenment utility mold. Liberation
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theology, by focusing on transforming the world, runs the danger of assuming that human beings
are defined by their capacity to effect changes in sociopolitical systems.
Goizueta affirms the importance of transforming the world. He applauds efforts to
remove oppressive powers as one of the central features of the Gospel. But his recognition of the
subtle instrumental anthropology lurking within liberation theology leads him to the following
critique:
My own experience in Latino communities, such as San Fernando, has also led
me to question . . . any emphasis on the social transformative dimension of human
action which would make this dimension itself foundational. In these
communities, I have witnessed a type of empowerment and liberation taking place
which, at least initially and explicitly, seems to have relatively little connection to
any social or political struggles. Indeed, in many cases, empowerment and
liberation are not explicit goals at all. Seemingly, the only explicit goals are dayto-day survival and, especially, the affirmation of relationships as essential to that
survival. This affirmation is manifested in all those seemingly insignificant ways
in which we love, care for, and embrace other persons. Central to the struggle for
survival and relationships, moreover, is the community’s life of faith, which also,
at least on the surface, seems little related to social transformation.74
Goizueta’s focus on the everyday aspects of life is built on this fundamental point. This insight is
also the foundation for his work on the rituals and celebrations of popular Catholicism, which
could otherwise be derided as useless folk mythology. Participants in a via dolorosa
reenactment, for example, do not follow the footsteps of Christ in order to accomplish
something, such as illustrating the liberative significance of the cross. Their action is an end in
itself.75 Of course, a via dolorosa procession in a Latina/o community may have the byproduct of
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signaling a theopolitical point—such as Christ’s presence with the “crucified peoples of history”
(Ellacuria)—and thus contribute directly to transforming the world. But this is not the point. The
ritual aims at nothing other than itself. Such activities are intended to draw the participant into a
physical, tangible relationship to God and community, and thus construct an intrinsically-good
concrete way of being in the world. Goizueta therefore categorizes these rituals as having an
“aesthetic” value, using this term to refer to the non-instrumental goodness of unity-withdifference, connected to the U.S. Latina/o experience of mestizaje, or “empathic fusion.”76
This inoperative quality to Latina/o Catholic ritual becomes even clearer in an essay
Goizueta writes on Latina/o celebrative practices, or “fiesta.”77 Goizueta begins his analysis of
fiesta by repeating his earlier criticisms of liberation theology’s focus on externally-oriented
praxis.78 However, when he begins discussing the new paradigm of popular religion in Latina/o
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theology, he quickly adds that “by retrieving the central theological significance of popular
religion, U.S. Latino/a theologians are also responding to this new reality, not by rejecting
liberation theology, but by adopting, adapting, and helping to deepen the groundbreaking and
radical insights of liberation theologians.”79 In other words, Goizueta does not want to choose
between “useless” popular religion and “useful” liberation. His goal, as he states clearly, is to
show how the “useless” popular activity of fiesta “is a principle form of cultural resistance,”
because of the new form of anthropology it introduces.80
How does a fiesta establish a socially-transformative and yet useless praxis, one that
defines a new anthropology? Goizueta answers this question by giving a detailed explanation of
the philosophy of fiesta. He begins apophatically. “The fiesta,” Goizueta says, “is not a party.”81
Although the fiesta does involve pure enjoyment, displayed in merriment of various kinds
(music, food, and dancing), it is also a serious act of commemoration. It is a way of being
together as a community—not simply a way to fulfill oneself as an individual partier. As
Goizueta puts it, “The fiesta is, at the same time, play and work.”82
The “work” that is part of a fiesta is not merely the physical labor involved in setting up
the amenities for revelry. It is the aspect of intentional community construction involved in the
recreation. Goizueta points to research done by Ronald Grimes on the fiestas of Santa Fe, in
which participants were asked if they could use music other than mariachi for the events. The
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response was emphatic: “The fiesta would no longer be a fiesta.” The quintessence of the fiesta
83

is creating and drawing together a community, and this requires culturally authentic elements—
in this case, mariachi rhythms. This authenticity is part of the “job description” of a fiesta.
At the same time, Goizueta says, a fiesta is not work, defined as production. Using
Aristotelian terminology, it is praxis, not poiesis. According to Goizueta, the inherent
“uselessness” of this praxis enables those who participate in the fiesta to experience life as a gift,
not a human-made construct.
What we are receiving and responding to is the gift of life, not in a sentimental
sense, but in an ontological sense: we know that whatever ‘we’ do, make or
achieve is ultimately gift; we know that whatever relationships we construct are
grounded in the prior constitutive relationship with the One who has loved us
first; we know that who we are is not dependent on what we do, make, or achieve;
we know that life—all of life—is gift before it is an ‘object’ that we work upon,
mold, transform, or liberate.84
This mentality, fostered through the ritual inoperativity of fiesta, is itself both the condition of
true liberation and the reality of that liberation. In other words, fiesta is an act of resistance
because it creates a different world within the present world. Goizueta calls this aspect of fiesta
“life in the subjunctive,” meaning that it provokes the participant to act “as if” the world had
been restored to a condition of perfect community, without hierarchy. Quoting Victor Turner,
Goizueta suggests that during the fiesta, “it is as though everything is switched into the
subjunctive mood for a privileged period of time.”85 The action of fiesta pulls future expectation
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out of its distant, hazy mirage and places it squarely within the community’s life. In this sense,
the subjunctive mood of the fiesta is a practical enactment of Moltmann’s future “anticipation.”
The eschatology Moltmann speaks of in abstract terms is carried out regularly in the jubilant
celebrations of Latino/a communities. In other words, Goizueta’s fiesta ties together the
eschatological vision of Moltmann’s understanding of divine inoperativity with the liturgical
encounter of Lacoste’s liturgical inoperativity, creating Agamben’s inoperative “form of life”
through the community-transformation Kook longed for. Of course, this carries enormous
consequences for political theology.
Political Implications
It is not hard to see that politics is deeply melded within the rituals of the Latina/o
communities Goizueta describes. However, in order to understand this political framework it is
important to emphasize that fiesta/inoperativity does not simply “carry” political meaning for
Goizueta, as if it were a symbol to which a community describes particular meanings. Goizueta
observes that is popular among scholars trained in a Northern European “nominalist” tradition to
analyze the practices of other cultures by searching of conceptual significance lurking behind the
practices, and then to connect such significance to various political causes. For example, one
could interpret the appearance of the Virgin of Guadalupe to Juan Diego as a story symbolizing
the affirmation of lower-class Latina/o identity. On such a reading, according to Goizueta, “what
matters is not Juan Diego but ourselves, our own need for identity, our own sense of dignity, our
own need for hope and liberation.”86
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Goizueta opposes this abstract form of interpretation. He points out that for the Latino/a
Catholic communities that celebrate the story of Juan Diego and Our Lady of Guadalupe, these
characters do matter. Similarly, the political meaning ascribed to fiesta is not the point. Of
course, Juan Diego and fiesta do carry political meaning—Goizueta does not deny this. But this
meaning cannot be separated from the form of the symbols. Goizueta explains that “the poor do
not find meaning and hope in the religious practices themselves, but in the particular person of
Jesus Christ, Guadalupe, and so forth.”87 The rituals of fiesta and other devotional practices must
be interpreted sacramentally, in such a way that the truth of the symbol and its form are not
separated.88
This makes an analysis of the political implications of Goizueta’s fiesta-inoperativity
tricky, because the one thing we must not do is suppose that we can draw out a functional telos
from behind the form of the ritual. We must not look for any implicit political goals hidden
within the matrix of Latino/a popular Catholicism. Doing so would be like asking a person,
“What are the political goals behind your existence as a human being?” The question is absurd
because it fails to acknowledge that people do not live for political transformations; they engage
in political transformations in order to live.
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How, then, may we speak of “political implications” to Goizueta’s understanding of
inoperativity in Latina/o rituals? The answer to this question emerges from understanding the
inherent relatedness and communal vision that are central to rituals in Latina/o popular religion.
Goizueta and other scholars such as Ada María Isasi-Díaz note that inherent within the linguistic
and cultural epistemic outlook of Latina/o persons in the United States is a different way of
understanding the self and the self’s social role. Goizueta emphasizes that “for U.S. Hispanics,
there is no such thing as an isolated individual who is not intrinsically defined by his or her
relationship to others.”89 This sets the Latina/o perspective at variance with the typical AngloAmerican perspective on the self, which tends to isolate the individual as the basic unit of
meaning within social relationships.90 In an individualistic framework, “politics” signifies
something individuals do, or choose not to do, depending on their own life choices. Activities
may be “political” if they are explicitly focused on political aspects of the self, which can be
donned or discarded at will. However, because of its understanding of the person as intrinsically
relational, the Latina/o perspective seems much more in line with the aphorism, “the personal is
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political.” By engaging in communal acts such as fiesta, the person may not add an explicitly
91

political dimension to her/his activity, but that is because the political is not a “meaning” that the
activity carries, but is already a constitutive element of the act itself. The inoperativity of ritual,
in the Latina/o framework, is political insofar as it is a form of life that is a politics of its own.
The intrinsic nature of politics in ritual helps to explain why Goizueta does not address
specifically the challenge fiesta presents to manifestations of sovereign power. Doing so would
imply that fiesta is simply a tool for accomplishing a political purpose, rather than being a form
of politics itself. In this sense, his reluctance to make political applications to inoperative rituals
is similar to Stanley Hauerwas’s insistence that “the church does not have a social ethic; the
church is a social ethic.”92 Hauerwas does not imply that social transformation is undesirable—
only that it must arise from a living witness—a concrete exemplification of the reign of God in a
particular community. For Hauerwas, thinking about the community’s life as an instrument for
political change risks neglecting the cultivation of those unique qualities of the community that
make political change possible. Likewise, for Goizueta, thinking of Latina/o popular Catholicism
as a political tool devalues the particular lives whose very being creates political change.
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Rather than making fiesta-inoperativity a political tool, Goizueta’s perspective entails
that there is a politics within the ritual. What does this politics look like? Goizueta makes a
number of observations that help us characterize it. One such statement is his declaration that the
fiesta is a time of “sweet disorder,” and a “liminal event.”93 It is a time when hierarchies of
power are overturned. For example, in the quinceanera a young girl—typically an otherwise
unprivileged member of society—receives royal treatment and is the subject of celebration.94 At
a broader level, this type of ritual displays what Mikhail Bakhtin calls the “carnivalesque”—a
celebratory upheaval in which societal classes are flipped.95 Such a time of dramatic social
change could signal a new way of social and political existence.
How does sovereignty function in this type of inoperative politics? Goizueta’s work
seems to suggest that it functions through the quality of the aesthetic. In Christ Our Companion,
Goizueta attempts what might appear to be a disjointed theological move: Bringing the practices
of Latino/a popular religion into dialogue with the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar. The
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latter claims that the beauty of divine revelation is located within the form of this revelation
itself: “The content does not lie behind the form, but within it.”96 Goizueta claims that this is
exactly the viewpoint on which Latino/a popular religion bases itself. Because the form of Christ
is that of a crucified person, it is within the form of the lives of poor, marginalized communities
that the beauty of the revelation of Jesus Christ appears. The rituals that sustain these lives do not
give rise to some sort of alternative construction of meaning (poiesis), but are the meaning of
Christ’s beauty. In Goizueta’s summary, “if the great Swiss theologian thus bemoaned
contemporary Catholic theology’s inability to see the form, U.S. Latino/a theologians are today
articulating a theology that, grounded in Latino/a popular Catholicism, suggests that the poor are
indeed able—and have always been able—to see the form.”97
Here Goizueta makes a key point: If the beauty of the form of Christ is revealed in the
lives and communities of crucified (and resurrected) persons, the type of power that this beauty
possesses must never be coercive or controlling.
To assert that Christ is the Way, the Truth, and the Life through any type of
coercion is impossible without thereby denying in practice what one claims to be
asserting in theory. If the truth of Christ is indeed beautiful, it can only attract and
compel from inside, through the inherent power of the crucified and risen Christ
as he is present today in the world, in Scripture, in the church, and especially in
the concrete lives of Christians.98
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The inoperativity of Latina/o Catholic rituals thus suggests an aesthetic politics—or a politics of
beauty—in which the model of sovereignty is a divine figure whose radiance reveals itself in the
simple splendor of communities coming together in celebration. Thus, returning to the question
of sovereignty, we could say that an inoperative sovereign creates a governmental model
whereby justice emerges through the inherent goodness of human lives. That is to say, justice is
the “letting be” of human beauty.
Summary
Goizueta’s work suggests that without rituals of pure inoperativity, social justice activism
can forget the basic goodness and eschatological significance of communal life itself.
Furthermore, excessively focusing on ends-oriented activism can easily sideline those persons
whose existence seems to have little to do with changing the world. For example, the abuelitas
Goizueta describes as being at the center of the home community may not have the time or
physical ability to engage in political campaigning. Nevertheless, their day-to-day life—focused
on survival and forming familial community through rituals of celebration—can itself be a form
of politics.

Conclusion
How does Goizueta’s emphasis on the self-fulfilling nature of inoperative ritual relate to
Kook’s argument that ritual serves an end outside of itself? At first, these seem to be opposing
paradigms. Kook claims that inoperative ritual must at times suspend itself in order to make way
for a new form of life, which is the intended product of the ritual. Goizueta claims that
inoperative ritual is life. Yet, on closer examination, these different perspectives on the practice
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of inoperativity are two sides of the same coin. Kook did not argue that shmita was only a tool
for producing a new form of life. Rather, shmita was the key element in that life—one which
needed to be suspended in order to fulfill itself. This point harmonizes perfectly with Goizueta’s
argument that inoperative ritual needs to be identified with life itself. In both perspectives, the
end result is a framework in which particular practices embody a distinct type of political
existence.
Perhaps we could say that Goizueta and Kook guard against different—though related—
challenges inoperative practices encounter. Kook was responding to the danger that inoperative
practices could destroy life by making it subservient to the sovereign control of a unitary force.
This force was the top-down authority of the deity. Goizueta, on the other hand, responds to the
danger that inoperative practices may unwittingly destroy life by being co-opted by a different
type of sovereign power—that of the market. For Goizueta, inoperative rituals must challenge
the tendency of market-based political paradigms to define the human being as homo faber, and
therefore as a tool to be managed at will by powers operating in permanent states of exception.
Kook wanted to protect inoperativity lest it be used to serve religio-political ends. Goizueta
sought to guard inoperativity against being employed by economic-political ends (which are
also, of course, religio-political).
Both Kook and Goizueta provide practical analyses of inoperative rituals that display the
main features of inoperativity we have charted in the previous two chapters. Kook and Goizueta
illustrate how rituals of inoperativity point toward the type of anthropology Moltmann and
Heschel find in Jewish and Christian texts. In shmita and fiesta, we find a conception of human
nature in which the value of human persons exceeds activity and productivity. In addition, these
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rituals offer a glimpse at a practical application of the philosophical perspective on power
articulated by Lacoste and Agamben. Kook’s shmita and Goizueta’s fiesta demonstrate how
inoperativity creates an alternative approach to human community, characterized by a state of
harmony, replacing the competitive and coercive trajectories of politics.
At the same time, Kook’s and Goizueta’s analyses show us that inoperative rituals are not
easily practiced. As the complex debates around the heter mekhira illustrate, applying rituals of
inoperativity to actual political problems requires nuance and an in-depth awareness of the
theology behind the ritual. Goizueta would also admit that extending the type of inoperative
existence of fiesta into all aspects of everyday life in Latina/o communities is likewise
challenging. For Jewish communities in early twentieth-century Palestine as well as for Latino/a
communities in twenty-first century America, there was and is an ever present possibility that
inoperativity might slip into its opposite, either as a tool for serving a controlling deity, or a tool
for pleasing market gods. Nevertheless, Kook’s shmita and Goizueta’s fiesta convincingly
demonstrate that a particular concept of ritual inoperativity is a viable tool for theo-political
thought. In the following chapter, I will show in more detail how this type of inoperativity might
“work.”

CHAPTER IV
THE CLIMATE-HEALING SABBATH
A POLITICAL ETHIC OF INOPERATIVITY
Throughout the preceding chapters, we have examined different building blocks for
constructing a political theology of inoperativity, drawn from three central sources for thinking
theologically. At this point, the stage has been set for developing a political ethic of
inoperativity. In other words, we may now articulate how religious practices of inoperativity can
play a role in shaping the way we live as political actors. The goal of the following chapter is not
to establish a precise political program for using ritual inoperativity in activism or legislation—
that would fall well outside the boundaries of this work. Instead, my purpose will be to establish
a framework for thinking about engaging in ritual inoperativity in an explicitly political way.
I will use the weekly Sabbath as a key example of ritual inoperativity in this chapter. I
will do so because the weekly Sabbath is one of the most widespread and recognizable forms of
inoperativity, and also one that—if practiced—takes up a considerable amount of time (oneseventh of existence). As noted in Heschel’s and Moltmann’s work, there are numerous ways in
which Sabbath may impact political life—far too many to address here. In order to keep the
following exposition brief, I will develop the following theological paradigm of Sabbath against
the background of one specific political problem: climate ecology. Unfortunately, Sabbath is no
panacea for the troubling dilemmas associated with climate change. But it does offer a helpful
paradigm for approaching the problem, one that has been noted by thinkers such as Moltmann,
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among others. Recently, several Jewish thinkers have issued calls to consider Sabbath as a
response to climate change, as is visible in the “Green Sabbath Project,” which has also drawn
participation by members of clergy from a variety of traditions.2 As far back as the early 90’s
Jewish thinkers such as Vicky Joseph recognized the value of traditional Sabbath practices for
ecology.3 I will speak more about these proposals at the end of this chapter and in the next.
Before showing the significance of Sabbath for addressing this issue, it is important to
identify the core of the problem. As with any political crisis, there are background paradigms
that form the structure for climate change. Understanding the elements of this background will
pave the way for demonstrating how inoperativity in the form of Sabbath provides a solution.
Thus, before drawing on the descriptions of inoperativity as developed in the previous chapters
to suggest a Sabbatical ecological ethic, I will first offer a brief description of the conceptual
substrata from which the climate challenge arises.

1

At the end of his work on Sabbath in creation, Moltmann famously noted—in connection to the problem
of pollution in general—that Sabbath could be “a day when we leave our cars at home, so that nature too can
celebrate its Sabbath.” See Moltmann, God in Creation, 296. Perhaps due to the fact that—in the late 1980’s when
Moltmann was writing—climate change was only beginning to emerge in the popular consciousness as the massive
problem that it is, Moltmann left this provocative idea undeveloped. Laura Hartmann has seized upon this idea and
developed an “ecological spirituality” based on Sabbath practices connected to using fewer resources. See also
Laura M. Hartmann, “Christian Sabbath-keeping as Spiritual and Environmental Practice,” Worldviews 15 (2011):
47-64. Other important thinkers who have connected Sabbath to the task of environmental action include Richard
Lowery, Sabbath and Jubilee (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2000); and Ched Myers, The Biblical Vision of Sabbath
Economics (Washington, DC: Tell the World, 2002).
The Green Sabbath Project seeks to unite members of different religions in a collective effort of “doing
nothing” as a response to climate change. See www.greensabbathproject.net. Much of what I will argue is
complimentary to this movement, as will be seen in the concluding chapter.
2

3
See Vicky Joseph, “Action on the Environment: A Practical Guide,” in Judaism and the Environment, ed.
Aubrey Rose (London: Cassell Publishers, 1992), 119-128. Joseph specifically mentions walking to synagogue and
refraining from using electrical devices.
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Background: The Nature of the Problem
Strong scientific consensus suggests that present levels of carbon emissions will result in
temperature increases with disastrous and possibly irreversible long term effects.4 Climate
change is, of course, a global phenomenon, but it does not impact everyone equally. People
living in places such as North America are unlikely to see significant problems, aside from
occasional coastal relocations due to rising sea levels and somewhat unpredictable weather.5
However, in equatorial regions—particularly coastal arid ones—climate change will lead to
famines, increasing storms, and other natural disasters.6 These could trigger political upheavals
such as mass migration, increased class stratification, and violent conflict.7
Halting the devastation of our earth is not easy, for hosts of immediate political reasons,
deftly explained by James Gustave Speth and Naomi Klein.8 All these reasons arise from cultural

4

For scientific assessments of the risks associated with continuing high-levels of greenhouse gas emissions
see Mario Malina et al., “What We Know: The Reality, Risks and Response to Climate Change,” AAAS Climate
Science Panel, American Association for the Advancement of Science (2014): 15-16. On the potential irreversibility
of these developments see Kevin Anderson, “Climate Change Going Beyond Dangerous—Brutal Numbers and
Tenuous Hope,” Development Dialogue 61 (September 2012): 29. See also Michael Le Page, “Climate Change: It’s
Even Worse Than We Thought,” New Scientist, https://www.newscientist.com/round-up/worse-climate/.
5

On the different impacts of climate change on different regions of the earth see the reports collected in
Mark G. New, et al., Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, A 369 (2011): 1-241. See also Anders
Levermann et al., “The Multimillenial Sea-Level Commitment of Global Warming,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 110 (2013): 13748.
6
For vivid accounts of the disastrous outcomes of these impacts see Elizabeth Austin, Treading on Thin
Air: Atmospheric Physics, Forensic Meteorology, and Climate Change: How Weather Shapes Our Everyday Lives
(New York: Pegasus Books, 2016).
7

These inevitably tragic political outcomes of climate change have been documented by many scientists,
but see especially Gar Lipow, Solving the Climate Crisis through Social Change: Public Investment in Social
Prosperity to Cool a Fevered Planet (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012). On the particular problem of migration as a
result of population displacement see Melissa Fleming, “Climate change could become the biggest driver of
displacement: UNHCR chief,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees,
http://www.unhcr.org/4b2910239.html.
8

See James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at the End of the World: Capitalism, the Environment, and
Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Naomi Klein, This Changes
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factors. The surface-level political problems are rooted in deeper philosophical conceptions.
Although the complexity of the cultural factors that have unleashed climate change could take
volumes to describe, I propose—for the purpose of the present argument—that there are two
primary categories, human identity and authority. These two categories are closely related, and
they correspond precisely to what Pope Francis, in his recent encyclical on “care for our common
home” refers to as the: “the place of human beings and of human action in the world.”9
Identity
Human beings have always struggled to describe their identity in relation to the earth. For
much of Western history, human beings have widely considered the earth an object to be
mastered and controlled. A strict stratification of human/nature has held sway at least implicitly
in political thought. Those of us living in Europe and North America (with the exception of
indigenous persons) have inherited a paradigm of human identity, whereby the human is defined

Everything: Capitalism versus the Climate (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2014). The problems they describe
are intricate and insidious. First, in many cases those most responsible for climate change—those living in the global
“North”—are precisely those who need worry least about its results. It is difficult to motivate voters to enact
sweeping policy changes to avert an outcome that will barely affect them, aside from killing the moose they see on
vacation or bringing an extra couple blizzards and rainstorms each year. Second, the effects of climate change are
slow enough in arrival that they do not fall within the tenure of many politicians. Unlike an event like an economic
recession or international conflict, no politician has to “own” climate change—the responsibility is spread out over a
vast multitude of political actors over a grand sweep of time. Together, these factors make it seem impossible to do
anything about the problem.
9

See Pope Francis, Laudato Si: On Care for Our Common Home (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana,
2015), 101. Commenting on Pope Francis’s approach, Mark Shiffman observes that this obsession with using the
natural world is rooted in a conception of human identity as a power holder: “The problem is not simply that the
extent and scope of our power have outstripped our wisdom and virtue. The problem rather is our fundamental
understanding of what the power that we are developing is, over what we develop it, and how and why we develop
it. Since such power is a human attainment, and its development is a human activity, the root problem turns out to be
at the same time a faulty sense of who and what we are as human beings—a faulty sense that both grounds and is
reinforced by our technocratic relationship to nature.” See Mark Shiffman, “The Other Seamless Garment: Laudato
Si’ on the Human Relationship to Created Nature,” in Care for the World: Laudato Si’ and Catholic Social Thought
in an Era of Climate Crisis, ed. Frank Pasquale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 94.
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by use of the earth for human ends. This paradigm requires a careful maintenance of the binary
between zoe and bios, and a sense that zoe must increasingly be corralled and altered. Not
surprisingly, as human beings have attained unparalleled mastery over natural phenomena, we
have used this power to engineer the potential for our own demise.
Under this same heading is a conception of productivity as the end goal of human life. If
human beings must find their ultimate fulfillment in making or production, it seems inevitable
the natural world must constantly feed this fundamental human need. Ceasing or cutting back on
production would, in this paradigm, be an anti-humanitarian measure. Because we tend to think
that the endless employment of nature is essential to who we are, we struggle to justify any effort
to do nothing in the face of nature. Efforts to stop climate change thus run against our basic sense
of human dignity.10
An illuminating example of this can be found in the “Cornwall Declaration on
Environmental Stewardship,” produced by the Cornwall Alliance, a group of conservative
evangelical, Catholic and Jewish leaders that denies human-produced climate change.11 In this
chapter, I will refer frequently to the Cornwall Declaration for several reasons. First, it is an
ecumenical and interreligious document, drawing together signatories from Catholic, evangelical
Protestant, and Jewish traditions. Second, although it is not officially binding on the members of
any of these traditions, it represents the views of key thought leaders. Third, it is one of the few

10

This plays a key part in the fascinating psychological phenomena associated with climate-change denial
analyzed in George Marshall, Don’t Even Think About It: Why Our Brains Are Wired to Ignore Climate Change
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2014).
11

See “The Cornwall Declaration,” www.cornwallalliance.org.
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ethical statements offered by religious leaders that directly opposes a movement to address
climate change through concerted action (in most cases, it is safe to say, Christians of this stripe
often ignore the problem or offer only a brief nod to climate-skepticism).12
The primary thrust of the document is that human beings are valuable because of their
capacity to “develop” resources and “enrich” creation. The document asserts that human beings
display the image of God by being “producers.”13 Although part of the document is nobly
concerned with preventing harmful outcomes for the poor that might result from economyslowing ecological policies, it is clear that a key rationale behind the opposition to such policies
is a motive to protect the identity of human beings as a producers and modifiers of nature.
A marked contrast to this approach can be seen in Pope Francis’s Laudato Si, which does
not deny the role of human beings as producers, but seeks to curb a “misguided
anthropocentrism” that defines human beings by technological accomplishment.14 The contrast
between the two documents demonstrates that a pivot point in the contemporary ecology debate
lies within our anthropology. This strongly suggests that if we want to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, we will have to directly face our own conception of ourselves in relation to the world.
We may, for brief intervals, slow down the problem of climate change by discovering more
efficient ways of expanding our domination of nature, or protecting ourselves from the most

12

The influence of the thinkers behind the Cornwall Declaration cannot be understated. Laurel Kearns
points out that the Cornwall Alliance is a group that supports many (or possibly most) anti-green movements within
conservative Christianity in the United States, including the “Resisting the Green Dragon” series. See Laurel
Kearns, “Religious Climate Activism in the United States,” in Religion in Environmental and Climate Change:
Suffering, Values, Lifestyles, ed. Dieter Gerten and Sigurd Bergmann (London: Continuum, 2012), 132-151.
13

See “Concerns” 1 and 2 of “The Cornwall Declaration.”

14

See Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, 115-121.
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imminent problems we have created. But these efforts will ultimately fail if we do not
fundamentally change who we think we are. Sabbath, I argue, can play a significant role in this
change.
Authority
Climate change taps into an ongoing difficulty Westerners face regarding authority. This
challenge is linked to the problem of identity because in a capitalist society, private property
creates sovereignty. We think of ourselves as “owning” portions of the earth, and thereby
possessing the authority to act as we wish in our respective domains. “Sovereign is the one who
decides in the state of exception,” and the one who decides is the one who owns the property in
which the exception occurs. Any pact or international agreement to reduce emissions levels may
be perceived as a threat to local sovereignty over natural resources.
This problem also emerges in connection to how to prevent people from using resources
that seem to be freely available to them. If human beings are in sovereign control of the materials
earth gives to them, how can anyone intervene in the ways private individuals choose to utilize
these materials? How do we ethically call a halt to the exploitation of earth, especially when it
appears that some people rely on this exploitation in order to survive?
This authority challenge appears in the Cornwall Declaration as well. The authors
repeatedly appeal to human “dominion” over earth, and emphasize that humans should recognize
“their proper place in the created order.”15 Although the authors assert that this dominion should
be “caring” and should take the form of stewardship, there is a clear indication that the authors

15

See “Concerns” 2 and 3, and “Beliefs” 3 in “The Cornwall Declaration.”

151
perceive human manipulation of creation to be an essential aspect of the human role in the world.
Since human beings are rightful bearers of authority over the earth, any attempt to curtail this
authority interferes with a divine commission. Hence, the authors “aspire to a world in which
liberty as a condition of moral action is preferred over government-initiated management of the
environment as a means to common goals.”16 In this perspective, government regulation is
problematic not merely for practical reasons (concerns about mismanagement, etc.), but because
it prevents the free exercise of divinely-granted authority.
In this approach, authority functions through a hierarchical system of control,
characterized by a need for humans to extract resources from that which is beneath them. This
contrasts sharply with the vision articulated by Pope Francis, who argues that in past Christian
tradition, “what was handed on was a Promethean vision of mastery over the world, which gave
the impression that the protection of nature was something that only the faint-hearted cared
about.”17 Against this framework, the Pope longs for an anthropology in which human beings are
in authority over nature, but this authority takes the form of self sacrifice and “openness to
others.”18 Once again, the cavernous contrast between the Cornwall Declaration’s approach and
that of Pope Francis serves to emphasize the importance of conceptions of authority in
addressing climate change.

16

See “Aspiration” 4 in “The Cornwall Declaration.”

17

Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, 116.

18

Pope Francis, Laudato Si’, 119.
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Responding to the concerns of the authors of the Cornwall Declaration is tricky, because
in many situations there seems to be an inverse relationship between the amount of authority
each individual human being holds over the natural world and the amount of authority human
beings have over each other. In other words, the “liberty” of human beings may be in tension
with the “liberty” of nature. Freed from the tethers of government regulation, human beings may
place nature in enormous, oppressive bondage. However, excesses of government regulation may
place human beings in oppressive bondage as well.19 Therefore it is not enough merely to insist
on the freedom of nature or the freedom of human beings. A political ethic for climate change
must consider how the types of authority corresponding to these freedoms relate to each other.
As with the problem of identity, the issue of authority in relation to climate change could
take volumes of its own. I cannot attempt to solve it here. I will argue, however that Sabbath
could play a key role in a solution.
A Sabbatical Ethic of Identity and Authority
Our perspectives on identity and authority are integral parts of our “social imaginary”—
the set of ideas that form the unquestioned background for how we think and act.20 Trying to
address climate change without changing this social imaginary will only result in short-term
solutions.21 In the following sections, I will explore how a particular practice of Sabbath—

Thus far in history, we have not yet seen an “ecological totalitarian government” that forces its citizens
into conditions of grim hardship in order to protect the environment, and thus it seems that climate skeptics who fear
this type of outcome may be propagating baseless fears. Nevertheless, such a totalitarian government is certainly
possible, and at least at a theoretical level, an ethicist must take it into consideration.
19

20

21

See Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

For this reason, Sallie McFague has called for a change in spirituality in order to address the problem of
climate change. McFague’s proposal is to focus on emulating the self-emptying lifestyles of certain saints—those
who lived out a counter-consumerist “kenotic” way of life. See Sallie McFague, Blessed Are the Consumers:
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grounded in the biblical, philosophical, and practical perspectives developed in previous
chapters—can dramatically alter our social imaginary. In what follows, I will draw on the
biblical, philosophical, and practical insights of the thinkers examined in chapters 1-3 in order to
articulate how this Sabbath might address human identity and authority.22
Sabbath and Identity
In general, human beings separate themselves from the earth by actions. One could argue
that the primary relationship in all of human life is that between activity and passivity. The latter
we associate with nature, whose patterns and rhythms seem not to lead to any particular goal, but
only to a continual repetition of the same. We do not know if mosquitoes or elk think about their
“life span” and what they want to accomplish in it, but certainly the clouds around New York
and the redwoods of California seem oblivious to such questions. By contrast, human beings
indicate that they are “above” nature through their construction projects, scientific developments,
and manufacturing of surplus goods. This is a key part of the “technocratic” paradigm Pope
Francis analyzes in Laudato Si.23

Climate Change and the Practice of Restraint (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013). The saints she analyzes are John
Woolman, Simone Weil, and Dorothy Day. Although I applaud McFague’s careful research and recommendation of
a “saintly” way of life as an approach to climate ecology, I worry that the focus on heroism associated with her
method could cause religious practitioners to focus on individual genius rather than on simple, community-based
practices. This may not be the case, however, and my approach and McFague’s could be harmonized. Strangely, at
no point in her work on the practice of “restraint” does McFague address Sabbath—a peculiar omission.
22

I must continually emphasize that using Sabbath to address these issues will not result in a perfect
solution to the problem. A situation as complex as climate change cannot be handled with simplistic, onedimensional approaches. My recommendation of Sabbath observance is predicated on the notion that Sabbath can be
one helpful tool to use in this case, not the only tool.
23
As Pope Francis puts it, “this paradigm exalts the concept of a subject who, using logical and rational
procedures, progressively approaches and gains control over an external object.” See Pope Francis, Laudato Si’,
106.
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As Lynn White famously observed, the idea that human beings are above nature and are
obligated to dominate it has deep, tenacious roots in the Christian tradition.24 Popular
understandings of Genesis 1’s injunction to the primordial couple to “fill the earth and subdue it”
often confirm this anthropocentric/dominant anthropology. By placing human beings in a
separate category from nature, the stage is set for an oppressive relationship. This imperative
within the creation story has often been used as a pretext for human oppression of nature,
although this is hardly the only or most straightforward reading of what “fill and subdue” might
mean, as several scholars have pointed out.25
Nevertheless, it is fascinating that the first creation narrative ends with God keeping a
Sabbath. This suggests that Sabbath could fulfill a key role in changing conceptions of human
identity, and thus impacting the paradigm that has lead to earth’s oppression. We can see this
impact first from the Biblical angles discussed in chapter 1.

Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,” Science 155, no. 3767 (March 10, 1967):
1203. Of course, not everyone concurs with White’s allegations. For a different perspective on the historic
contribution of Christianity to ecology see Wendell Berry, “Christianity and the Survival of Creation,” Classical
Carousel (April 8, 2015).
24

25
Most persuasive among these scholars could be Richard Bauckham, who points out that the command to
fill the earth and subdue it is not an imperative that sets human beings apart from nature, but is part of humanity in
which humans are similar to animals: “When humans obey the command to be fruitful and multiply, to fill the Earth
and to subdue it, they are not imitating God in a unique way but behaving like other species. All species use their
environment and, though agriculture is unique to humans, it can be seen as a peculiarly human extension of the right
of all animals to use their environment to live and to flourish.” See Richard Bauckham, The Bible and Ecology:
Rediscovering the Community of Creation (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010), 19. On the idea that “filling
and subduing” do not justify coercive control see also Douglas John Hall, Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986); Norman C. Habel, “Is the Wild Ox Willing to Serve You? Challenging the
Mandate to Dominate,” in The Earth Story in Wisdom Traditions, ed. Norman C. Habel and Shirley Wurst
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000), 179-189; and Peter Harrison, “Having Dominion: Genesis and the Mastery
of Nature,” in Environmental Stewardship: Critical Perspectives, Past and Present, ed. R.J. Berry (London: T&T
Clark, 2006), 17-31.
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Biblical Approaches to Inoperative Identity
As we observed in our analysis of Moltmann’s and Heschel’s readings of Sabbath
traditions, there is an anthropology latent in Jewish and Christian Sabbath texts. This is evident
in the fact that the Jewish and Christian Scriptures do not simply mandate Sabbath without
explanation. The Sabbath command in Exodus 20:8-11 points backward to the creation story as
its rationale. This creation story leaves us with an image of God and human beings resting
together in a state of mutual respect.
What does this mean for human identity vis-à-vis nature? Here Moltmann’s emphasis on
humanity as imago Dei becomes paramount. Often the idea of the imago Dei can be portrayed as
an identity marker of separation. The animals and plants, for example are not made in the image
of God, but humans are. This grounds humanity’s right to rule over the earth. But if human
beings exist as images of a Sabbath-keeping God, this relationship is much more complicated
than it initially appears. Through the Sabbath, God’s relationship to earth does not feature
constant production and development, but a state of letting be. Therefore, the Sabbath keeping of
humans must take a parallel form. By resting on the Sabbath, human beings adopt the identity of
God in relation to the world. Their being in the world mirrors God’s being. As Moltmann puts it,
“His (God’s) works express God’s will, but the Sabbath manifests his Being.”26
As we saw in chapter 1, Moltmann uses this view of God to provide hints at an
anthropology in which human beings do not form their identities through activity in nature, but
through a type of inoperativity that blends with human action in the world, providing it with a
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Moltmann, God in Creation, 280.
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telos or self-fulfilling goal. In this anthropological framework, human beings display their
purpose in the world by resting with God. As described in chapter 1, this does not mean that
humans ought to do nothing, but that their activity ought to be pervaded with rest as its goal and
criterion for meaning. For Moltmann, this leads to a direct political ethics of labor in which work
does not create human identity but emerges from it.
Heschel reinforces this same idea with his interpretation of the Jewish perspective of
Sabbath as a counter to spatial covetousness. He argues that “Judaism tries to foster the vision of
life as a pilgrimage to the seventh day; the longing for the Sabbath all days of the week which is
a form of longing for the eternal Sabbath all the days of our lives. It seeks to displace the
coveting of things in space for coveting the things in time, teaching man to covet the seventh day
all days of the week.”27 This perspective moves the locus of human identity from the conquest of
things to a form of existence for its own sake—a restful being with God. Heschel draws on
Jewish textual traditions that personify this rest as a “queen”—a sovereign figure who arrives in
a distinctly non-imperial way. For Heschel, this translates into a politics of spatial “letting be,”
changing the anthropology that underlies racism and economic mismanagement.
What would be the potential outcome of this type of Sabbatical thinking for the current
ecological crisis? Moltmann and Heschel’s work suggests that Sabbath keeping could counteract
the tendency to identify human beings with the effects they produce in nature. Industrial culture
and the economy it produces mirror the identity that human beings create for themselves. If we
are what we do, it becomes imperative for human beings to do more and more to alter our world
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Heschel, The Sabbath, 90.
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to suit our desires. Rest, as the biblical traditions depict it, is the fundamental antithesis of this
trajectory. By purposefully resting (and not resting merely to prepare the way for more work),
Sabbath-keepers articulate a view of human identity that slows the perpetual motion-machine of
the modern western world. For this reason, if westerners adopted a biblical-Sabbath
anthropology, the identity framework that founds the climate change problem would be undercut.
This transformation of identity on a biblical Sabbath model would also alter the way the
image of God is understood in documents such as the Cornwall Declaration. As noted above, the
authors of this document often use the biblical language of human “dominion” to justify a
fundamental human need to produce value in the world. In this approach, to “fill the earth”
through production is the practical application of being in the divine image. What this approach
easily forgets is that the God of the Genesis story is portrayed as culminating the creative project
with Sabbath rest, indicating—as Moltmann and Heschel argue—that God’s way of being in the
world is characterized by Sabbath. God does not dwell with creation as a productive force, but as
the power of letting be. Because human beings should strive to display the divine image, they
should imitate God’s restful coexistence with nature.
This biblical understanding of human identity would also change the way we view the
standard of human progress. If we define ourselves as actors and producers, we logically come
closer to our ideal the more we act and produce. “Progress” toward the human ideal then means
endlessly increasing activity. But if, as Moltmann and Heschel argue, God’s being with the earth
must be understood sabbatically, the ideal of human progress would be realized not by doing
more, but by doing things differently. In other words, ethics based on this anthropology would
have us ask ourselves, “Does X (course of action) lead to greater rest or capacity for rest?” This
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would dramatically change the common western assumption that every opportunity for economic
development is necessarily a boon.
Understood this way, Sabbath would also point western culture toward a re-evaluation of
material “needs.” It has been pointed out that if everyone on earth attempted to use as many
resources as residents of the United States do, earth’s resources would be forthrightly depleted.28
The problem is that developed economies such as that of the United States view constantly
increasing production as a “need.” (If there is any doubt about this, consider what would happen
if a U.S. politician running for office were to say that “our economy is growing fast enough.”)
This political problem is built on a perspective of human identity that Sabbath, understood
through the biblical lens of Moltmann and Heschel, could help to change.
Philosophical Approaches to Inoperative Identity
The philosophy of inoperativity articulated by Lacoste and Agamben also addresses the
ecological problem of human identity. Although Lacoste examines the ritual of the night vigil
rather than Sabbath, his phenomenology suggests that being inoperative before God expresses a
different vision of the human person’s role in the world. As we have seen, the individual who
keeps the night vigil “does nothing” and yet in doing so exists in a reciprocal relationship to the
Absolute. The absolute is inoperative, and those who enter into liturgy emerge inoperative as
well, for liturgy is not a circumscribed zone of human life, but integral to being human. Lacoste
thus helps us envision a “Sabbatical end of history” in which the identity recognition of master

28
According to the official statistics of the University of Michigan’s Center for Sustainable Systems, the
United States in 2018 contained about 5% of the world’s population, and used 17% of the world’s energy. Contrast
this with China, which in the same time period comprised 19% of the world’s population and used 22% of the
world’s energy. See University of Michigan Center for Sustainable Systems, “U.S. Environmental Footprint,”
css.umich.edu/factsheets/us-environmental-footprint-factsheet.
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and slave—self-oriented thymos—is achieved not through relentless competition, but conjoined
inoperative worship.
Agamben’s philosophy leads to a similar identity framework, approached from the binary
perspective of zoe and bios. Against standard political theories that seek to define how societies
should structure bios life and exclude zoe, Agamben grasps for a way to suspend these
categories, or to express a human identity on the threshold between them. The resulting
anthropology would characterize human beings with a type of passivity before nature. The world
of humans and the world of nature would dwell in a space of non-differentiation. Perhaps the
best image for capturing this type of existence is Sabbath.
From the perspective of Lacoste’s and Agamben’s depictions of inoperativity, a ritual
such as Sabbath would suggest that human beings need not aspire to an absolute identity built
around action. Their key insight is that humanity can fully “be itself” without relying on
functional operations as a means of preserving the category of the human. This is crucial,
because in the western world, reversing climate change may require doing what—under a
production oriented paradigm of human identity—are fundamentally “anti-human” or even
“inhumane” measures. This is why voters are unlikely to approve of policies that could slow the
economy in order to reduce carbon emissions. Cynics might point to greed and short-sightedness
as explanations for this democratic phenomenon—and they would be partially right—but there is
also an identity issue lurking here. Human beings strive to achieve Absolute being through
constant activity in the world. They desire to separate themselves from nature in order to exist as
bios life. Asking them to desist from the activities that enable these identities can be nearly
unthinkable.
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This is where a ritual such as Sabbath becomes important. Sabbath could enable human
beings to exist together with an inoperative identity. In other words, by keeping Sabbath
together, human beings could create an identity that suspends the categories of master and slave,
or zoe and bios. Sabbath would direct human beings back to materiality in fresh ways. As Sigve
Tonstad observes from the perspective of Christian church history, “disparagement of the
Sabbath, as in the writings of Origen, went hand in hand with repudiation of the body and
neglect of the Earth.”29 Earth-connectedness and Sabbath are closely tied together, because the
latter provides the identity formation which enables the former.
The phenomenon of vehicle-driving provides a vivid example of how identity and action
could be altered by Sabbath. In many parts of the Western world—especially the United States—
driving a car is one of the central ways in which human beings establish their identity. This goes
beyond the simple status question of what kind of car one drives. By driving to work, human
beings increase their sense of a separate identity from nature and from lower life forms (those
unfortunate human beings who do not work or must take public transportation to work). In some
cases, longer and more expensive commutes indicate a more important identity, such as in cases
where one owns a home far out in the suburbs and works in the metropolitan center. In these
contexts, to drive is human.
Against this backdrop, consider the sabbatarian practice of not driving cars (most
commonly followed by orthodox Jewish communities). Of course, if widely practiced, such a
ritual would reduce carbon emissions significantly. At a deeper level, the action would suggest
that Sabbath is a day on which we refrain from exercising difference over the earth. By walking
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wherever we need to go, we would signal a type of passivity, akin to Bartleby’s “I would prefer
not to.” Not only would this directly slow climate change, it would also help develop a
Sabbatical mindset that questions the necessity of a separate identity vis-à-vis nature, the
framework that created the problem in the first place.
Practical Approaches to Inoperative Identity
Although Kook and Goizueta do not seem to directly analyze a paradigm of human
identity, we do find in their approach a practical perspective on how inoperativity could inform
such a paradigm. In the case of shmita, Kook emphasized that the purpose of the ritual was to
allow the “soul” of the nation to display its divine qualities: “On the shmita, our inner spirit may
be revealed as it truly is,” Kook said.30 The purpose of the practice was thus to display a shmitapeople, whose identity was marked by rest-giving and fellowship. This was why the partial
suspension of shmita through the heter mekhira was so important. The ritual needed to be used to
create a society of rest-giving and a sovereignty of “letting be,” and in order to fulfill those goals,
the ritual needed to be capable of inoperativity in itself.
Goizueta formulates his approach to identity from a much different angle. Rather than
examining inoperative ritual as a means to construct a particular political result, Goizueta’s
method finds a human identity within the ritual. Recall that for Goizueta, “The fiesta is, at the
same time, play and work.”31 In other words, fiesta is a human identity, lived in a subjunctive
attitude toward a just world. The rituals of fiesta accomplish nothing, but in doing so they fulfill
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their purpose of allowing human beings to flourish. Inoperative ritual, in Goizueta’s paradigm, is
a way to view human joy in existence as an intrinsic end, one that requires no external
accomplishment for its own validation.
This type of inoperative praxis—manifested in fiesta or Sabbath—is creates a different
approach to human identity than found in either capitalism or socialism. Goizueta agrees with
Marx that the rituals of modern capitalism alienate human beings by instrumentalizing them, but
he also points out that Marx’s solution falls into the same trap: “What Marx—like all
modernity—failed to appreciate is the ambiguity inherent in any notion of human praxis that
defines it in terms of production, even if what is being produced is ‘the just person’ or ‘the just
society.’”32 The type of praxis Goizueta calls for—and finds in Latina/o communities—is a
genuinely “aesthetic” praxis, characterized by communal indwelling or accompaniment, with no
end outside itself. To recall Goizueta’s analogy we explored in chapter 3, this is the difference
between building a house (poiesis) and making a home (praxis).The latter celebrates life and the
home environment not as a means to further development or conquest, but simply as inherent
goodness. Rituals focused on this type of life are the only kind that can avoid reducing human
identity to productivity—the very conceptual framework that has created the climate problem.33
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Taken together, Kook’s and Goizueta’s perspectives on inoperativity suggest that a
cohesive approach to human identity in response to climate change must utilize practices that
improve the world (Kook’s concern), but do so by being intrinsic ends (Goizueta’s concern). In
other words, we must use particular rituals to address climate change, but we must not make this
ecological goal something external to the ritual. The ritual must be a way of being on earth, not
simply a tool or gimmick for fixing a problem. The climate problem requires solutions that arise
from the depths of everyday human life. We must actively change destructive political structures
by living a different kind of politics.
The practical benefit of a weekly Sabbath as a ritual for addressing climate change is
precisely that it is a ritual that blends with human life. Because it occurs every seven days,
Sabbath has a unique capacity to influence the way we live our lives on the other days. Sabbath
is also a ritual that points toward the domestic sphere, re-centering human attention on those
elements of life that are seemingly unrelated to industry and therefore forgotten by the modern
production-identity paradigm. This domestic focus is something Sabbath holds in common with
Latina/o popular religious rituals, which are also centered on the home, as Miguel Díaz
observes.34 By celebrating the common, domestic Sabbath as the highest ideal of human life, one
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acquires a new identity—that of a Sabbath-keeper or sabbatarian, which is a way of saying “one
who lets be.” This identity change signals an enormous difference between keeping a Sabbath
and simply taking time off from work in a casual way. The latter might be an eco-friendly thing
to do, but it signals no direct intention to allow freedom to the earth. Vacations and days at home
are largely amoral practices, in that they make no direct statement about the goodness or badness
of any given lifestyle or identity. Sabbath-keeping, on the other hand, is a straightforward claim
that doing nothing can be good, that ceaseless production is not an absolute human ideal.
The weekly Sabbath may thus be “life in the subjunctive,” as Goizueta might put it. It is a
practice aimed at a particular goal (changing the “soul” of a people, to use Kook’s language), but
that is because it makes a claim about the intrinsic value of the kind of life it embodies. In the
context of climate change, this type of identity-transforming ritual is essential, because moral
exhortations alone are unlikely to be effective in changing entrenched patterns of behavior.
Climate activism often resorts to fervent appeals for action—or work—to address the impending
catastrophe. Such appeals are noble and understandable. However, they remain trapped in an
anthropological framework in which the human being is defined by labor or production. Under
this paradigm, it will be impossible to effectively urge human beings to stop the constant
exploitation of Earth’s resources. What we need now is a celebration of truly “aesthetic”
praxis—a genuine “accompaniment” of our planet. For centuries Western culture has viewed the
planet as a house that needs building through productive mechanisms of control. Now we need to
transition toward viewing it as a home for dwelling. Given the severity of the problem—many
scientists are convinced it is already too late to avert massive disasters—we need now more than
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ever to find the t’shuvah Kook longed for, accomplished through inoperative rituals that alter our
innermost being.
Sabbath and Authority
The climate change problem is connected to the issue of authority in several ways. At one
level, there is the question of human authority over nature. Like all creatures, human beings
exercise some level of control over natural processes. Aside from a few highly romantic
naturalists, most people agree that human beings must “govern” nature to some extent.
Furthermore, most agree that humans should manage nature in a non-exploitative way. Even the
authors of the Cornwall Declaration use words such as “care” and “stewardship” to describe their
ideal human-nature relationship. Clearly, though, such noble language does not go very far in
describing the extent of human authority over the earth. At what point should we curb our
impulse to grab more power over nature?
Another aspect of the authority problem is human-to-human authority. It seems hard to
address climate change without talking about coercion in some form or another. Part of the
reason certain emissions-reduction agreements have failed to gain the acquiescence of important
countries such as the United States is that there is no one to leverage force strong enough to
make these nations join and keep the agreements.35 Within individual nations, coercive power
seems necessary to keep corporations and individuals compliant with restrictions. The problem
of curbing climate change has led some to argue that only a revival of some form of socialism
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can lead to success. Such speculations cause others to fear the potential of a planned economy
36

with no place for market freedom.
The problem of authority—its limits, ideal qualities, and methods of enforcement—is too
broad to adequately address here. My goal is to show instead how Sabbatical inoperativity,
understood in the frameworks developed in the previous three chapters, can point toward a type
of human authority that could be helpful.
Biblical Approaches to Inoperative Authority
From the perspective of traditional Christian and Jewish texts, Sabbath is deeply
connected to sovereignty. The first Genesis creation story shows God resting after the
completion of creation, indicating that rest is an integral part of God’s being. If, in Christian and
Jewish theologies, God is sovereign, God is such as one who rests. As noted above, this idea has
enormous implications for understanding human identity in the world, because human beings are
intended to bear the image of God, being in the world as God is. Correspondingly, it carries great
weight for a concept of human authority. If human beings have authority over creation, this
authority must be enacted in a “Sabbatical” manner.
But what does that mean? Here it is helpful to recall Moltmann’s understanding of work,
analyzed in chapter 1. For Moltmann, work and Sabbath must be understood in the light of each
other. Moreover, the relationship between them is teleological. Work exists for the purpose of
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Sabbath. Moltmann asserts that “work is thus meaningful not because it alone provides the
meaning of life, but precisely because it is limited by the goal of rest and joy in existence. The
Sabbath does not simply interrupt work. Rather, work is understood and defined through the
Sabbath.”37 As we saw in chapter 1, Moltmann deduces from this axiom that work must always
be exercised for the purpose of liberation. It follows from this that the work of governing the
earth must also be carried in the same way.
Heschel’s observations on the sovereignty of Sabbath follow a similar trajectory,
though—as we saw—Heschel also draws on additional Jewish Sabbath traditions. Like
Moltmann, Heschel depicts the days of the week as existing for the purpose of Sabbath, thus
making all human activity conducted on those days point toward Sabbath as its ultimate
fulfillment. Heschel adds imagery from Jewish tradition depicting Sabbath in starkly personal
and political terms: “The distinction of the Sabbath is reflected in the twin meanings of the
phrase kabbalat Shabbat which means to accept the sovereignty as well as to welcome the
presence of the day. The Sabbath is a queen as well as a bride.”38 As argued in chapter 1, this
metaphor of Sabbath as queen and bride indicates accepting Sabbath as a model for private and
public existence. As Heschel argues, to live in the Sabbath is to live for the sake of time, rather
than merely for space. To exert sovereignty in a Sabbatical way is therefore to reject the spatial
covetousness that Sabbath, in Heschel’s understanding, is so firmly against. Sabbatical authority
would be a liberating authority that “lets” space be.
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How would such an authority work in the context of climate change? One way to
understand such authority was briefly introduced in the discussion of Jesus’ healings in chapter
1. According to Moltmann, Jesus celebrated the meaning of Sabbath in his controversial Sabbath
healings. Moltmann does not elaborate in great detail on the significance of these healings, but
they are important for understanding what Sabbatical authority might look like.
To understand why, one must understand the meaning of “healing” in the Gospels. Of
course, this is a topic which is much too large to address in full here. Certainly there are
numerous facets to the healings of Jesus.39 However, some key scholarship on the subject of
healing is particularly useful.40 To illuminate what Jesus was doing through his miracles,
scholars sometimes make a key distinction between disease and illness, a conceptual binary first
formulated by Arthur Kleinmann.41 Diseases are bodily malfunctions that impair physical health,
resulting from pathogens, chemical imbalances, or toxins. Modern medicine, as a rule, attempts
to cure diseases. Illnesses are sharply different, even though they are closely related. An illness is
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a broader form of social or political toxicity that often gives rise to disease. You cannot cure an
illness with a drug or surgical procedure. Illnesses can only be cured by changing a person’s
social standing or personal circumstances—through an act of social authority.
According to scholars such as Pilch and Crossan, Jesus’ healing miracles addressed
illness, not disease. Of course, this could be a misleading distinction, because the two categories
feed into each other. But thinking with these two categories is helpful because it is necessary to
see the broader social implications of Jesus’ healings. It appears that Jesus performed some type
of symbolic actions which effectively changed the social status of the persons suffering from
illnesses. In other words, healing was an authoritative act that changed the social status of the
persons Jesus encountered. For example, by touching people with skin diseases or women with
menstrual disorders, Jesus was exercising a power to transform their socially-imposed lack of
dignity.42
By performing these healings on the Sabbath, as Moltmann observes, Jesus was
indicating that Sabbath is a day of healing, and that the authority of Sabbath exists for the
purpose of healing. Since healing was not merely the removal of disease but more properly a
social-structural transformation, this would indicate that the authority of Sabbath works to
restore health by placing human beings and nature in dignified relationships to each other.
In the context of ecology, the authority of Sabbath would consequently work to “heal”
the earth by restoring its dignity, as well as that of those who live on it (especially those
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marginalized persons who are often the first victims of ecological crises). In answer to the
question, “how much authority do human beings have over the earth?” the answer would be,
“that authority which is necessary to restore and preserve the dignity of the earth.” In other
words, just as Jesus did not use his Sabbatical authority to subjugate those beneath him, human
beings who live sabbatically will not seek to subjugate the earth, but will respect its dignity and
independence.
The idea of authority-as-healing directly challenges the interpretation of human dominion
offered in the Cornwall Declaration. Although the authors use the language of “stewardship” to
describe human sovereignty over nature, this concept implies the management of private
property, used for the benefit of the owners. “We aspire to a world in which the relationships
between stewardship and private property are fully appreciated, allowing people’s natural
incentive to care for their own property to reduce the need for collective ownership and control
of resources and enterprises,” the authors assert.43 Here, authority functions in a relationship
between a user (humanity) and the thing used (the earth). Much like the benevolent paternalism
of some slave-masters over their slaves, there is an element of “caring” here, but it is caring for
the purpose of extraction of benefits.
A Sabbatical approach to authority is much different. As understood by the Jewish and
Christian traditions Heschel and Moltmann draw from, and as articulated through image of
healing, such authority must work to restore the inherent dignity, well-being, and independence
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of earth. On this basis, we should approach climate change with a healing mindset, treating the
planet with the same sovereignty Jesus used in healing lepers and demon-possessed persons.
On the same note, this approach mandates that human-to-human authority should be
carried out with a similar approach to dignity and freedom. This means that efforts to address
climate change should consider how those most threatened by the crisis can be aided. Climate
change policies should be aimed at increasing the freedom of these marginalized persons. This
will mean reducing the freedom of those who exploit the environment, but only insofar as is
necessary to create a situation of “letting be” between humans and nature.44 In the final,
concluding chapter, I will suggest ways in which a Sabbath that illustrates this healing authority
could function.
Philosophical Approaches to Inoperative Authority
The concept of inoperativity developed in chapter 2 adds important dimensions to a
theory of human authority. As we saw, Lacoste’s phenomenology of worship depicts human
beings in an inoperative relationship to the Absolute. If liturgy is the model for how the Absolute
is sovereign over the worshipper, Lacoste envisions a type of sovereignty characterized by
openness between them. Worship accomplishes nothing, indicating that the deity worshipped
transcends the boundaries of human action. For this reason in liturgy, a person “refuses to
participate in the dialectics that make up history.”45 Master and slave, in Lacoste’s framework,
may rest together, pointing to a Sabbatical kind of existence in which hierarchy subverts itself.
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Agamben develops this approach in a similar yet different way, focusing on the
“biopolitical machine” which functions through a hierarchical separation between zoe and bios.
Sovereign authority, for Agamben, declares a distinction between these forms of life and
preserves the domination of one over the other. The type of inoperativity Agamben characterizes
as “messianic” would suspend these categories, creating a “division of the division.” It would
create a space for “whatever” being—ontology of the human and the natural that would not
collapse them together, but would not insist on the strict classifications that classical western
theological approaches have long cherished. Human authority would no longer base itself on the
enforcement of divisions. Using Agamben’s work, I have argued that Sabbath could create a
space for this imagery of the human to be realized.
Building on the approaches of Lacoste and Agamben, it seems that a Sabbath could
create dramatic alterations in the entire debate over human authority in relation to climate
change. The reason for this is that Lacoste and Agamben challenge the conceptual field in which
this debate is carried out. To see why this is the case, consider once again the Cornwall
Declaration. The authors of the document repeatedly use the preposition “over” to describe the
relationships between God, humans, and the earth. The document’s summary statement of beliefs
begins by asserting the following: “1. God, the Creator of all things, rules over all and deserves
our worship and adoration.”46 At first glance, this theological and liturgical assertion seems to fit
oddly in the flow of the document. What does “worship and adoration” of God who is “over all”
have to do with ecological policies?
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The answer quickly becomes apparent when we read the next few lines, one of which
begins, “Men and women were created in the image of God, given a privileged place among
creatures, and commanded to exercise stewardship over the earth.” Once again, notice the key
preposition “over.” The document’s argumentation appeals to a hierarchy of being, in which God
rules over humans who exist for God’s glory, and humans rule over nature. Nature is to humans
as humans are to God. Authority, in this scheme, is a function of these strict categories, which
are preserved through the mechanism of glory.
What happens if these categories are rendered inoperative through a “messianic”
Sabbath? Such a time would challenge the hierarchical designations of “divine,” “human,” and
“natural.” As tools of language, these designations would still exist. Humans would not become
indistinguishable from frogs. What would change is the significance of these designations for
authoritative governance. Frogs would not exist for the glory or utility of humans. The
connection between them would be a space of “letting be.” In Agamben’s terms, there would be
“intimacy without relation.”47
This philosophical Sabbath might sound like it would result in an apathetic approach to
nature, but the result could be a greater appreciation for the natural world.48 This type of
appreciation would be different from the typical approach of romantic “nature appreciation,”
which tends to posit nature as a separate, discrete object, living out an identity beneath human
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beings. We confine nature to parks and forest preserves, separating our “natural” worlds from
49

our properly “human” worlds. The inoperative Sabbatical mindset, by contrast, would suspend
the categorization. This would create a perspective about nature that creates a different kind of
“closeness” or authoritative nexus between the human and the natural.
To give a personal illustration of this, when I moved from rural Michigan to Chicago, I
took it for granted that I was leaving “nature” behind to move to the city. But, as I currently sit
looking out the window at my surrounding urban landscape, I realize that nature is not separable
from the human. The greenhouse gasses emitted in Chicago will not stay in Chicago. The city’s
atmosphere is the world’s atmosphere. Human beings cannot claim separate spaces that do not
impact nature, and then engage in biopolitics from a distant vantage point. Sharon Delgado calls
this orientation shift “awakening to who we are,” and claims it is a crucial precursor to any
ecological change.50
Notice, it is significant that I did not come to this realization until I looked out my
window. That is to say, I did not come to terms with my overarching position of unity with
nature until I was inoperative. Only in a time of passivity before the world could the carefullyconstructed classification system monitored by biopolitical management dissolve.51 Without a
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Sabbath, the pace of frenetic human activity encourages a latently top-down hierarchical
perspective of authority over nature.
This is true even for those whose occupations or lifestyles put them in direct contact with
the natural world. For example, many people, frustrated by life in artificial urban landscapes,
relocate out of the city into rural areas, seeking greater “closeness” with nature. Such efforts,
admirable as they sound, often entail modifications to the natural world that may be more
damaging to the earth than actions carried out by typical urban dwellers. An American in a rural
home might use larger amounts of fuel to heat a larger living space, or drive longer distances in a
larger vehicle for commuting. The constant work necessary to maintain a rural life may
paradoxically cause a person to authoritatively dominate nature, rather than appreciate it.
This suggests that the solution to the cold-hearted attitude displayed by human beings
toward nature—a sinister mindset easily blamed for climate change—might not be countered
simply by increasing romantic appreciation of nature, but rather through the openness of
Sabbath.52
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Practical Approaches to Inoperative Authority
As the most cursory observation of political life will show, authority functions through
rituals. Particularly in religious contexts, rituals serve to magnify the authority of the deity and
remind worshippers of their subservient place before the deity. (This is in part why Lacoste’s
analysis of the inoperativity at the heart of liturgy is so groundbreaking.) As shown above with
reference to Agamben’s work, a ritual that commands inoperativity may be a further instance of
sovereign authority, or it may be “messianic” event—a ritual that brings about a suspension of
sovereign authority.
As shown in chapter 3, Rav Kook and Roberto Goizueta represent two different but
complimentary approaches to the second type of inoperativity. Kook’s understanding of the
authority of shmita gives a practical example of an authority structure that can suspend itself.
The heter mekhira was not a means of stifling shmita, but of bringing it to its ultimate fulfillment
by making space for the flourishing of the people and the land. Through its suspension, shmita
would reveal that its authority did not exist for itself, but for the sake of “use.” According to
Kook, using the authority structure in this way would culminate in a mystical transformation of
the soul of the nation. By advocating for the heter mekhira, Kook gave an illustration of the early
Jewish and Christian idea that “the Sabbath was made for human beings, not human beings for
the Sabbath.” Ritual authority always has an extrinsic purpose.
Goizueta offers a much different perspective, which at first seems to contradict Kook’s.
For Goizueta, ritual is an end in itself. One does not “use” a fiesta to make the world a better
place. Of course, as argued in chapter 3, there is no contradiction here. Goizueta cautions against
the use of a ritual to create change only in order to preserve the inherent inoperativity of the
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ritual. A ritual functions by allowing the participant to simply experience the new world of
justice and peace that is being created. For this reason, the authoritative power of the ritual does
not operate to accomplish an external purpose (even though, at a larger level, it does, because it
restructures human being in the world).
Combining the insights of Kook and Goizueta, one could argue that the authority of
inoperative rituals such as Sabbath for addressing climate change works through an affirmation
of the intrinsic value of a certain kind of life. This type of ritual would draw together the main
ideas we have seen in the biblical traditions and philosophical analyses examined above. A
sabbatical authority would create ways of being in the world that are healing and restorative
precisely by appreciating the intrinsic value of people and the earth—not seeing it as a means to
something else that is valuable for human beings. Such an authority structure would use neither
human beings nor nature, and precisely by doing so it could practically be “used” to create a
more just, sabbatical world.
The weekly Sabbath is the ideal ritual for addressing the authority problem in ecology
because it practically suspends the means-end structure of most forms of authority. Sabbath, as a
space for letting things be, imposes only that type of authority that is necessary for preserving the
inoperativity of everyone (and everything) involved. One does not keep a Sabbath “for” the
Earth, as if Sabbath were simply a means to ecological prosperity. At the same time, however, it
would not be Sabbatical to deny the earth the capacity to have a Sabbath. In this way, Sabbath
challenges us to find a type of life in which all can rest, without coercion or force.
A key factor in creating this Sabbatical approach to climate change is the importance of
community. This is a central feature of the type of inoperativity Kook and Goizueta develop, and
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one without which no true Sabbath is possible. The reason Kook supported the heter mekhira
was that it protected the viability of the community. The reason Goizueta argues that fiesta is an
end in itself is that it arises in and through community. Without a communal context for
inoperative rituals, the authority behind them can easily become distorted into a sovereign power
over others. If I tell someone that he or she may not drive a car on a particular day, I impose my
sovereign authority on that person. If the person cannot survive without driving on that day for
economic reasons, my sovereign power puts that person in danger. If, however, we are part of a
care-giving community with a common inoperative ritual, the authority of this ritual may take
the form of a permission: You do not need to drive on a particular day, because it is not
necessary. In other words, the community creates a form of life that enables earth-benefiting
behavior, rather than prohibiting earth-harming behavior.
The creation of communities of this type is an important and highly overlooked
contribution to efforts for combating climate change. In a largely individualistic society—such as
the United States—habits of moral restraint are difficult to develop outside of communities in
which those practices are workable.53 This is why moral exhortations about using less in order to
halt climate change do not go far unless they are given in contexts where a community is present
to help carry them out.
At the same time, communities themselves cannot be formed without shared rituals that
enable them to live life together. This is a major part of Goizueta’s argument. Here a ritual such
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in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), and more recently Jonathan R. Wilson,
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as Sabbath becomes pivotal, because it contains a form of life that may inherently oppose climate
change, and it also helps to structure a community that (un)works together to accomplish the
same goal. This is the same dynamic that motivated Kook to defend the heter mekhira.
Ultimately, Kook wanted to see the land governed in a fully Sabbatical way, in which it would
gain complete rest every seven years. But in order to make that happen, a community needed to
flourish within it, and this required a “suspension of the suspension.” The authority of shmita
could only work through community.
Along the same lines, an ecological Sabbath ritual needs community in order to realize
itself. However, there is a benevolent, gracious circularity in this type of ritual. Sabbath can only
be kept through communities, but Sabbath-keeping also draws communities together and holds
them in place (through shared space, food, accountability, and so on). It thus contains an
authority structure within itself. In this way, Sabbath mirrors the reality of divine grace in
Christian tradition, which requires an active response by the human subject, but is itself also the
source of that response. This is perhaps why the author of the book of Hebrews uses Sabbath as a
model of “entering” God’s grace.54 Like Jesus’ healing acts, which “commanded” individuals to
be made whole, Sabbath manifests an enabling authority. To borrow a phrase from Augustine, it
“grants what it commands.”55

Hebrews 4:9-11 reads: “Therefore, a Sabbath rest still remains for the people of God. And whoever
enters into God’s rest, rests from his own works as God did from his. Therefore, let us strive to enter into that rest,
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At this point, a question still remains: Even if Sabbath is an authority of letting be that
works to create healing through a new evaluation of humans and earth, does it nevertheless
involve some type of coercion? Before concluding with a brief description of a climate-healing
Sabbath based on these ideas, it is crucial to answer this question.
Sabbath Politics and Coercion
As mentioned above, it seems impossible to address the problem of climate change
without some type of coercive politics. Human beings do not naturally stop using earth’s
resources, and our near-sightedness about the climate problem only adds to our inherent cupidity.
If, as argued above, Sabbath may be crucial in changing our views of human identity and
authority, we might ask whether it must be used to force people to stop.
Clearly, as seen in chapter two, such a Sabbath would not fulfill the requirements of
Agamben’s “messianic” Sabbath. It would constitute an act of sovereign power, leading not to
genuine rest but to the tense peace of hegemonic control. The Sabbath rest that brings in a
transformed soul may only be offered and freely chosen. That being said, there is a way in which
I will argue it is possible for Sabbath to be understood as a politically-applicable command,
coming from a sovereign power.
This sovereign enforcement of Sabbath is necessary in the following sense: we must view
Sabbath as an absolute divine requirement. At first, this stipulation appears to contradict what
was argued earlier—that Sabbath should not justify itself as an operative worship practice

argue that in Augustine’s thought, grace functions as a power that enables freedom. And this freedom,
paradoxically, functions through a type of inoperativity: “Movement from velleity to true freedom (posse) is not
attained by an assertive clenching of fists and a stiff upper lip, but by letting go. Vulnerability, powerlessness is at
the heart of the power that is freedom.” (Duffy, Dynamics of Grace, 100).
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directed to God. But there is a fruitful paradox here. It is true that Sabbath does nothing for God.
At the same time, God needs and commands our Sabbath. The paradox emerges from the fact
that a Sabbatical God needs and desires our freedom and the freedom of the earth. And without
divine command, this freedom will not exist, because others will attempt to take it from us or
from the earth.
We see this paradox in the story of the Exodus from Egypt, specifically in the ongoing
debate of Moses with Pharaoh. As Walter Brueggemann points out, this narrative is the essential
background for understanding Sabbath, which is why Brueggemann claims Sabbath must
incorporate, or be viewed as, a form of resistance.56 According to the narrative, the Israelites
“groaned under their bondage” working for Pharaoh, and God “heard . . . and God knew”
(Exodus 2:23-25). The story establishes that God’s concern for Israel motivates God to seek their
freedom.57 Yet, when Moses and Aaron speak to Pharaoh on God’s behalf, Moses’ argument is
perplexing:
Afterwards Moses and Aaron went to Pharaoh and said, ‘Thus says the LORD,
the God of Israel: Let my people go, that they may hold a feast for me in the
wilderness.’ Pharaoh answered, ‘Who is the LORD, that I should obey him and let
Israel go? I do not know the LORD, and I will not let Israel go.’ They replied,
‘The God of the Hebrews has come to meet us. Let us go a three days’ journey in
the wilderness, that we may offer sacrifice to the LORD, our God, so that he does
not strike us with the plague or the sword.’ The king of Egypt answered them,
‘Why, Moses and Aaron, do you make the people neglect their work? Off to your
labors!’ Pharaoh continued, ‘Look how they are already more numerous than the
people of the land, and yet you would give them rest from their labors!’
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Even though God’s purpose in sending Moses and Aaron is to free Israel from sovereign
oppression, they do not make a humanitarian case for this cause. Instead, they confront Pharaoh
by telling him that Israel has a strictly theonomous, or divinely-ordained obligation to cease
working.58 Israel must hold a “feast” in the wilderness. The word for feast here (hagag) is the
same word used to describe the mandatory religious festivals such as the feast of unleavened
bread, Pentecost or “the feast of harvest” (Shavuot), and the feast of booths (Sukkoth).59 These
feasts were times of inoperativity, of rest.60 As the prophets noted, they had a humanitarian
purpose, without which they would be worthless. However, Moses and Aaron do not specify this,
even implying that God will punish them for failing to rest. Why?
One explanation is that Moses and Aaron are bluffing. Perhaps, as Nahum Sarna argues,
this so-called “feast” is simply a cunning way to sneak out of Egypt, and claiming divine
authorization for this “feast” gives weight to the argument.61 (Perhaps a good analogy for this
would be the strategy of avoiding a troublesome social engagement such as an office party by
erroneously claiming that one’s spouse would be unhappy if one attended.) There is some truth

As Cornelis Houtman observes, “Moses and Aaron mean to say that they make the request only for
religious reasons, that they are under enormous pressure and have no option but to ask Pharaoh for permission.” See
Cornelis Houtman, Exodus, vol. 1, Historical Commentary on the Old Testament (Kampen: Kok Publishing House,
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to this explanation. The overarching goal of the engagement with Pharaoh was not to merely take
a religious vacation in the wilderness, but to actually escape from bondage. Nevertheless, what
Moses and Aaron say regarding the feast in the wilderness is not false.62 Israel is called to
celebrate festivals—but their feasting and their escape are one and the same. This is why the
Sabbath becomes a permanent sign of Israel’s liberation. As Goizueta would likely point out, the
Sabbath and the feasts were analogous to fiesta—not a means to liberation, but the reality of
liberation itself.
Because God demands Israel’s relief from oppression, God demands a feast. The divine
imperative is needed because without it Israel will stand alone against the domineering power of
Pharaoh. By appealing to divine authority, Moses and Aaron change the dynamics of the
dialogue. It is no longer the Israelites against Pharaoh; now, as Carol Meyers observes, “God and
Pharaoh are in a power struggle.”63 If Moses and Aaron had said, “Our people are tired and need
a break,” their case would have gone nowhere. As the passage shows, even with their appeal to
divine authority Pharaoh still detects the ultimate aim and responds accordingly: “Why, Moses
and Aaron, do you make the people neglect their work? . . . you would give them rest from their
labors!” Pharaoh has no interest in relieving the Israelites—overwork is built into his economic
system. Only the intervention of what Benjamin would call “divine violence”—a Sabbath of
forced inoperativity—will counter his oppressive sovereignty.64

Even Sarna admits that “strictly speaking, the pretext that is given to the king is the truth, for earlier, in
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Benjamin contrasts “mythical violence,” which preserves the power of law in a bloody way, with “divine
violence, which is done for the sake of the living. The worker’s strike may be a form of this violence, for although it
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For this reason, inoperativity can and should be a matter of divine command. The
“pharaohs” of the modern world—the capitalist imperatives to ceaseless production and
consumption—do not respond to private, personal resolutions. Saying, “I need rest” will not
carry weight against a system that tells me what I need. In a heavily market-controlled, social
media-driven society, human beings cannot step outside the matrix of operative processes at will.
Even vacations become alternative means to further economic boons—as well as exhausting
ways of personally fulfilling one’s production-oriented identity, while leaving an enormous
carbon footprint. Only explicit reference to sovereign authority enables inoperative individuals to
confront this system with a different form of life.
The primary way this happens is through community. Inoperativity that takes place only
in individual spaces could succumb rapidly to market forces and the pressures of employers and
competitive associates. This is why Sabbath should be practiced in a community that provides
accountability and motivation. Sabbath-keeping communities are the means by which Sabbath
“functions” politically, defending the rights of those persons denied inoperativity through
Pharaoh-like forces. Such communities also offer a corrective to the wider world, challenging it
with the liberative implications of Sabbath. By incarnating a divine imperative to stop, a Sabbath
keeping community becomes, in Carl Raschke’s phrase, “a certain agency that has the force of
God behind it.”65 The Sabbatical community envisioned here is different from the type of

does nothing (it is not a violent act in the sense of taking life) it suspends the current legal order. See Walter
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community Raschke proposes, because his community is visibly “operative,” while this is a
community that does nothing—or lets be.66 Nevertheless, the Sabbath-keeping community is
clearly an “insurrectionary force” in the sense that it creates a break in the standard political
framework.
In this sense, we may posit the necessity of a sovereign authority that tells Pharaoh-type
oppressors to permit rest for human beings and the earth. This Sabbatical sovereignty is different
from other kinds of sovereignty because instead of initiating a rupture in the political order for
the sake of increased covetousness of space (Heschel), the Sabbatical sovereign opens potential
for human beings and the earth to simply be. Any sovereign power who inhibits human
flourishing through the command of a state of exception is thus not a Sabbatical sovereign. The
types of authoritative commands issued from a Sabbatical sovereign must take the form of
permissions—cessations of activity for the sake of letting people free.
How would this logic of sovereignty apply to the situation of climate change and the calls
for authority needed to curb it? If inoperativity is necessary for halting the steady progression of
global warming, a Sabbatical authority would look for ways to enable people to be free for rest.
Forcing people to rest would not work. An effort to construct any type of “blue laws” shutting
down businesses on certain days would only harm those businesses and the people working for
them, as well as poorer people struggling to survive in neighborhoods where such businesses

Raschke draws on an interpretation of Augustine’s Civitas Dei to argue for a type of church that
constitutes itself as an alternative, “insurrectionary” force that interrupts the politics of the state. This community is
represented by “the saints.” As he puts it, “We live at a time when the baton of political theology passes to the
saints, the revolutionary saints, the Christian insurgents, the visible signs of the operative and indefensible force of
God” (Raschke, Force of God, 169). Although Raschke denies that this mentality leads to any form of
“triumphalism,” it is difficult to see how such an insurrectionary force will not lead to a mirror image of the state
force it aims to interrupt.
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operate. The inoperativity that would result would be a minor inconvenience to wealthy people,
but would come at a cost to the most vulnerable.
By contrast, a Sabbatical authority would “let be” by focusing on first providing people
with the means necessary to rest. An economy that requires many single-parents to work
multiple jobs per week in order to survive, curtailing the possibility of meaningful rest, is
inadmissible. A Sabbatical approach to climate change would thus begin by asking what could
be done to ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable have access to the resources they need for
well-being.67 Only after this step is taken could there be any hope of terminating or reducing
behaviors that require greenhouse gas emissions. Authority would exist not to make such people
rest, but first to assert that they must be permitted rest.
This distinction between forcing rest and allowing rest is vital, but it might seem to
collapse upon close investigation. Like Moses and Aaron before Pharaoh, Sabbath-keepers today
may validate their climate-protecting inoperativity by claiming that God requires a Sabbath—
that they are commanded by divine authority to rest. The important point is only that the
command ultimately translates into an authoritative intervention on behalf of the poor. Here it is
vital to recall that in both versions of the Sabbath command legislated in Exodus 20 and
Deuteronomy 5, the imperative to provide rest is directed explicitly to those who own “gates,”
property, servants, and livestock. The authority of Sabbatical politics leverages itself first on
people who hold power over others.
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In the context of climate policy, this would validate what some economists call “selective
degrowth”—methods of reducing greenhouse gas emissions that may reduce economic gains, but
do so in a way that improves the well being of poorer individuals within the grand scheme.68 For
example, climate change policy can begin by reducing work in certain toxic, high-end fields
(such as oil refineries) and open up other work areas that benefit poorer communities, such as
investing in building newer, energy-efficient infrastructure.69 The “rest” of this economy would
not be imposed on those for whom unemployment is particularly harmful.70
Sabbath changes authority structures by orienting them toward permissions—maximizing
the freedom of those oppressed by sovereign powers. In answer to the question of whether
Sabbath may be politically imposed in order to address climate change, we may answer “yes and
no.” No, Sabbath cannot be legislated as a ritual in which all must participate. This would violate
its essence as an institution of freedom. On the other hand, yes, those who would forcefully
maintain a state of perpetually accelerating activity must be forced to provide rest for those who
work. This means that although no one may be coerced into resting on the Sabbath (just as no
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one may be “coerced into being human”), coercive force may be employed to prevent authorities
from suppressing the Sabbaths of others. This provides a “Sabbatical” ground for challenging
economies in which constant work is necessary to survive. For example, a business that pays a
wage so low that two such jobs would be necessary to survive (or maintain a family) in a
particular city or region could be directly suppressing the Sabbath-keeping of others.71
Legislation aimed at addressing this problem would be “Sabbatical.” The Earth’s Sabbath may
also be infringed upon in similar ways, and warrant interventions (such as restricting the use of
certain kinds of motor vehicles or limiting emissions at certain times). I will speak more about
this in the next chapter.
The question of whether force may be used in Sabbath taps into an ancient, ongoing
tension in theology between divine grace and human works. If Sabbatical “force” is ultimately
the work of divine grace, one must ask what role humans play in experiencing this grace.
Stephen Duffy argues, along with most liberation theologians, that grace can be understood
personally, socially, and at a transcendent level.72 Sabbath clearly is a form of grace that operates
at all levels, including the social/political. However, this means there must be the possibility of a
type of “political Pelagianism” in Sabbath-keeping in which human beings attempt to force a
Sabbatical reality into existence, apart from grace.73 Duffy argues that it is possible to think of

I make this statement with a tentative “could be” because there might be mitigating factors explaining the
low wage. For example, the wage might be low because the overall economy is depressed to such an extent that this
wage is the highest the employer could conceivably pay. This could occur in a region undergoing a natural disaster
such as a drought or famine, or recovering from war. In these types of emergency situations, a low wage might not
be directly anti-Sabbatical.
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I use the term Pelagianism here in a loose sense, since the proper definition of the term is slippery.
Historically, Pelagianism referred to the teachings of the eponymous layman whose ideas found expression in works
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grace working “through” human actions for liberation (which would include Sabbath). This
74

makes applying the term “Pelagian” to specific patterns of action incredibly difficult. Still, it
seems clear that human beings can oust grace from Sabbath by forgetting that it is an institution
of letting-be, a force of passivity, the ultimate goal of which is freedom. In the context of
combating climate change, Sabbath is simply one way human beings and Earth can dwell
together freely. There is a continual tension in this freedom between grace and human response.
This is why a coercive effort to Sabbatically liberate those who are controlled by the sovereign
domain of “thinginess” must constantly be vigilant lest it slip into a sovereign, dominating mode
itself.
The way to avoid this negative form of sovereignty in Sabbath is to constantly keep in
mind the nature of Sabbath itself—rest. This means focusing our attention on providing rest for
those suffering the most from the ravages of industrial human activity. There is a sovereignty
involved in Sabbatical political theology, but it is a sovereignty exercised for the poorest of the

of Julian of Eclanum, whom Augustine fervently opposed. The term is now used generally to denote “worksrighteousness” or the view that human beings are essentially good and may save themselves through their own
efforts, apart from grace. That this is actually what Pelagius thought is doubtful, as scholars note. See B.R. Rees,
Pelagius: Reluctant Heretic (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1988). Some contemporary political theorists use the term to
describe a progressive view of the world which believes human beings hold the capacity to create ideal (or at least
ever-improving) political structures. Nicholas Rengger points out that there are also political “anti-Pelagians” who
cast aspersions on progressive theorists, claiming their ventures are inherently hubristic. See Nicholas Rengger, The
Anti-Pelagian Imagination In Political Theory and International Relations: Dealing in Darkness (London:
Routledge, 2017). Rengger’s depiction of these anti-Pelagians in political theology is rather gloomy and possibly
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earth, and thus for the earth itself. As Delgado observes, “Justice for people and justice for the
earth go together.”75
Conclusion
The type of inoperativity charted in the first three chapters of this dissertation holds
immense significance for addressing political challenges. This chapter has shown how
inoperativity could confront one central political problem—that of climate change. Our current
ecological impasse emerges from human concepts of identity and authority; and Sabbath-keeping
has the potential to alter these concepts by creating a different form of life. This type of Sabbath
abrogates human identity distinctions vis-à-vis Earth, and reorients our concept of authority from
coercion to “letting be.”
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the idea that Sabbath may play a role in
addressing climate change is hardly one that I have pioneered. Several contemporary Jewish
thinkers have issued calls for an implementation of Sabbath as an ecological form of healing. In
the latter part of the last century, Norman Lamm exhorted ecologists to envision the ideal human
future as a time of perpetual Sabbath, grounded in a distinctive “Jewish eschatology” which
would be “not a progressively growing technology and rising G.N.P., but a peaceful and
mutually respectful coexistence between man and his environment.”76 Jeremy Benstein has urged
that Sabbath might create a counteracting spiritual force to human control of nature, realized
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through purposeful non-intervention in the world. David Seidenberg has called for a Sabbath
77

understood through the uniting impulse of kabbalistic tradition. Through this lens, he frames it as
a “rehearsal for living sustainably and justly in relation to the Earth and all her species. When
one rests on Shabbat by refraining from all the categories of work defined by rabbinic tradition,
one effectively relinquishes the power to manipulate the environment.”78 Seidenberg thus finds
Sabbath to be the climax of human-nature unification which he grounds in kabbalistic teaching.
At a more practical level, prominent Jewish historian and activist Jonathan Schorsch, to give one
example, has argued that a traditional rabbinic form of Sabbath observance could be utilized
across monotheistic traditions as a time of earth-rest:
In theory, more maximal Shabbat observance could produce a 14.3% (oneseventh) reduction in carbon emissions without additional spending, new
technologies, or unintended environmental consequences—one day out of seven
where emissions are nearly eliminated. Observing a truly full weekly Shabbat,
“doing nothing,” as it were, offers an effective action that one can take now to
help heal our environment. Since the heavily environmentally damaging
“developed” world is made up mostly of monotheists, the impact of eliminating
most emissions once weekly would be particularly important.79
By a “more maximal Shabbat observance” Schorsch means a form of Sabbath-keeping governed
by rabbinical principles (particularly the prohibition on making a fire on the Sabbath). These are
guidelines that many Reform Jews and Christian Sabbath observers do not follow. Admittedly,
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See David Benstein, The Way into Judaism and the Environment (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights
Publishing), 182-188.
David Morevach Seidenberg, Kabbalah and Ecology: God’s Image in the More-than-Human World
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), n. 1039.
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Jonathan Schorsch, “The Sabbath in an Era of Climate Change: An Ancient Jewish Practice May Help
Save Us All,” Tablet, February 4, 2020, https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-life-and-religion/297781/the-sabbath-inan-era-of-climate-change.
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the practical possibilities Schorsch envisions are highly idealistic, perhaps absurdly so (though
he is aware of this). Nevertheless, his proposal offers something lacking in many texts of
religious ecological ethics: a concrete plan of action. Sermons, religious education courses, and
small-group consciousness-raising studies can only go so far in fighting a nemesis as farreaching as climate change. Sabbath offers an approach that, as Schorsch notes, impacts oneseventh of human existence.
Of course, these outcomes are far from guaranteed, because the way religious rituals are
practiced often differs greatly from the ideal. It is not clear if sabbatarian communities, even
“maximal” ones, will choose to find in their ritual the ethical significance I have described here.
Part of this challenge arises from the fact that ecologically-friendly Sabbath practices can hit
practical roadblocks because they may require enormous life changes in order to maintain
longstanding traditions. For example, many orthodox Jewish congregants refrain from driving on
the Sabbath because this violates the principle of not lighting a fire on the Sabbath. But these
communities also have a longstanding tradition of attending synagogue on the Sabbath. This
necessitates living within walking distance of the synagogue. However, if another religious
community were to advocate not driving on the Sabbath (when this has not been a traditional
requirement of this community before), this would only be possible if congregants who live far
from the synagogue/church/meeting house ceased attending, or moved closer to the building. It is
highly unlikely that communities would make such a massive change. I will try to partly address
these and other practical challenges in the next chapter.

193
Also, in the United States at least, there is a strong taboo against recognizing the political
ramifications of religious rituals, or even the overlapping concerns of ritual and politics.80 Part of
this taboo arises from the positive caution we found in Goizueta’s work against making religious
rituals instruments or political tools. Still, it is important for theologians and ethicists to
recognize that Sabbath has the capacity to help meet the challenge of climate change.
The analysis I have offered here could also be applied to other rituals of inoperativity. I
have chosen Sabbath because of its historic, central significance in both Judaism and
Christianity, as well as the time commitment involved (one-seventh of human existence). But
other practices such as fiesta, the Christian and Jewish holidays, or Muslim times of prayer or
fasting (such as Ramadan), not to mention various meditative or celebrative practices in eastern
religions, traditional European religions, and indigenous American and Australian religions also
say a great deal about human identity and authority, and could be immensely relevant to the
problem of climate change. Of course, the contributions offered by each ritual would not be the
same as those of the Sabbath, but—as we have seen with shmita and fiesta—the differences
could be complimentary.
Although the value of Sabbath as a climate-healing practice should be clear, I have not
said much about the specific elements of such a practice. In the concluding chapter of this
investigation, I will briefly lay out a few such elements, which correspond to the two facets of
the climate problem analyzed here: identity and authority.

80
On occasions when teaching undergraduates, I have pointed out the political significance of a religious
idea or practice, only to have students react in disbelief that politics and religion could have anything to do with each
other. As popular as political theology may be in certain sectors of the academy, my sense is that the basic premise
of political theology is still very foreign to many people at the non-specialist’s level.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
THE CLIMATE HEALING SABBATH
The paradox at the core of this dissertation—that ritual inoperativity accomplishes
something immensely significant—should be clear at this point. If a ritual such as Sabbath can
dramatically alter human conceptions of identity and authority, this constitutes nothing less than
a transformation of political theology, inasmuch as political theory as a whole centers on
conceptions of human identity and authority. Furthermore, given that the current ecological crisis
emerges precisely from difficulties in these areas, Sabbath seems never more relevant than now.
Therefore, at the very least, if one adheres to a theological method based on “critical reflection
on praxis,” this type of ritual should become a central object of reflection.1
Notwithstanding these enormous implications, a glaring problem may immediately come
to mind: Many sabbatarians (though certainly not all) seem oblivious of the possible import of
their ritual for addressing our current climate problem. While no statistical research has been
done on the attitudes of Sabbath-keepers to environmental degradation, it would be surprising if

1

Naomi Klein seems to indirectly call for a ritual such as Sabbath to address the current crisis, because of
the lack of spiritual resources she finds available in the western world: “(T)he challenge goes deeper than a lack of
institutional tools and reaches into our very selves. Contemporary capitalism has not just accelerated the behaviors
that are changing the climate. This economic model has changed a great many of us as individuals, accelerated and
uprooted and dematerialized us as surely as it has finance capital, leaving us at once everywhere and nowhere. These
are the hand-wringing clichés of our time—What is Twitter doing to my attention span? What are screens doing to
our relationships?—but the preoccupations have particular relevance to the way we relate to the climate challenge . .
. Just when we needed to slow down and notice the subtle changes in the natural world that are telling us that
something is seriously amiss, we have sped up; just when we needed longer time horizons to see how the actions of
our past impact the prospects for our future, we entered into the never-ending feed of the perpetual now, slicing and
dicing our attention spans as never before.” See Klein, This Changes Everything, 158-159.
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such practitioners were likely to make any explicit connection between their ritual and what is
perhaps the most significant political problem of our age. For most, Sabbath is a personal thing.
Of course, a major part of the purpose of this dissertation has been to challenge the
traditional standpoint that Sabbath is merely personal. From biblical, philosophical, and practical
angles, we have seen that ritual inoperativity holds the potential to challenge political attitudes.
Sabbath issues a soft-spoken, yet powerful summons to re-think what a person is and how a
person should interact with others. It takes great mental agility to avoid thinking of these issues
as political. Still, the fact that Sabbath-keeping seems practically bracketed from politics is a
challenge. This challenge suggests a need to think about what a properly political Sabbath might
look like, especially one that is kept with the problem of climate change in mind.
This task is even more necessary because of the problem of authority and coercion raised
in the previous chapter. If, as I argued, Sabbath may be seen as a divine imperative (of the same
type as the injunction to Pharaoh to “let my people go”) we must ask, how is this imperative
enforced? If sabbatical authority works through healing, how is this healing performed? A full
exploration of the practical application of Sabbath to the current ecological crisis is outside the
scope of the present work. Empirical research would need to be conducted in which communities
actively orient their Sabbath-keeping towards the climate problem, and the process and effects of
this Sabbath-keeping would need to be documented.2 For now, my purpose is to suggest features

2

Some work has been done recently that suggests a model for this type of study. A Princeton dissertation
by Nathan Stucky involved interviewing children and teenagers in order to ascertain the impact of Sabbath practices
on their emotional lives and mental well-being. This type of work could be done with other sectors in relation to a
climate-healing Sabbath as well. See Nathan T. Stucky, “Disorienting Grace: Sabbath, Youth, and the Potential of a
Grace-Rooted Identity,” Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary (2015). For another, earlier study that focuses
more narrowly on mental health see Joyce M. Earickson, “The Religious Practice of the Sabbath: A Framework for
Psychological Health and Spiritual Well-Being,” Ph.D. diss., California School of Professional Psychology (2004).
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of a climate-healing Sabbath which would make the idea reasonable. As observed in the previous
chapter, many of my ideas are not new, but have already been suggested by Jewish practical
thinkers. I aim to build on their insights by framing this type of Sabbath observance in an
explicitly political/theological mold.
Keeping in mind the characteristics of inoperativity charted throughout this dissertation, I
will end with a few brief proposals for a type of Sabbath practice that could heal structures of
ecological illness based in negative attitudes toward human identity and authority. Following a
structure corresponding to the previous chapter, I will suggest practical ways Sabbath could
impact identity formation, and then show how this would impact conceptions of authority.
Remapping Identity through Sabbatical Community
The goal of Sabbath, as developed in this dissertation, is not merely to take time off, but
to develop a sabbatical “personhood” or identity. This means adopting a framework in which a
human being is not reducible to a producer things and a manipulator of nature, but someone
whose living is good in itself, as a form of praxis. The question is, then, how do we create such
an identity?
Human beings exist as social beings, and our conceptions of ourselves are molded by
what we do collectively.3 A Sabbath that would have the capacity to heal our frameworks of

See also the example of the Eco Synagogue research project discussed below in the section on “practical
challenges.”
3
This is a relatively uncontroversial perspective on human conceptions of identity, although it is possible to
argue that human beings may conceive of themselves as “selves” without reference to others. For an overview of the
communitarian versus individualist conceptions of selfhood see John V. Canfield, Becoming Human: The
Development of Language, Self, and Self-Consciousness (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
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identity would need to be grounded in groups of human beings who share the same vision.

4

Without this communal element, a politics of Sabbath would be impossible. As Lacoste noted,
master and slave must engage in inoperativity together if there is to be some type of political
impact. This is not easy in cultures where religious rituals increasingly adopt a private,
personalized character—where we say, “my Sabbath,” for example. Nevertheless, we must resist
this religious privatization. Sabbath cannot be just any day that I choose to take time off. It must
be a day in which human beings together seek to live a certain type of life.
To create this communal style of Sabbath, different communities would need to develop a
format of ecumenical and/or interreligious engagement in Sabbath-keeping. That is, they should
strive to find a way to celebrate this ritual together. This is easier said than done, largely because
different communities celebrate Sabbath on different days, and as noted above, it is crucial that
Sabbath not be seen as just any day. Such confessional differences have historically produced
immense dissension among Christian denominations, with different groups attempting to
persuade other groups that their day is the right one. The solution to this problem is not to insist
that Sabbath is a flexible arrangement, because that would lead to the privatization and
personalization that de-politicize Sabbath and render it impotent for creating healing. A better
approach would be for communities in which Sabbath is unimportant to join with other
communities that already have deeply-established traditions of Sabbath rest. For example, in a
town where Mennonites keep Sabbath fervently and regularly, it might make sense for another

4
Robert Johann has gone so far as to argue that any practice aiming to have a moral effect must have a
community as its locus, otherwise it becomes morally inert. See Robert O. Johann, “Person, Community, and Moral
Commitment,” in Person and Community: A Philosophical Exploration, ed. Robert J. Roth (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1975), 155-175.
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Christian group that does not concern itself with Sabbath to begin practicing it in conjunction
with the Mennonite community (or any other community present that devotes itself to Sabbath).5
As a general rule, at least in the western world, Jewish communities have put more work into
developing practical Sabbath-keeping approaches, and it is particularly important for other
traditions to dialogue with them as they develop their practice.6
When a group of people is formed who share the same motivation for developing an
inoperative identity, they should begin practicing Sabbath in a way that affirms their harmonious
relationship with nature, characterized by letting-be. For example, drawing on the common-meal
tradition (which is a key part of Christianity, and also other religions), communities might
practice a Sabbath in which they join together to eat food prepared from meatless or vegan
sources or food that is sourced locally. The key to such a sabbatical ritual would be to
characterize it not as a heuristic tool (although it would have that function) but as a way of living
together—the point of life itself. In this way, sabbatical harmony with nature would not be the

5

Here we cannot avoid commenting on the aged and ongoing Saturday vs. Sunday debate within
Christianity. What to do when certain communities feel equally adamant that one of these days should be celebrated
and not the other? Although this is a complicated issue, a healthy compromise may not be as difficult as one might
think. Scholarly consensus at present indicates that both days originally held significance for many early Christians,
with Saturday being the day of rest and Sunday being the “Lord’s Day”—or day of the Lord’s resurrection. The
Lord’s Day was “actually a day of worship for centuries before it became a day of rest” observes Horace T. Allen,
building on the classic study of the Lord’s day by Willy Rordorf. See Horace T. Allen, Jr., “The Lord’s Day as
Anticipation and Promise in Liturgy and Word,” in Sunday, Sabbath, and the Weekend: Managing Time in a Global
Culture, ed. Edward O. Flaherty and Rodney L. Petersen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 98; Willy Rordorf,
Sunday: The History of the Day of Rest and of Worship in the Early Centuries of the Christian Church (London:
SCM Press, 1968). Perhaps, given this ancient distinction between the purpose of the two days, Sunday could
become a day of liturgy (which is not necessarily restful, as any clergy person will readily aver) and Saturday could
become the day of rest? Such an approach might not work in all contexts—particularly where Sunday-worshipping
communities already have long-running practices of rest on Sunday—but it could be helpful in others.
6
This should be done while avoiding the problem of appropriation that may emerge in Jewish-Christian
relations. What this means is that although Christians may learn about Sabbath keeping from Jewish communities,
they should not seek to mimic the practices of Judaism in a way that suggests supercessionism or disrespect for the
particular origins of these practices.
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exception but the norm. In other words, the community leaders should emphasize that abstinence
from earth-harming activities on the Sabbath is not a type of “fast” or periodic withdrawal from
regular habits, but an attempt to live a new identity with new habits, and gradually to make the
rest of life conform to the new identity.
Several Jewish practitioners have considered approaches to Sabbath keeping that could
reframe human identity in relation to the earth. Dan Fink argues that a key Sabbath practice vital
to creating an improved ecological awareness is actually physically spending time in nature. Fink
cites precedents from early traditions in which rabbis would greet the Sabbath outdoors, in fields.
He also points to a kabbalist tradition that commands that Sabbath be welcomed in an open
territory.7 Although this type of practice may not be helpful in areas with cold seasons or heavily
urbanized areas, it could be useful in areas where access to nature-immersion and appreciation
are possible. As a further development of this idea, churches or synagogues located in areas with
fragile or threatened ecosystems could conduct their Sabbath communal meals out-of-doors in
these settings, as a way of resting in solidarity with the earth.
Another way communities could begin to foster a different type of human identity
through Sabbath would be by explicit acts of rest-giving. In many Western cultures, rest is
associated with increased consumption—long distance vacations, trips to amusement parks,
recreational boating. Although it is indisputable that these activities are therapeutic and “restful”
psychologically, they are forms of rest-taking, in that they benefit the consumer at the cost of

See Dan Fink, “Shabbat and the Sabbatical Year,” in Ecology and the Jewish Spirit, ed. Ellen Bernstein
(Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2000), 112-120.
7
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increased strain on earth’s resources—a point also made by Pope John Paul II in Dies Domini.8
These kinds of rest give rise to entire markets—the recreational and tourism industries—that
play a major role in increasing greenhouse gas emissions. They craft identities focused on
production—the production of fun. They also create and maintain hierarchies between people
groups, with wealthier and otherwise privileged groups gaining access to the most pristine
recreational opportunities, and their poorer counterparts being left out.
By contrast, the healing Sabbath takes a different therapeutic approach. The emphasis of
this kind of rest is on enabling whole communities and the environment itself to join in rest. This
would mean finding ways to intentionally reduce consumption of fossil fuels on the Sabbath, by
refraining from driving cars, or avoiding fuel-powered transportation entirely. The common
meals eaten within communities could also be forms of rest-giving, especially in contexts where
poorer members of the community might not have the resources to purchase more expensive
locally-grown food.9 In areas where the climate is (already) warm, religious meetings or other
events could be held outside, obviating the use of electricity for indoor lighting and airconditioning.

8

See John Paul II, Dies Domini (The Holy See: Papal Archive, 1998), 82. As Donald Conroy observes,
“Leisure and recreational activities are healthy for the human psyche; that is a given. But self-centered pleasureseeking activities which ignore the human impact on others and on the environment at large can clearly contribute to
the degradation of other persons, societies, and the delicate ecosystems which sustain life.” See Donald B. Conroy,
“Sabbath in an Age of Ecology within an Emerging Global Society,” in Sunday, Sabbath and the Weekend, 169.
9
This could help to address some of the challenges of food justice noted by Eric Holt-Gimenez, “Food
Security, Food Justice, or Food Sovereignty? Crises, Food Movements, and Regime Change,” in Cultivating Food
Justice: Race, Class and Sustainability, ed. Alison Hope Alkon and Julian Agyeman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011),
309-330.
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Cultivating a rest-giving identity would also mean extending the reach of Sabbath outside
of the boundaries of the local Sabbath-keeping community. This does not mean promoting
Sabbath-keeping in an aggressive, evangelizing sense, but rather offering rest as an opportunity.
For example, Sabbath keepers could use Sabbath-time to bring climate-friendly, healthful food to
homeless or low-income communities whose diets might otherwise consist of heavily processed
food. In cities, rest-giving could involve providing public transportation passes to those who
need them. Volunteer groups could assist in “greening” houses in older neighborhoods, by
installing solar panels and adding insulation. Other volunteers could refurbish bicycles to provide
for lower-income individuals who might want to use this supremely ecologically-efficient mode
of transportation, but not have the finances to acquire it.10 This would be “work” in the
traditional sense, but it would be the same type of work that Jesus engaged in by healing on the
Sabbath. As in Rav Kook’s understanding of the heter mekhira, these would be forms of activity
that prepare the way for greater inoperativity.
If communities embraced these practices, the hoped-for end result would not merely be
the formation of “eco-friendly” clubs or churches, but assemblies of those who seek to define
human beings differently. Presently within the western world there are socialist and free-market
based organizations that seek to combat climate change through activism and “development.”
While not condemning such organizations and their efforts, the purpose of a sabbatical
community would be to find a different framework of existence altogether, a framework that

10
In my experience working with homeless persons in Chicago, I have noticed that there are many
individuals who would like bicycles for transportation, but are unable to afford them. A further structural problem
that compounds this issue is the absence of bike lanes on most urban roads. Part of healing the earth could involve
advocating for increased bicycle accessibility in these areas.

202
embraces human inoperativity in relation to earth. The activist approach and the inoperative
approach are distinct, but not incompatible. In fact, one could argue that they may mutually
support each other. Only when human beings properly understand their identity can they work to
establish a social/political system that conforms to that identity.11
Remodeling Authority through Sabbatical Resistance
Once human beings grasp their inoperative identity through Sabbath, the question
becomes how to preserve and protect that identity. This leads us to the issue of authority. As
argued in chapter 4, Sabbath presents a different approach to authority—one oriented away from
control and toward “letting be.” A climate-healing Sabbath would need to articulate this model
of authority. In the context of the climate change problem, this type of authority manifests itself
in sabbatical resistance.
At first, this may sound like another way of describing coercive activism. Resistance may
be an effort to gain power over others. Even when the resisters are oppressed persons who seek
justice, there is always the possibility that once they gain a position of authority, they may cling
to power for its own sake and become as dominating as the system they replaced. The
sovereignty of Sabbath, as argued before, is different. Sabbath opposes any type of controlling
power, even to the point of suspending itself when necessary. This means that sabbatical

This connects to Rav Kook’s idea of a type of “soul” that is nurtured by inoperativity and enters into
other aspects of human life. Following a similar line of thought, Michael Fishbane argues that “this mode of
intentionality and attachment to God throughout the Sabbath day is not for itself alone. It must also serve lived life.
One enters the Sabbath rest in order to cultivate a mindfulness of inaction that can gradually suffuse one’s entire
consciousness (a kind of supernal soul added to our nature); and one may therefore hope to return to the workweek
with this divine gift in one’s heart.” See Michael Fishbane, Sacred Attunement: A Jewish Theology (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 127. Although Fishbane does not express it explicitly, I find that his theology of
Sabbath also embraces the paradox that I have articulated in this dissertation regarding Sabbath observance. That is
to say, Fishbane argues that Sabbath is a complete “divestment” of labor and a form of total inaction, yet it is also a
time of “intentionality” that produces specific results in transforming human beings.
11
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resistance is not an effort to make others keep a Sabbath. Although it might be tempting to think
that government enforcement of a universal Sabbath would do wonders for ecology, such a
political move would violate the essence of the day.
The authority of sabbatical resistance is thus not the same type of authority that Pharaoh
and his deities exercise. The sabbatical deity and the powers of Egypt clash precisely because
their visions of government and authority are so radically different.12 This needs to be clearly
emphasized, lest an image of “green totalitarianism” come to mind, in which religious authorities
take it upon themselves to force everyone to rest, thus wreaking havoc on independent industries
and poorer persons who must work extended hours in order to make a living.13 Authorities must
be pressured to allow others to rest, in the same way that they must be pressured to allow
freedom of speech or religion or other fundamental human rights. If resting is a fundamental part
of being human, there is no value in forcing it on people. The only imperative is to make it
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, Brueggemann is clear about this. Speaking about the identity of
the sabbatical God, Brueggemann points out that “this is the God ‘who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of
the house of slavery.” Thus the Sabbath commandment is drawn into the exodus narrative, for the God who rests is
the God who emancipates from slavery and consequently from the work system of Egypt and from the gods of
Egypt who require and legitimate that work system. It is, for that reason, fair to judge that the prohibition against the
‘the other gods’ in the first commandment pertains directly to the gods of Egypt (see Exod. 12:12) and other gods of
the same ilk in Canaan, or subsequently the gods of the great empires of Assyria, Babylon, or Persia. In the narrative
imagination of Israel, the gods of Egypt are stand-ins for all the gods of the several empires. What they all have in
common is that they are confiscatory gods who demand endless produce and who authorize endless systems of
production that are, in principle, insatiable. Thus, the mention of ‘Egypt’ brings the God of Israel into the orbit of
socioeconomic systems and practices; and inevitably sets this God on a collision course with the gods of insatiable
productivity.” See Brueggemann, Sabbath as Resistance, 2.
13

Along these lines, it deserves reiteration that the Sabbath commandments are always addressed to those
who own slaves, property, and livestock—not to those who work for such individuals. Thus the commands are about
the human responsibility to give rest, not force other people to rest. As Brueggemann observes, the command of
Sabbath is to “sponsor a system of rest that contradicts the system of anxiety of Pharaoh.” See Brueggemann,
Sabbath as Resistance, 30.
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available. Of course, doing so will inevitably create a clash of values with a system bent on
continuing activity.14
What, then, does sabbatical resistance look like? At its core, it is the same activity
mentioned above that fosters a sabbatical identity: rest-giving. Those who are keeping a climatehealing Sabbath must look at the world and ask themselves, “In what ways are people or the
Earth being barred from rest? How can that rest be restored?” The authorities in whose hands
Earth’s well-being lays—the fuel companies, transportation industries, and conglomerates of
diverse markets—do not readily surrender permission for earth’s rest. A Sabbath that aims at
healing will make space for resisting the agendas of these authorities.
In part, resistance to these ecological Pharaohs is already built into the structure of
Sabbath, in that simply by doing nothing one is defying the ceaseless market imperative to spend
more. From the perspective of a Marxist analysis, in which capitalist economies inherently
oppose any types of inoperativity and seek to fill time with as much production as possible, the
simple act of doing nothing must invite some type of inherent opposition, if only through social
disapproval.15 On this account, we could say that many sabbatarian communities engage in acts
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The fact that within the context of modernity every economic system has been focused on everincreasing productivity indicates in my mind that the potential for a green totalitarianism which uses Sabbath as a
coercive force is virtually nonexistent. Communist systems, though predicated on a philosophy which seeks to
escape labor oppression, have been just as focused on increasing production and dominating the environment as
capitalist systems. It seems straightforwardly evident that any economic system driven by acquisitiveness will find
no space for rest, and thus will have no interest in enforcing a Sabbath. I mention the potential for a sabbatical
totalitarianism only to allay the fears of those who have mentioned such a theoretical possibility, specifically many
Seventh-day Adventists, beginning with their founder Ellen G. White. On this see Dennis Pettibone, “The Sunday
Law Movement,” in The World of Ellen G. White, ed. Gary Land (Washington, DC: Review and Herald Publishing,
1987). On the various ways in which a type of totalitarian Sabbath has been predicted by Adventists see Reinder
Bruinsma, Seventh-day Adventist Attitudes toward Roman Catholicism, 1844-1965 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews
University Press, 1994).
According to Ana Levy-Lyons, “Marx describes how technology, rather than freeing us from labor,
creates an increasingly frenetic pace of work—the need to milk more and more value from a human hour in order to
15
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of resistance to ecological devastation without even being aware that they are doing this. For
example, despite the large influence of the pioneering Jewish ecology movement, it is probably
safe to say that most Orthodox Jewish communities do not walk to synagogue Saturday morning
with the conscious awareness that their refusal to drive constitutes an affront to the schemes of
ExxonMobil or BP, even though if everyone followed their example by not driving on Saturday
these companies would certainly feel a punch.
In more intentional ways, Sabbath could function as a boycott of activities and products
that prevent Earth’s rest. As mentioned above, the communal gatherings could feature food
drawn from sustainable, climate-friendly sources, which would reinforce the notion that Sabbath
is a day for creating rest not only for ourselves, but also for our atmosphere and the various
ecosystems that sustain it.16 If done well, such communal meals would also have the effect of
showing that a sustainable diet can be both enjoyable and conducive to the highest levels of
human flourishing. This is immensely important in combating culturally-induced assumptions
that certain products (such as meat) are commodities that humans cannot live without, or at least
not live comfortably. By providing people with concrete examples of climate-friendly living, a
communal Sabbath would accomplish much more than simply telling congregants to “eat less

‘close the pores’ of time.” See Ana Levy-Lyons, “Sabbath Practice as Political Resistance: Building the Religious
Counterculture,” Tikkun 27, no. 4 (Fall, 2012): 16. Levy-Lyons argues that simply by doing nothing, a Sabbath
keeper creates a culture which strangles the capitalist mindset. While I agree with Levy-Lyons’s fundamental point,
I would argue that we must involve in our Sabbath keeping a more direct challenge to systems of labor, precisely
because these systems harm and oppress others. One cannot keep a Sabbath while forgetting one’s neighbor who is
trapped in slavery. If we forget this resistance component, Sabbath runs the risk of becoming a bourgeois privilege.
16
Arguing from the common meal tradition of Eucharist described in 1 Corinthians 11, Michael Northcott
argues that just as the first Christians protested the Roman economy through their eating, modern Christians should
eat in a common way that challenges the western economy of earth devastation. See Michael S. Northcott, A Moral
Climate: The Ethics of Global Warming (London: Dartman, Longman and Todd, 2007), 232-266.
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meat.” Sabbath keepers could also make their practice a form of resistance by publicizing it—
17

making it a time of “conspicuous nonconsumption.” It would be a time of “living ‘as if.’”18 By
showing the world the value of inoperativity in the fulfillment of human life, Sabbath-keepers
would present a clear challenge to the dominant system.19
Beyond boycotts, sabbatical resistance also allows for confronting powers that enforce
the consumption status quo. The Climate-Healing Sabbath could be a day in which communities
could mobilize to protest new drilling and fracking operations, or the construction of new natural
gas pipelines.20 The rationale for this resistance is not that oil companies need to keep Sabbath.
Rather, the point is that such organizations must not prevent others from keeping Sabbath. By
continually ravaging the Earth they are causing it to face a never-ending strain, which also results
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This is an important point, because some research published by a group of Dutch scientists suggests that
public efforts to cajole meat-eaters into eating less meat because of climate change may actually have an adverse
affect, by causing them to dismiss climate science entirely. These researchers argue that efforts to reduce meat
consumption should be multi-leveled (including references to health and overall well-being). It seems that a helpful
part of such an approach to reducing meat consumption would be providing an experiential awareness that a meatfree diet can be easy and satisfying. See Joop de Boer, Hanna Schosler, and Jan J. Boersema, “Climate Change and
Meat Eating: An Inconvenient Couple?” Journal of Environmental Psychology 33 (2013): 1-8.
This calls to mind Goizueta’s “life in the subjunctive” as well as the litany of practices Anne Marie
Dalton and Henry Simmons describe in their chapter “Living ‘as if’,” in Ecotheology and the Practice of Hope (New
York: SUNY Press, 2010), 105-126.
18
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It is significant than in his ground-breaking work on nonviolent resistance as a response to climate
change, Kevin O’Brien emphasizes that one of the most important features of successful nonviolent resisters (here
he focuses on the examples of John Woolman, Jane Addams, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King, and Cesar Chavez)
is “joyful living”—“we need to enjoy good food and good jokes.” See Kevin J. O’Brien, The Violence of Climate
Change: Lessons of Resistance from Nonviolent Activists (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017),
198, 200. Any movement that seeks to resist a negative way of life by providing an alternative must demonstrate the
attractiveness of that alternative, or face popular extinction.
20

This raises the question of whether faith communities should focus on global issues (campaigning for
international treaties, for example) or address their attention to more parochial aspects of the ecological crisis
(protesting the practices of a local company). Although I do not have space to fully address this issue, I can point to
the work of Michael Northcott, who has argued that faith communities work best when they address local issues, not
to exclude broader problems, but to appeal to their most immediate range of influence. See Michael S. Northcott,
The Environment and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 323.
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in a restless existence for people living in climate-affected areas. Using Sabbath as a time for
opposing the politics of climate-oppression is thus not an act of “using religion to meddle in
politics” or violating the separation of religion and state. It is just the opposite. By their
aggressive and uninhibited domination of nature, western corporations are violating the Sabbaths
of others. How can an indigenous community in the Amazon find rest or keep a Sabbath when it
has been displaced because of deforestation or water pollution and its members have been forced
to work long hours in factories or in the same industries that destroyed their community? How
can refugees from a catastrophic draught in northern Africa be able to keep a Sabbath when their
very survival is at stake? Privileged westerners cannot keep a Sabbath authentically while
forgetting the plight of these other communities.21
Incorporating resistance into Sabbath observance may not mean directly engaging in acts
of civil disobedience or political campaigning on the day. There is a delicate balance to be
aspired to here. This balance hinges on the paradox of inoperativity—it does nothing and yet
accomplishes something. Although rest-giving is a key part of Sabbath, and this means that
Sabbath keeping should confront that which opposes rest, the seduction of “functionality” may
be difficult to resist if activism becomes the primary purpose of Sabbath. Sabbath-keeping
communities may decide that resistance should be something that happens on other days of the

21

Theologians such as Jim Antal and Larry Rasmussen have argued that earth and its resources should be
viewed as “sacramental” in a proper sense. See Larry Rasmussen, Earth-Honoring Faith: Religious Ethics in a New
Key (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 257; Jim Antal, Climate Church, Climate World: How People of
Faith Must Work for Change (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 110-111. Under this logic, acts of
defamation to the Earth are anti-religious acts. Under the same logic, any acts that systemically prevent Earth from
resting, or keep it in a state of ceaseless activity, are similarly anti-religious. This is an important point, because in a
real sense, the imperative to constantly increase production and nature-domination is also a religious imperative,
arising from the religious structure of capitalism. The ecological crisis of global warming is thus a religious conflict
writ large. The question of how to resolve this conflict deserves greater attention than I can give it here.
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week. Resisters may reference Sabbath as a reason for a particular policy of letting the Earth rest,
as did a community of Scottish Presbyterians who led a campaign against a new quarry that was
to be built on their island of Harris in the Hebrides.22 Sabbath itself may not be used as a
challenge to ecological destruction, but it could serve as a motivation for it.
The key to maintaining the legitimacy of this challenge would be to insist on the
significance of this Sabbath as an end in itself. We return here to the caution that emerged in our
analysis of Goizueta’s work: Sabbath functions to heal the planet, but only if it insists on being
truly inoperative. While emphasizing the purpose of Sabbath as resistance to carbon emissions
and other forms of ecological exploitation, we would need to remember that Sabbath is always
only about living a fully human form of life. Resistance plays a role in this, but it must never
take center stage, or turn us away from the basic practices of eating, celebrating, and resting
together. The idea of Sabbath as resistance is to complete these practices by generating the antioppressive impulse that is already contained within them.
Realistic Challenges
The idealistic practical framework I have articulated here is not without its potential
problems. Certain Jewish communities have already put “boots to the ground” (to use an
admittedly faulty metaphor for Sabbath) in developing an ecologically friendly Sabbath practice,
and future efforts in this endeavor need to take their experiences into close consideration. Jewish

According to Michael Northcott’s description of the situation, a company (Redland Aggregates) sought
to obtain a license to build a “mega-quarry” on the island, but were opposed to local residents who claimed that the
expansion of the industry in the area would disturb their Sabbath rest (their branch of Presbyterianism focuses
extensively on strict Sabbath-keeping). Although Northcott reads the scenario as an endorsement of local, or
parochial, methods in ecological resistance, it could also serve as an example of the power of rest-giving as a tool in
resistance. See Michael S. Northcott, Place, Ecology, and the Sacred: The Moral Geography of Sustainable
Communities (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 87-97.
22
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thinkers have also developed practical ways of using Sabbath to create an environmental
awareness that extends beyond the day itself.23 As already noted, at the end of the previous
chapter, it is tricky to develop a Sabbath practice that is ecologically powerful but also
practically realizable.
One of the key areas of difficulty arises from the use of technology. In a popular article,
Yonatan Neril extols the benefits of refraining from technology use on Sabbath:
Shabbat offers great potential to reduce consumption and thereby benefit the
natural world. The act of shutting off a computer or car for a day contains
environmental meaning far beyond the energy saved from not using these devices
for one day. The deeper significance of the act centers on the reorientation that
can occur from outward focus to inward focus, from reading from screens and
Blackberries to reading from scrolls and books, from communicating via
technology to communicating face to face.24
There does seem to be immense potential for a change in worldview resulting from a technologyfree day. However, as western culture’s social life continues to be embedded in technological
systems, fully removing oneself from technology may seem practically impossible, if other
aspects of Sabbath are to be maintained. To point out one instance of this, if Sabbath is to be kept
“together” in social solidarity, this requires clear communication and careful orchestration.
Today, we accomplish all these tasks through technology. If, for example, I live in an upstairs
apartment and I wish to have a group of friends come over for a Sabbath dinner, the only way

See, for example, Lydia Roussos, “Sustainable Shabbat Ideas Can Help Environment All Week,” The
Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, March 31, 2008, https://www.jewishchronicle.org/2008/03/31/sustainable-shabbatideas-can-help-environment-all-week/. Based on my own survey of research, the majority of practical reflections on
how Sabbath observance can be implemented with an ecological mindset within Judaism have been written at the
popular level. To my knowledge, no official or academic publications have been written on how to develop a
Sabbath for climate change within Judaism.
23

See Yonatan Neril, “Shabbat and Environmental Awareness: Rejuvenating Ourselves and Our Planet,”
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/shabbat-and-environmental-awareness/.
24
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they may be able to contact me to open the door is through cell-phone texting. In an urban
setting, almost any group activity requires technology if it is to be carried out smoothly.
Sabbatarians who have reasonably close immediate family may seek to spend Sabbath only with
their family, and this might be easily facilitated without cell phones. But for most single adults, a
technology-free Sabbath will be an isolated Sabbath. For such persons, a conflict emerges
between the identity-forming impact of togetherness in ecological Sabbath-keeping and the
identify-forming benefit of abstaining from technology.
Another problem concerns the nature of communal Sabbath meals. Again, Jewish
communities keeping Sabbath in an ecologically-friendly manner have already thought through
how such meals may be conducted. The Jewish environmental organization Hazon has published
a booklet giving recommendations on creating a practical form of communal meal which is also
earth-friendly.25 The authors go through recommendations of eating lower on the food chain,
choosing local produce, and being cautious of what types of dairy products and eggs to use (if
they are used at all). However, there are areas of potential difficulty that arise throughout the
booklet. One of them concerns the use of dishes. In order to avoid waste, washing dishes seems
like an obvious choice (in order to refrain from using disposable plastic).26 However, washing
dishes with hot water may violate a key Sabbath proscription for some Jewish communities.27

25

See Hazon, Hosting a Sustainable Shabbat Dinner (New York: Hazon, 2011).

For one perspective firmly against using any plastic for Jewish Sabbath meals see Raphael Zarum, “Why
Plastic Cups Should Not Be Kosher for Kiddush: Disposed Plastic Is Harming Sea Life—We Should Change Our
Habits,” https://www.thejc.com/judaism/features/environmental-responsbility-why-plastic-cups-should-not-bekosher-for-kiddush-1.467181.
26

27

The problem with dish washing for more traditional forms of Judaism is that it often involves hot water,
as well as the use of dish rags or sponges (however, washing with cold water with wire brushes may be acceptable
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Furthermore, washing dishes hardly seems restful, and leaving dishes in the sink for hours until
after Sabbath may create unnecessary stress. The Hazon authors therefore recommend using
compostable dishes and related items. But they note that these may only be eco-friendly if a
composting facility is available, and not all biodegradable items are regulated; thus companies
might not be honest about their products’ level of biodegradability.28 Thus, although the idea of
an ecological Sabbath meal may seem easy, the reality can be different.
The problem of a Climate-Healing Sabbath meal has also been addressed by a Jewish
association of environmentally-concerned synagogues called Eco Synagogue. A group of 25
synagogues affiliated with this organization who met together in May of 2018 decided to
perform a case study to discover how smoothly a “Green Kiddush” meal could be carried out. 29
The participants focused on the basics of climate-friendly food—vegan/vegetarian items, locallysourced whenever possible, use of glassware rather than disposables. Overall, their report
deemed the event a success. However, they were honest about the difficulties. These included the
fact that because no absolute “mandate” had been given to any of the families who brought food,
they could not prevent a family who wanted to bring fish dishes from doing so.30 Sometimes
arranging items with a low-carbon footprint meant driving more to bring them to the synagogues,

for some communities). See https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1232465/jewish/Can-I-wash-dishes-onShabbat.htm.
28

See Hazon, Hosting a Sustainable Shabbat Dinner, 12.

See Eco Synagogue, “NNLS Green Kiddush Case Study,” https://ecosynagogue.org/nnls-green-kiddushcase-study/.
29

30
This is a micro-level example of the problem of authority and coercion in Sabbath keeping. Because
Sabbath rest is a free decision, communities can only offer so much demanding accountability to those who wish to
keep Sabbath in a less environmentally friendly way. Thus it seems that before existing sabbatarian communities can
move toward more overtly earth-healing Sabbaths, there may need to be extensive educational work done in the
community, perhaps both at a theological and scientific level.
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a defect the organizers admitted with admirable candor. Another challenge the organizers
discovered was that not necessarily all vegetarian “green” food is particularly sustainable. A
centerpiece of most vegan meals is avocadoes, and unless one lives in warm locales with
avocado orchards nearby, avocadoes will almost always require extensive shipping.
There are numerous other complexities that could be described with keeping Sabbath
with positive ecological intent. Many of these difficulties seem like minor issues, but the plethora
of them means that tough decisions will need to be made by communities who wish to create
such a Sabbath practice. The point of citing these is not to cast a dim light on my proposal, but to
recognize that practicing this type of Sabbath in the current world will require ongoing dialogue
and innovation.
As I assess these challenges, two major pitfalls seem possible. One is excessive laxity
about the importance of insisting on earth-healing practices. When hard changes need to be made
and complexities arise, it may be tempting to cut corners. This is where a strong sense of
tradition may be helpful. The other, opposite pitfall would be a tendency toward judgmental
behavior and a hard-line stance on miniscule matters that could divide communities. It seems
evident that if a form of inoperativity that can address climate change is to gain wide acceptance,
it will need maximal unity and collaboration among people of different traditions. In particular,
because Jewish sabbatarians seem to have done the most extensive groundwork in practically
enacting ecological Sabbath practice and negotiating the difficulties thereof, Christian
sabbatarians—who seem to be lagging behind here—ought to pay close attention.
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Conclusion
The Climate-Healing Sabbath would cultivate an inoperative human identity as well as a
“letting be” model of authority through community engagement. By dwelling with others who
celebrate praxis—the innate goodness of life—Sabbath keepers would challenge the standard
mindset that gives rise to climate change. Rituals of rest-giving and resistance would gradually
create a sabbatical world within the present world. This type of Sabbath is consistent with the
paradox of inoperativity: It aims at doing nothing, but in the process accomplishes significant
political goals.
Such a Sabbath might look something like the following. The beginning of the day would
be occupied with rituals that emphasize solidarity and togetherness. For Christians, this might
include liturgies, sermons, and prayers that draw on ecological themes of wholeness and the
common good, directed toward faith in a better world. Special care should be taken to ensure that
congregants find this to be a time of joy and hope, even in the face of ecological crisis.31 These
rituals would be followed by (or integrated with) acts of resource-sharing, such as through
common meals. Here coordinators would emphasize the rest-giving and resistance aspects of
eating, using sustainable food items and making the food freely available to all who wish to
participate.32 After this, participants could spend time focusing on outward-directed rest-giving,

31

Of course, there are different kinds of hope. The type of hope emphasized here would not be the type that
looks forward to a new earth as a unilateral act of divine intervention, but a hope that summons human beings to live
the new earth now. As Jonathan Moo and Robert White point out, the biblical type of hope is always linked with
practical love. See Jonathan A. Moo and Robert S. White, Let Creation Rejoice: Biblical Hope and Ecological
Crisis (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2014), 167.
32
Even though adding a charge to the common meal would make funding it easier, this would take away
from the rest-giving aspect of the ritual. Furthermore, outsiders and persons from low-income backgrounds (the
homeless, single-caregiver families, youth, the elderly, etc) should be particularly welcome to participate, especially
since these are people for whom climate-friendly food may be least available.
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through acts of resistance to ecological domination. This would be an appropriate time for
demonstrations, protests, and other public activities raising awareness of those who are kept from
rest because of human activity. This would also be a good time for practical acts of mercy like
those mentioned above, such as repairing bicycles, tending community gardens, distributing
climate-friendly food, or otherwise acting on behalf of those negatively affected by climate
change.33 Such acts would not initially seem inoperative, but they would constitute a “suspension
of the suspension,” paving the way for rest for others. The day would conclude with more ritual
celebration, expressing joy and thanks for the goodness of life. The core theme of the day would
be an interwoven thread of gratitude and expectation. Leaders should emphasize that the day is
not a duty to be fulfilled, but an expression of the pinnacle of human existence.
As emphasized above, the day would also need to be carried out in conjunction with other
communities. For Sabbath to gain wide acceptance, some level of visibility and opportunity for
mimesis would be necessary. Sabbath, like most rituals, thrives on collaboration and cooperation.
Western culture, however, tends to privatize and individualize rituals. It is imperative for
communities to devote themselves to creating community across boundaries on Sabbath. Jewish
communities should be particular reference points to this end.
Of course, the concepts behind a Climate-Healing Sabbath are applicable in other rituals
besides the traditional Jewish or Christian Sabbath. One can easily imagine the same ideas
entering into rituals surrounding Ramadan, Christmas, or Easter. As long as human beings come

33

See examples of these types of actions in Roger Gottlieb, A Greener Faith: Religious Environmentalism
and Our Planet’s Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 186-187.

215
together in a spirit of genuine inoperativity, devoting themselves to a practice of uninhibited
“letting be,” the potential for political healing is present.
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